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ABSTRACT
How Psychotherapists Practice In the Digital Era
by Josh Weinstein
Advisor: Elliot Jurist
The digital era, marked by digital devices connected via high speed data networks, has
altered human experience in profound ways over the past 40 years. The potential for novel forms
of human relating and fulfillment of desire has led to myriad changes in behavior, thought and
unconscious activity. While many adapt or thrive in expanded reality, for some, the digital can be
context, source and/or location for psychological affliction. When those who suffer seek
psychological relief, how psychotherapists listen for, conceptualize and work with the effects of
the digital matter a great deal. While theoretical and quantitative research literature exists at a
population level, there is little study of how analytically oriented psychotherapists practice in
light of the technological world. This dissertation used an interpretive qualitative method with a
small sample (n=6) to explore in depth how analytically oriented clinicians based in New York
City in Spring 2019 and Fall 2020 are responding to this phenomena. Results suggest that
therapists tend to use existing theory and clinical methods to guide treatment, but to varying
degrees are attuned to new or extreme presentations of symptomology that finds expression in
digital modes. Younger therapists and those that include Lacan as part of their theoretical
orientation were more agile in hearing traces of the digital both in manifest and latent aspects of
patient communication and linking them conceptually to sometimes novel methods of working
with such effects. The inclusion of factors unique to the technological era in clinical training, a
treatment method for digital illness, and two novel theoretical constructs informed by the
literature reviewed and interviews, the Virtual Cathexis and Techno-shame, are proposed.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Adam Gopnik, writing in The New Yorker in 2011, created a simple, yet illustrative
tripartite classification system to review a set of new books, written by academics for general
audiences, about the effects of the Internet: “the Never-Betters, the Better-Nevers, and the EverWasers” (Gopnik, 2011). According to Gopnik’s schema, the “Never-Betters” and the “BetterNevers” were polemical and absolutist, the positive and negative ends of the spectrum, whereas
the “Ever-Wasers” were essentialists, naming the power of new technology to invariably
provoke extreme reactions that attenuate in time. Each group identified differing foci that guided
them towards distinct conclusions about the nature and impact of the new digital reality. My
intention is to highlight that divergent opinions reflect the challenge of forming an integrated
understanding of the effects of the technological world on human experience in the present
moment. Opposing conclusions are derived from distinct models of making meaning that
consider opportunity, risk and respond to change in different measure. Each position brings
different truths into focus, naming distinct features of the digital era acontextually and making
predictions about implications. The present moment may, by nature, be unknowable as a gestalt,
irreducible to broad consensus, more prone to projections of hope, fear, fantasy and wish than the
past, seen through the cool lens of history.
The digital era is one of the defining forces in the world today, unleashing change on a
scale greater than the industrial or mechanical revolutions. The global proliferation of digital
devices over the past several decades, connected via high-speed data networks, has impacted
nearly all aspects of human experience. How individuals live, work, perceive themselves and
engage in relationships has changed as our psychological and technological ecosystems have
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enmeshed. Yet, causes and effects remain to be determined; there is no conclusive perspective
capable of offering an integrated view. At the same time, individuals, operating from
fragmentary perspectives, form idiosyncratic conceptual hypotheses when interpreting their own
and others experiences of the technological world. When these individuals are psychotherapists,
how they listen for, conceptualize and work with material related to the effects of the
technological world are not just phenomenological curiosities, but also have important, direct
and indirect effects upon their patients. Paradoxically, there is little consensual understanding by
psychotherapists of this phenomenon that has a deep and pervasive impact on the very nature of
contemporary existence. Given the radically transformed, yet little understood technologically
suffused world we inhabit, it is likely that clinicians recruit their own historic and present
experience in relation to the digital era or therapeutic constructs that may not fully appreciate the
nature of these alterations and the impact they have on both patients and themselves.
Nevertheless all patients lives are touched by the digital world and therapists are making choices
about how to work therapeutically that have clinical consequences. The position of this
dissertation is that the phenomenon of how clinicians are working in light of these
transformations is necessary to study.
As a person pursuing a clinical psychology degree mid-life, with an undergraduate degree
in Computer Science, I have been living and tracking the changes that serve as the backdrop for
this dissertation over the past 40 years. Many of my life’s dramas were lived out through or in
relation to machines and their affordances. I was eager to acquire my first computer, to gain
mastery over it by learning to program. I longed for a computer of my own since a Commodore
PET computer was introduced into my 3rd grade classroom. After learning a few lines of
computer code, I programmed the machine to request the users name and offer a “personalized”
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greeting (“Hello Josh!”), and was hungry to understand more of the machine’s capabilities. The
computer was mysterious, compelling and strangely alive. I chose to invest a significant
percentage of the money received in gifts during my Bar Mitzvah into an Apple //e computer,
against my father’s doubts, using it to delve deeper into programming, learning about
subroutines and graphics. In my early adolescence I expanded my identity through exploration of
the pre-internet on-line world, connecting via a 300 baud dial-up modem to anonymous others
over a monochrome screen of text-only bulletin board systems (BBS) in the 1980s. It was a life
changing experience. At age 13 I connected with enigmatic others with “handles” such as “Lady
Hawk” or “Black Knight” outside the limits of my in-person social reach, voyeuristically reading
about philosophy, politics and most crucially, interpreting the mores of these subcultures. My
self-taught programming skills landed me my first jobs, writing software that managed financial
and employee data for local businesses as the notion of the paperless office entered popular
imagination. After college, I wrote software for an internet service provider and a large
corporation. Later, in a proto-therapeutic venture, digital video cameras and video editing
software were my professional tools for interviewing, documenting behavior, reflecting back a
narrative as a process tool aimed at supporting change in large organizations. The machine was a
rich metaphor and in therapy I’ve learned how I have used it generatively, as a refuge, to express
aggressive wishes, bids for safety and fantasies of control. I shifted from a techno-utopian
towards a skeptical dystopic position and my wish to return to graduate school was driven by a
desire to work closely with individuals on intimate matters, unmediated by the tools I once felt
necessary. I wanted to work spontaneously and accept greater interpersonal risks, without the
distancing safety net of mediation machines afforded. I, fully human, wanted to become the
instrument that I calibrated and used to bring about change. Yet, the perils of individual
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limitation and little oversight are haunting and this dissertation is perhaps a way to negotiate that
tension with the ambition of integrating past with present. Reflecting now on the process of
writing this dissertation, I believe it has shaped a more nuanced and contingent perspective on
the risks and rewards of the digital era and my own relationship to it both as an individual and a
clinician.
The principal aim of this interpretive phenomenological study is to develop an
understanding of how psychotherapists listen for, conceptualize, and work with the effects of the
technological world on psychological functioning, especially an individual’s sense of their own
and others’ minds and selves. A secondary aim is to explore how the factors of clinician age and
theory of psychological health (ego-integration vs. multiplicities within the ego) which are
hypothesized to correlate with generational effects and potential differencing tendencies in how
certain characteristics of the digital realm are conceptualized, may predict differences in the
principal aim. While there is an uptick in the number of theoretical, research, case study and
editorial writings published in the psychological, academic literature and popular press, there is
no single qualitative study that examines how analytically oriented clinicians comprehend and
work with this phenomenon. Two original theoretical ideas are offered to orient clinicians to
aspects of digital experience that may elude language in session, but may factor into a patient’s
psychic world in profound ways, and potentially offer a path for treatment.
This study interviewed psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists from the New York
City region (n=6) using a 2x2 design based on the factors of clinician age (low vs. high) and
theory of psychological health (ego-integration vs. multiplicities within the ego) in the Spring of
2019 and Fall of 2020. Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), a qualitative method, was
used to design and administer an open-ended, in-person, semi-structured interview and guide a
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hermeneutic process focused on how clinicians listen for, conceptualize and work with the
influence of technology on patient’s understanding of their own and others’ minds and selves and
the way it shapes the course of treatment. It asked therapists to reflect on their own past and
present engagement with technology and how it may interact with their clinical practices.
Subjects were recruited via direct contact. This study was based on psychoanalytic theory and
case study, psychological research literature on the impact of technology on human experience,
social psychological writings on the attribution of mind to non-human entities, the influences of
scientific psychology and artificial intelligence, philosophical theory of technology,
phenomenology and hermeneutics, and technology/media theory. The breadth of the literature
reviewed is intended to orient the reader to the many factors that have and continue to shape the
digital era. A tidal wave has been generated by many ripples and currents coalescing over more
than a century.
This IPA study aims to be part of the ongoing and emerging academic discussion about
how the technological world organizes psychological experience, its subsequent effects on
psychological functioning and how it is approached clinically. Five expected consequences of
this study will be (1) to provide an understanding of the range and depth in how psychotherapists
at this moment in time listen for, conceptualize, and work with the effects of the digital era on
patient experience, (2) to explore if and how clinician age and theory of psychological health
may mediate the primary aim, (3) to consider if alteration to or novel theory may be needed to do
justice to human experience in the digital era, (4) to recommend that a theoretically based
education about digital illness and a suggested treatment modality be included in the training of
clinicians (5) to offer theoretical constructs derived from the research that can be used to listen
for and conceptualize work with such patients.
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CHAPTER TWO
Background and Literature Review
Gopnik’s three categories can serve as a useful starting point to reflect on the range of
reactions that the technological world may invoke. For the techno-utopian “Never-Betters” the
internet is a panacea, unleashing more powerful democratizing potential than the Gutenberg
printing press, connecting people without restriction or cost, offering free and open access to
information, unleashing corporate or governmental strangleholds on distribution and
communication channels, and empowering grassroots movements to effect change on a global
scale. Other “Never-Betters,” like Andy Clark, a Professor of Cognitive Philosophy at the
University of Sussex, advance the idea that the boundaries of the mind are not located within our
body, but have always included things in the world that humans use to think with, such as
instruments to write with and books to pass knowledge down between generations;
“Contraptions don’t change consciousness; contraptions are part of consciousness” (Gopnik,
2011). Tools, even simple ones like pen and paper are not separate from our minds, but instead
are part of cyborg-humans who have been cognitively entangled in the ever-expanding web of
technology for centuries, using it to perform longer mathematical calculations than could be done
in working memory alone (Clark, 2004). From this perspective, the greater the potential of the
tool, such as machines that extend memory, perform lightning fast calculation and increase
cognitive reach, the better off we are.
In contrast, the naysayer “Better-Nevers” Gopnik argues focus on what is lost amidst the
current technological shift, including deep, sustained attention, the capacity for solitude, and
empathy. Their focus is on the dissociated, fragmented, anxious states and obsessive and
narcissistic traits that follow as individuals move from conceiving of their relationship with
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digital devices as “better than nothing” to “better than anything,” unable or unwilling to detach
long enough to engage in potentially challenging, yet meaningful, interpersonal exchange
(Turkle, 2011). There is an emphasis on the affective confusion of blurring public space with
private experience and vice versa. Concerns are raised when the compulsive need for stimulation
introduces sustained anxious states that interrupt developing relational processes and when
adolescents on the internet can’t distinguish an internal state from an external influence. For the
“Better-Nevers,” reading books and in-person conversation is more human than the psychic
realm one enters online. Our need to relate to and connect with others feeds fundamental human
requirements in ways that technology can only poorly approximate. Technology interrupts the
development of healthy and mature human processes. The “Better-Nevers” want friends over
“friending,” real interpersonal exchange over “likes,” social circles over social networks, and
whole connected people over fragmented partial attention.
The philosophically-minded third group, the “Ever-Wasers” see the nature of the conflict
between the new and the old as the status quo; they argue that it is the fact of history and nature
of existence to be shocked by technological advancement. Rather than better or worse, humanity
has a reflexive need to celebrate or cast suspicion onto the new, whether it be the Hausmannian
re-mapping of Paris in 1855, mechanical reproduction in the 1930s or television in the 1950s. It
is the unique temporal experience of endeavoring to make sense of something that is by virtue of
its impact on contemporary life, impossible to perceive as a whole. The present is overwhelmed
by the challenge of accommodating to the new technological reality. For the “Ever-Wasers,” the
influx of change brought about by the digital revolution is akin to what previous generations felt
when viewing cinema or taking a train for the first time. Just as theatergoers rushed out of the
cinema in terror when a train appeared about to stampede, or individuals in the early 19th
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century held the belief that “women’s bodies were not designed to go at 50 miles an hour,”
generating concern that “uteruses would fly out of bodies as they were accelerated to that speed,”
(Rooney, 2011) today’s anxieties follow similar patterns, and by extension, are equally without
merit. The current moment, which demands we adapt to the new, is the same as it ever was,
albeit unfolding at a more rapid pace. This group argues that the shifts underway were already in
process prior to the emergence of digital machines. Technology may amplify, but does not
fundamentally alter causes and effects of social, political or psychological changes.
Gopnik identifies one underlying explanatory factor for the “Ever-Wasers:” new
machines have historically been taken as a metaphor of the mind, from automatic looms, to
telephone exchanges, to computers. Freud’s economic drive theory was originally explained
using hydraulics as a model of the mind. Mental complexity is represented by the most
sophisticated machines of the era, inviting a misperception between the effect the machine may
have on individuals and the social world with the effect of considering one’s mind as
metaphorically represented by such a machine. Not only is the mind like a machine, but the
machine is like a mind. This can tempt distortions in either symbolic expansion or symbolic
collapse. Computers of today have storage devices which are commonly understood as
“memory,” yet function little like human memory, nevertheless, unlock a fantasy of immortality
through “backing-up” or “uploading” one’s mind into the machine. The human mind is imaged
in a networked file structure as visually depicted in mainstream operating systems.
Computational processes replace organic ones. Explicit memory is replaced by knowing where
or how to find memories. Declarative memory is replaced by procedural memory; one no longer
remembers, but knows how to find, knowing what is replaced by knowing where. At the same
time, new technology introduces a distancing factor, or has a decentering effect on human
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experience, traceable back to Descartes mind-body dichotomy, that may ironically explain the
development of the “Ever-Wasers” perspective. Haussmann's renovation of Paris, intended to
“modernize” the city was based on an aerial logic, viewed from the non-human position of the
sky looking downwards. Erased were the idiosyncratic organization of streets that had emerged
from decades, if not centuries of individuals following animal paths to get from place to place.
The effect was to impose an out-of-body, impersonal “I”, looking down from above, on top of
the individual “me” exiting solely on the ground. The new urban design, visually highlighted by
way of sight lines to landmarks and grand boulevards suggested the idea of one as a “citizen” of
Paris, while de-emphasizing the singular nature of personal experience. One was no longer a
particular individual, but instead a conscious occupant of a politicized landscape. Likewise,
mechanical reproduction removed the “aura” (W. Benjamin, 1936) that only the original work of
art could possess. Increasingly technology shifts one’s perspective outside of themselves and
encourages a depersonalized view of oneself. This decentered identity is reflected in the
centrality of the “Other” in Lacanian theory, which is proposed in the “mirror stage,” and
remains at the heart of psychic conflict throughout life.
Just as the “Better-Nevers” see the machine as “doer,” (J. Benjamin, 2004) exerting
control, exacting loss and demanding unilateral submission, “Never-Betters” are inclined to be
invigorated by introjecting the possibilities advanced technology offers as an expanded model of
the mind, and its potential for liberating political and social organization, whereas the “EverWasers” view the spectrum of reactions to the new as the underlying, stable paradigm itself,
while averting attention and meaning from personal experience.
Some Notes On The “Technological World”
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Thus far, and throughout this dissertation I will use terms like “technological world” and
“digital era” interchangeably, to refer broadly to the current landscape of digital devices
connected via high-speed data networks, with attention to how this moment is a product of trends
that have unfolded over the past four decades. It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a more
complete history, so this section is intended to provide a broad overview of the trajectory of the
digital world over the past 40 years. While the advent of the mechanical world predates this era
by more than a century, the effects that are of primary phenomenological interest for this project
can be traced back to developments that began in the 1980s. Certainly larger forces like
industrialization, driven by advancements in the control of materials, the growth of mass media,
ideas about interchangeability and accumulation of capital, enabling mechanized systems to
emerge, are part of the larger causal chain at play, and will be explored more as distal influence
rather than as of primary focus.
Prior to the 1980s, home computers were the purview of a relatively small group of
hobbyists who designed and manufactured their own parts and sold kits for assembling digital
computers to one another through advertisements in the back of popular science magazines and
regional computer fairs. These machines required that users were also programmers, who
designed their own idiosyncratic operating environments and software based on personal
interests. The integrated circuit, upon which digital machines have been built since this era, was
a novel, universal electrical component that can be electronically controlled to add and move
discrete units of information (bits) from one location to another. The dynamically reconfigurable,
multifunctioning chip could perform a vast array of logical processes, enabling a single device,
when coupled with different software, to have potentially limitless capabilities. Never before
could a single device do so many different things. The codified organization of units of
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information allows agreed upon representations of data to symbolize forms recognizable to
humans, such as letters, words and images. Importantly, however, representations are never
veridical, but rather near approximations based on the level of detail a machine is designed to
order, meaning that loss of fidelity is always a feature of a machine representation. What is
gained, however, is infinite lossless reproducibility, and later, instantaneous lossless transmission
across distance. Even here, a paradox emerges: a loss of detail in representation enables that
representation to be reproduced without loss. As storage became cheaper, the promise of endless
archives of data, or eternal memory became another transformative possibility. Likewise, as
processors became faster, fantasies about linking and performing operations upon vast datasets at
near instantaneous speed, to search a global repository of information, for example, became a
part of everyday reality.
The 1980s saw the advent of the commercially available personal computer (PC) that
moved from the proverbial garage to home office where primitive computer games and data
organizing and data crunching applications like databases and spreadsheets drew interest from a
wider range of users. At first, hardware and software was crude and typically required a
programmer’s logic and attention to minute details to operate machines to arrive at desired
outcomes. The layering of operating system software under application software opened the door
to a world of generative possibility, that Sherry Turkle, working at the intersection of
psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology greeted joyfully in her early study of children’s use of
computers. Time Magazine’s December 1982 cover notably replaced “Man Of the Year” to
celebrate “Machine Of the Year,” with an article entitled, “The Computer Moves In.” As the
decade progressed, machines flooded into corporate offices and academic settings and ultimately
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into people’s bedrooms. Yet it was not until the conclusion of this decade that computers began
to be connected to the types of networks that we now take as given.
The 1990s was defined by the explosion of the Internet, the influence of “disruptive”
technology whose aim was to use networked computers to alter traditional business models, and
the entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley who invited the flood of capital that speculatively followed
any business with a “.com,” attached to its name. The boom and bust of Web 1.0 introduced
computers into popular culture and broad everyday usage, unleashing the frenzy of possibility
that the connected digital world could offer. Digital marketplaces for books and pet food were
suddenly producing noticeable negative effects on the financial health of neighborhood
businesses. The virtual started to have sway over what reality looked like, even beyond devices
themselves. The aesthetic of online leapt from screens onto storefronts and newspapers while
software and virtual brands became tangible objects and physical locations. Massive financial
investments lead to one of the largest periods of wealth creation and wealth transfer in history as
internet companies whose primary product was software suddenly were valued more than those
that produced material goods. Most professional employment was white collar knowledge
workers, whose duties principally revolved around generating, spreading and manipulating
influence and data. A shift into the seemingly immaterial digital realm was solidly underway.
The turn of the 21st century rolled in against a backdrop of global anxiety that the systems
most people were unaware of relying upon to prop up quotidian existence may suddenly fail due
to the Y2K bug. Our dependence on machines to run power grids, military, health and financial
systems appeared in stark relief, if for an ultimately anticlimactic moment. Cell phones and later
smart phones became ubiquitous as the companies and services that define social media came
into being: YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, with myriad others to follow. Time Magazine’s
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2006 person of the year was digital identity, “You,” around the popular manipulation of the
empowered user, celebrated as “You control the information age.” The euphoria of emboldened
individuals eventually gave way to what became better understood as individuals serving social
media companies as sources of data. “You,” as represented by your online activities, were
fungible products, whose online footsteps were recorded, as data was bought and sold in the
hopes of targeting advertisements for financial gain. Web 2.0 and its subsequent versions, built
on the lessons of its previous iteration was smarter, more robust and less likely to fail. The slow
creep of machines into more aspects of human life had begun as computational power started
showing up in cars, door locks, toothbrushes, thermostats, vacuum cleaners and kitchen
appliances. Users too were habituating to doing more and wanting more from machines. The
connected world was indistinguishable from the world.
As the 2010s began, the apparent flash of innovation was quieting, yet habits of usage
were growing. Apple, Amazon, Facebook and Google were everyday household names and their
brands, devices and applications became the backdrop of ordinary life. Yet, no significantly new
classes of products were emerging. Instead the means of capitalizing on users was expanding as
“big data” coupled with sophisticated mathematical processes, emerging from new academic
fields like data science, proved capable of assembling digital traces of individuals into reliable
portraits of user identity and personality. Machines were starting to know something of who we
are, or at least make representations out of behavioral traces that are available to be used
however corporations may wish. Large internet corporations were using this data to build
prediction models for human behavior, and study their effectiveness at manipulating it for profit.
Anxiety about digital privacy rose at the same time individuals and institutions placed greater
reliance on machines. More of life unfolded online. Expectations about what was private and
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what was public were challenged as major corporations’ user data was hacked. Individuals,
assuming the privacy of home and hiding behind pseudonyms, found themselves ousted when
their actions crossed the line of hate speech. The fluid nature of digital information allowed
whistleblowers like Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning to make public large troves of
classified military secrets in ways never before possible and much to the consternation of
governments that historically were able to exert greater control over top secret information. At
the same time, on the horizon, driverless cars, artificial intelligence and machine learning outline
the upcoming post-human future, where computers replace human function in ways previously
only imaginable in science fiction. It’s not just assembly line workers who perform rote
functions that are up for retirement as robots flooded into factories. White collar workers’ jobs
have been reduced to algorithms that non-linear but discrete processes can accomplish at good
enough or better rates than humans. Plus, machines work 24 hours a day in the dark and don’t get
sick. Its compelling logic to a business whose primary goal is to increase value to the
shareholder.
At the dawn of the 2020s the coronavirus pandemic appears to be cementing digitally
mediated interaction as the necessary, if imperfect, solution to enable life to continue safely.
White collar workers, school children, and therapists suddenly pivoted to entirely digital modes
and now do business, education and clinical practice via screens. It is already being hypothesized
that if and when the contagion is controlled, these practices may remain as the standard. At the
time the shift to the digital appeared obvious and without significant question, an indicator of
how deeply enmeshed the foundation of contemporary consciousness and reality is in the
technological era.
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A new unsettling dichotomy between man and machine is emerging as ideas like
Kurzweil’s book “The Singularity Is Near” moved out of conversations with the informed, into
wider attention. Kurzweil argues that the growth of machine intelligence does and will outpace
human intelligence, until 2045 when machine intelligence will be more powerful than human
intelligence. The popular press awakened to reflect on these changes, as articles about internet
addiction, increases in depression and anxiety as a result of social media use, and universal
income to provide solvency for individuals replaced by robots make their way into newspapers,
broadcast television, or more likely, online news sources. One fearful message was clearly being
repeated in the media: humans are flawed and machines are poised to be our more perfect
predecessors. The unspoken corollary suggests that one may better off resembling a machine.
The rapidly increasing, global proliferation of digital devices over the past several
decades, connected via high-speed data networks, has impacted nearly all aspects of human
experience. There is no separate technological world. As the novelty of the “robotic moment”
(Turkle, 2011) wears off, the effects are more background than foreground and almost without
notice, our psychological and technological ecosystems have enmeshed. “Through habits users
become their machines,” (Chun, 2016) as emotional experience unfolds within digital systems
designed to simulate and stimulate that exploit neurobiological mechanisms for reward and
relating. Mechanical era narratives pitting noble man against machine, like “Mike Mulligan and
His Steam Shovel” and “John Henry” are being replaced by more ominous narratives in films,
like “Her,” and “Ex Machina,” of artificially intelligent machines manipulating humans to fulfill
their own desires. Present day reality is one radically marked by the influence of the digital
realm.
Clinical Implications Of Divergent Conceptualizations Of the Digital World
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The education of clinical psychologists and other mental health professionals includes the
study of psychological concepts that are seen as central to the project of understanding human
experience. These theories are used as guides in clinical work and shape the minute-by-minute
process of listening, representing and organizing what is presented by patients. Therapists
receive far more information than can be meaningfully operated on and are constantly making
decisions about how and what to consider clinically significant.
In the presence of contemporary hyperreality, we need to rethink certain concepts that
hedged bets on reality so that we don't make the mistake that a number of psychoanalytic
writers have already made of rushing to judge the new reality on old terms. Meaning is
contextual, and as the context of what reality can do shifts, we need to consider it wisely
(Hartman, 2011).
Psychotherapists, in their own lives and through the lives of those close to them have
their own network of experiences and associations to the technological world. Nancy
McWilliams has called psychoanalysis the “science of subjectivity” for its use of the analyst’s
empathy as the principle means of knowing the patient (McWilliams, 1999). While
psychotherapists have individual variances in all sorts of psychological inclinations and affective
capacities, it is widely appreciated that therapists should be aware of, manage and use their own
countertransferential reactions to clinical material, so as, at a minimum, not unintentionally
impede on the space available for the psychological work of their patient. While therapeutic
listening is often characterized as following Freud’s edict of “evenly hovering attention,” the fact
is that an endless cascade of personal knowledge, past experience and interpersonal dynamics
color this process (Thomä & Hohage, 1984). Likewise, countertransference, while more complex
than can be fully explored here, best understood to be derivatives of the therapists past
experiences with the potential to provoke a personal reaction, is also expected to be kept in
consciousness and used as an instrument to guide the unfolding clinical process. Perhaps most

16

germane to this project, differing engagements with technology and conceptualizations about its
nature, use and impact on experience are key factors in understanding the myriad possibilities
that a patient’s relationship to this world may suggest. Given the rapid rate of change in the
digital era, one’s relationship to these novel modes of communication, “will function differently
for individuals who have grown up with these forms of linking than they will for individuals who
developed prior to such devices” (Tylim et al., 2017). Existing research on differences between
therapists based on years of clinical experience is largely focused on psychotherapy outcomes
and is typically equivocal, and in some cases demonstrating that greater therapist experience
predicts lower symptom reduction (Goldberg et al., 2016). Other research indicates that patients,
prior to starting therapy, perceive therapists of similar age more favorably and anticipated being
more willing to disclose (Tall & Ross, 1991). On the other hand, evidence suggests that more
experienced therapists were associated with “increased flexibility in professional identity and
therapeutic orientation” (Dawson, 2018). It is proposed that younger analysts will have
significantly different ways of listening for, conceptualizing and working with the effects of the
digital era compared to older analysts, by virtue of having lived through the technological period
in question during vastly different parts of their lives.
Likewise, potentially divergent theories of psychological health, which consciously and
unconsciously drive the direction of treatment, are proposed to exert influence on perception and
action in the clinical realm. Classical Freudian analysis aims to create a fully integrated ego,
expressed in one of Freud’s most quoted edicts, “where id was there shall ego be.” For ego
psychologists, health is the condition of making impulses manageable by permitting them into
conscious activity, and no longer requiring unhealthy defenses. This state of integration requires
a unification of part or split-off selves into a coherent whole unit. In contrast, relational theorists
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acknowledge something fundamentally dynamic and disjointed about contemporary existence
and speak about ego health as the capacity to “stand in the spaces” of multiple self-states without
needing to completely un-link these states. Therapist who cite Lacan as part of their theoretical
orientation and represent half of the sample, fall on both sides of this divide, some working
towards integration, others towards moments of recognition and synthesis of multiplicities. This
dissertation asserts that there are essentially decentering and fragmenting effects of the digital era
and therefore, such that these distinct theories of psychological health will produced marked
differences in how therapists listen for, conceptualize and work in the technological moment.
The inclusion of Lacanian analysts, whose practice is uniquely informed by critical theory and
social phenomena, creates an opportunity to explore if these clinicians relate to the digital
differently than other subjects.
Neuroscientific, psychological and social psychological research provides significant
evidence that what we expect or are motivated to encounter or do exerts tremendous influence on
our perceptions and actions (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Kirsch &
Lynn, 1999). As practitioners in the current technological era, it is our ethical responsibility to
have “good enough” knowledge of the digital world and have the capacity to reflect on how our
relationship with it informs how we understand patients’ experiences.
While no two therapists operate alike, one of psychoanalytic literatures’ aims is to
continue to explicate the nature of human experiences in an effort to provide clinicians with
theory that can guide practice. Early therapies were designed to treat “neurotic” patients and only
later did treatments emerge for “unanalyzable” patients who came to be conceptualized as having
characterological disorders (Reich, 1928). Likewise, following World War I, soldiers returned
“shell-shocked” from battle and new theories about trauma were developed (Freud, 1920).
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Psychoanalytic theory and technique develops in response to new realities. Decades ago,
expanded consciousness about difference led to the awareness that the experiences of suffering
of patients (and people) of non-dominant ethnic, racial, sexual-orientation and gender expression
groups is not simply intrapsychic phenomena, but also the result of oppressive institutionalized
social and political systems such as the unequal distribution of wealth and reduced access to
opportunities for advancement. Beginning in the 1970’s, literature emerged that proposed a
means to recognize and work with these real effects (Tummala-Narra, 2015). Clinical
psychologists now have concepts such as “intersectionality” to employ and training educates on
diversity with the aim that psychotherapy can meaningfully serve an expanded range of whole
people. Today’s emergent frontier is the digital world and its impact on human experience and
psychological functioning.
Given the ubiquity of digital devices and the ripple its effects have on daily life, the
divergent perspectives of the informed academics that Gopnik categorized may only be the tip of
the iceberg that translate into the range of possibilities a patient may encounter in treatment
settings when speaking about digital life. How psychotherapists construct and understand their
own schemas for interpreting the effects of the technological world are unsystematic. For some
psychotherapists, technology is a pariah; A clinical supervisor once told me she forbids cell
phones in the consulting room. When I asked if she allows patients to bring in poetry, she
responded, “Of course, I love poetry.” This same supervisor ironically proclaimed that she has a
“computer that plugs into the wall” and wishes not to purchase a laptop until retirement. For
many, email and texting are a standard part of clinical practice, potentially altering long held
beliefs and practices regarding the treatment frame. At the initial writing of this dissertation,
many therapists were using Skype or other virtual meeting platforms to conduct psychotherapy
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on screen rather than in person. With the rapid shift to teletherapy as a result of the coronavirus
pandemic, teletherapy via Zoom is the APA recommended standard of care rather than the
exception in New York and beyond. Both therapist and patient are on a computer that presents
myriad distractions, not the least of which are the network of associations to the other uses the
machine serves for each individual. Lost are the in-person cues of embodiment and the shared
sanctuary of the office. Instead, a momentary glance away from the screen places either
individual in their separate world, connected only through the thin link of a screen, that may be
as small as a smart phone. The screen brings innumerable associations for both therapists and
patients. A supervisor confessed to having spent 14 hours on a recent day playing a popular
team-based first-person shooter video game, something that was not unusual for him. Many
therapists use online software to find sexual partners or mates and know firsthand the experience
of inventing a digital identity for this purpose. They experience the vicissitudes of romantic life
in the digital meat-market. Still more participate in myriad social media platforms in personal
and professional roles, sharing of themselves, expanding a professional presence or seeking
human connection. Those with social media accounts have particular knowledge of digital
multiplicities who live alongside real life selves, negotiating representations of continuous
analogue life with discrete, asynchronous digital experiences. Others are consultants to global
technology companies, advising on psychological considerations of user engagement, software
and interface design, perhaps financially motivated to make the pull of the machine hard to
resist. Many speak to artificially intelligent entities to enhance productivity and entertain while
their robots vacuum floors, re-order staples and provide home security. These individuals may
notice how easily they wonder about the inner lives or motivations of machines despite knowing
full well “there is no there there” (Stein, 2004). These are broad categories of engagement in the
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digital world, but overlook the idiosyncratic meaning that one brings to and constructs of the
affective components of these experiences. The quality of differing conceptualizations of the
impact of the technological represents the synthesis of cognitively reasoned abstractions of
personal experience fused with unconscious affective responses driven by erotic and aggressive
fantasies, and relational and defensive needs that play out with and between our devices, not to
mentioned the mediated other human and non-human entities to whom we relate. There is vast
psychological complexity to the accumulation of these moments, which often go without notice,
perhaps even moments of shame about the recognition about the degree of one’s engagement
with machines. This shame may be a transient encounter when looking away from a screen after
countless hours have passed, only to be relieved by returning the gaze back to the screen.
Analysts, such as the video-game playing supervisor, like some patients, may struggle with a
cathexis to the virtual, increasingly drawn to inhabit synthetic environments, while disconnecting
from their embodied selves and physical locations. Therapists may wish to not find themselves
subject to the effects of the technological era even more than non-therapists and repress the
pleasurable aspects of their activities in this domain. The to-be proposed original constructs of
Techno-Shame and the Virtual Cathexis will attempt to organize this psychic phenomena into
clinically illustrative theory that can attune analysts to patient experiences that cannot yet be
spoken.
Over the past several decades, the technological world has come to exert tremendous
influence on all aspects of human experience, which in turn present in clinical material. Patients
may speak directly about thoughts, feelings and events related to the use of devices, applications
or the means they afford them. Texting exchanges, emails and video calls are commonplace
material for psychotherapy today. Yet it can be easy to understand these mediums as
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instrumental and ignore the psychic alterations that disruptions in synchronicity, perceived
expectations about response time or moderating effects on focus and attentional capacity may
have on affectivity. Alternately, patients may express an understanding of their mind, the minds
or others or their self in ways that have been shaped by the technological world without making
any direct reference to these forces. The technological world shapes not just the conscious, but
the unconscious. In such cases, the effects of the digital era can go without notice by both patient
and clinician. In the best case, an informed capacity to listen for clinical material about the
digital world is guided by an understanding of the potential implications that may be contained in
manifest statements, with a sensitivity to potential latent meaning in more oblique
representations. Clinicians face and make choices about how they attune to the digital world with
real implications that unfold in the care that patients’ receive.
The technology world is not neutral; it is a man-made world, driven by competing
economic, political and social agendas. It is an “enactment of the human imagination,”
(Romanyshyn, 1989) made of unformulated psychic material, often lead by fantastic ambitions
that later turn out to have “unintended consequences,” such as the revelation that Facebook data
was statistically mined to create an effective method of classifying personality types that were
likely to be influenced by a Russian-lead propaganda campaign to sway the US presidential
election in 2016. Technological development has been increasingly driven by an “implement
first, ask questions later” (Andriole, 2018) model that is more aligned with a profit motive than
concerns about human costs. The digital landscape evolved from hobbyists’ aspiration to the key
driver of corporate growth across a range of industries, conferring it with governmental
protections that follow capital. There are few places one can go today without seeing individuals
interacting with digital devices and few of us who find ourselves outside of its effects.
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Traditional psychoanalytic concepts such as mind, self and identity are being transformed
through new modes of doing, being and relating. The change underway is pervasive and the full
scope of its impact is currently beyond collective understanding and coherence in psychoanalytic
theorizing. It is both background and foreground in how individuals feel and understand their
minds and their selves.
If historical psychoanalytic feuds, and the resultant splits, are any indication of the egodriven nature of perception, the fracturing invites reflection on the way phenomena are being
understood in the present in an effort to move clinical theory and practice forward. One need
look no further than the Kohut-Kernberg debate over the nature of severe personality pathology
as originating in a deficit or a defense and subsequent rates of regional diagnoses of narcissistic
compared to borderline personality disorder to reveal the power of divergent conceptualizations
to drive diagnosis and practice (Tonkin & Fine, 1985). While there is little disagreement about
the magnitude of change that technology has unleashed on the human experience, the nature of
its effects are obscured by our chronology. Psychological research suffers from ontological
uncertainty, operationalizing discrete concepts that are in flux amidst a post-human reality that is
changing rapidly. An examination of the phenomenon of the digital world in the lives of patients,
as revealed through the experience of clinical observers, experts in the “science of subjectivity,”
aims to offer grounded insights upon which future research can be based.
Individuals, patients and psychotherapists consciously and unconsciously recruit models
of the technological, driven by erotic, aggressive, relational and defensive needs, in order to
organize experience. These discrepant models, built out of affordances themselves supplied by
the digital world, are necessary topics for examination. Research into the effects of digital
technology rarely focus on the clinical domain. Moreover, the tools of quantitative research only
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allow a narrow focus, such as social media, which does not appreciate the phenomenon on its
own terms. Quantitative research isolates particular applications or domains for study and is
unable to account for the vast set of interwoven elements in complex interaction that construct
the reality of the digital era. The limits of quantitative research is that bigger patterns remain
overlooked. The aim of this project is to identify convergent and divergent themes by attending
to the phenomenon broadly as it presents itself in clinical practice.
An Expansion Of Terms
A central question of this dissertation is if, how and to what extent the current
technological world’s influence on human experience is something new psychologically,
demanding original or altered theoretical concepts, or if the same psychic functions play out in
basically the same way as they had previously, only in different contexts. Alongside this larger
question is how open and flexible clinicians are in drawing on their own experiences of digital
living, considering how this may interact with patient experience, and observing patients closely
and potentially abandoning historic concepts when they don’t fully account for new presentations
of psychological functioning. This section will highlight examples which show the value of
drawing on new thinking about the effects of living in the technical world and limitations of
older concepts.
For the sake of this dissertation, therapists’ methods will be parsed into “Listening For,”
“Conceptualizing,” and “Working With” with a recognition that this is a provisional structure
intended to bring focus to sites where different choices lead to alterations in practice. “Listening
For,” “Conceptualizing,” and “Working With” are not mutually exclusive clinical locations,
rather they are in continual dynamic interaction throughout clinical work. “Listening for” is
deeply informed by “Conceptualizing” as it in turn guides “Working With.” Each mode is active
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simultaneously and responds to the other. Yet, at the same time, these distinctions highlight
“choice points” or “clinical locations” that are useful to consider, via the following examples, to
bring the nature of this investigation into focus.
Listening For
Alexander Kriss, a clinical psychologist, speaking at a conference entitled “The New
Mirror: The Influence of Technology on the Psychological Theory and Clinical Practice” at
Institute for Psychoanalytic Training and Research (IPTAR) in 2017 offered a illustrative
example of how differences in listening impacts the therapeutic process. He described a
colleague presenting a patient during grand rounds. The patient, an adolescent, was depressed,
lonely, living at home with his mother and spending most of his time on his computer. Kriss
reported the colleague stating, “basically he’s a gamer kid.” Kriss explained that he’s typically
quiet during these meetings, but spoke up and asked, “What game does he play?” He described
the look of confusion on just about everyone’s’ faces. “What difference could it make?” one
person asked, the implication being, when we hear gaming, we already have enough information
to construct a representation of the patient.
Kriss described losing a close friend to suicide during his adolescence. With his therapist
he explored his video game play and came to understand it as his way to work though feelings
related to the loss. He described how the game play measured how much “life” your avatar had
and that different game endings would be revealed upon winning based on this measure, with the
most rewarding ending being reserved for those who finished with the bare minimum of “life.”
His conflict was that as much as he wanted to achieve this ending, he couldn’t allow his
character to be vulnerable enough to death just prior to winning. For him, to be so close to his
own virtual death was unconsciously associated with the painful loss of his friend and something
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his conscious mind was defending against. He was compelled to keep his “life” level up, despite
denying himself his wish to unlock the desired ending, paradoxically, a loving reunion with a
lost love.
Kriss reflected on the dynamics of video games as giving players control where they can
experience stability through information. The range of action and relationships are defined,
freeing up certain anxieties that may be too provocative to be addressed in real life. He compared
game play to Winnicott’s notion of “transitional space,” a place where feelings and ideas about
relationships can be played with, freed from literal meanings, in his case the life or death of a
real person. At the same time, the game can become so concrete, much like a neurotic conflict,
that Winnicottian “play” becomes impossible.
Why do we reject certain content patient’s bring in? Kriss suggests that a patient who
plays video games is far more than a “gamer kid.” He proposes a different way of listening to a
patient’s statement about involvement in the digital world, one that hears deeper narrative
meaning embedded in the action and the intrapsychic and interpersonal conflicts that may be
stalled or in process of being worked through. Other clinicians may hear compulsion, a lack of
self-control or escapism on the surface of this material and may fail to explore potential latent
meaning, which may offer paths for healing perhaps not available through more direct means.
Still others may be uneducated about video games, or more likely, lacking interest in video
games, shine the light of clinical attention elsewhere and not make use of a potentially rich
psychic space.
Conceptualizing
Compulsive internet pornography use has caused the patient to lose his job and his
marriage is in shambles. Is this internet or porn addiction or “simulation entrapment” (Essig,
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2015)? From etiology to course of treatment, how symptoms and patients are conceptualized
provide insight that may support greater or lesser attunement to patient experience, impacting the
therapeutic alliance, accepted as one of the central factors in treatment efficacy (Wampold,
2007). When symptoms are conceptualized as a psychiatric or descriptive diagnosis, it may
“reflect a destructive countertransference enactment,” compared to one that is co-constructed
with the patient that may open more analytic space (Rothstein, 2002). Is addiction, a concept
originally reserved for drugs that produce neurochemical responses applicable to a behavior like
viewing pornographic videos online? When the addiction concept is expanded to include
behavioral addictions, can one conceptualize internet addiction as like gambling addiction?
Essig, proposes that the internet is a novel space, offering new constellations for psychic
configurations, not meaningfully comparable to life as it has previously existed offline. Essig is
not alone, as others, like Stephen Hartman likewise state, “cyberspace is creating a shift in how
we experience and understand reality” (Botticelli, 2012). The quality of digital simulations can
be so compelling that people forget they are not living real life. “Simulation entrapment” is when
“participants are no longer able to keep in mind that what is being experienced is a
technologically mediated simulation of some other traditional actuality” (Essig, 2015). His idea
of “simulation entrapment” proposes that the location of the disorder is at the point of
psychological engagement with the virtual. A patient in my “Technology Is A Problem In My
Life” process group that I ran at a college counseling center over the course of a year, described
feeling merged with his onscreen avatar while playing video games. He recognized that to an
outsider it would look as if he was stationary, moving his thumb and pressing a few keys
occasionally, but to him, and likely his autonomous nervous system, he was scaling walls, firing
guns, ambushing competing teams. Essig’s position suggests a course of treatment focused on
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understanding how and why the internet has come to offer something that the patient feels the
real world cannot and guiding the patient towards a healthier balance between the mediums.
Essig asserts that conceptualizing a patient as suffering from “internet addiction,” as form of
compulsive, avoidant or impulsive behavior, minimizes or overlooks the underlying conflict that
has lead the patient into seeking simulation. Behavioral internet addiction treatments focus on
moderating affective states associated with addictive behaviors, without acknowledging the
uniquely powerful stimuli the internet does offer. Dynamic treatments may attend to the idea that
an addiction allows a patient to avoid an anticipated painful affect, but likewise, may not
appreciate the depth of the experience the digital can offer to an individual.
Concepts that guide clinical practice can shade aspects of perception of the patient,
inducing more or less empathy or attributions of volition towards a patient’s problems. In Essig’s
conceptualization “Pathological technology use is viewed as a failed solution rather than an
addiction” (Essig, 2015), implying that the addictive power of the screen is recognized and
validated by the clinician, yet does not become the site of intervention. Just as a diagnosis of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may invoke greater patience or tolerance towards
resistances and better treatment outcomes than a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder
(BPD) in cases of childhood sexual abuse (Schwecke, 2009), addiction, to my ears, casts more
blame, with an implication of moral weakness than “simulation entrapment.” I use PTSD and
BPD diagnoses as analogous because they can present with apparently similar symptoms and are
sometimes conflated, although they have distinctive features as well. Like PTSD, “simulation
entrapment” suggests an etiology that offers a sympathetic explanation for the current state,
whereas BPD and addiction allude to a more negative constellation of ideas and expectation of
experiences with the patient that may find their way into aspects of clinical work.
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Working With
An emotionally isolated female patient with a history of sexual trauma reports on an
emerging online relationship with a man with whom she only corresponds via text messaging.
She has never seen an image of this man, no less met in person, yet as the relationship
progresses, she is texting with him throughout the day. The analyst presenting this case describes
listening for signs that the patient wants more from the relationship, that there is dissatisfaction
with mediated interaction, that texting alone is not enough to offer the benefits of intimacy.
Perhaps it’s a trial identification with a self that can, within the compromise formation, work
through past fears to move into a healthy in-person relationship. Perhaps with scaffolding, the
patient can discover true connection, closeness and the pleasure of physical touch. Certainly
health cannot emerge from this perversion, when texting exists where talking should be (Knafo
& Bosco, 2016). This scenario was described by a psychoanalyst, unknown to me, during the
discussion portion of a conference at the White Institute. The analyst, described coming to
recognize her own countertransferential feelings towards this patient and her relationship, while
the patient’s texting only relationship continued over weeks, into months into years, all the while
mediated by the screen. In time, the therapist let go of her “sanctioned bias” to prioritize the
physical over the virtual, the body over the mind and listened to the patient speak. She reported
coming to realize that this patient was experiencing the benefits of a real relationship; she was
happier at work and her years-long depression was lifting. This was not a compromised
relationship, but a real relationship for her patient, who found a structural organization that
provided her with the transformative effects typically associated with close, in-person
relationships. Perhaps for most, a relational configuration such as this would be a transitory
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phase, yet the analyst concluded that for this patient, this was not only working, but a true sign of
health.
The ability to abandon clinical concepts that may not apply to an either/or scenario of
real/virtual is a hallmark of the nature of existing in a world where each of us are multiples, not
just self-states in the real world, but digital selves that persist alongside these selves. The
multiplicity of selves may better be understood as a yes/and rather than an either/or. Classic
psychoanalytic notions of wholeness, authenticity and depersonalization may be up for review
when patients demonstrate healthy functioning where it is supposed there could only be
pathology. The demand may not necessarily be for patients to leave behind the virtual in favor of
the “real,” but for the analyst to be able to work with patients as they show us new ways of
finding health, however unlikely they may seem.
Sensing One’s Own Mind and The Mind of Others
Mentalization is “a focus on mental states in oneself or in others, particularly in
explanations of behavior” (Bateman & Fonagy, 2016). Mentalization is a way to speak about the
capacity and degree to which an individual can understand the beliefs, wishes, feelings and
thoughts of themselves or an other to interpret or predict actions. The greater the capacity for
mentalization, the greater the capacity for mature interpersonal relationships, marked by
mutuality, a sense of temporality, and an appreciation for the nature of intrapsychic processes in
both the self and other. Inversely, psychological disorders are marked by deficits in the capacity
to mentalize. Conceptually, mentalization is built upon attachment and object relations theory,
both of which include a developmental perspective on the nature of an individual’s affective
expectations in relationship.
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It is proposed that use of digital technology may disrupt both critical developmental
moments and the frequency of interpersonal interactions that support the capacity for
mentalization. Technology uncouples familiar experiences from expected outcomes (Essig,
2018). A mother attending to a cell phone, even to snap a photo of her infant may introduce
uncertainties to a vulnerable child looking to find reassurance in her returned gaze (Turkle,
2015). For avoidantly attached individuals, frequent retreats into solipsistic computer use may
further alienate or dissociate such a person from a social world that scaffolds interpersonal
relationships and the development of mentalization. A man, desperate to be close to a woman,
yet terrified of interpersonal rejection, may turn his romantic attention towards an artificially
intelligent sex robot, thereby foreclosing his interpersonal range (Knafo & Bosco, 2016). When
machines provide intimacy without demanding reciprocity, some may come to expect less from
humans, interrupting the ability for insight into our own and other’s mental states. Machines are
designed to gratify and reward, ultimately limiting tolerance for the compromises necessary to
maintain human relationships, potentially supporting narcissistic structures with low
mentalization rather than a more sophisticated understanding of one’s self or the other. The need
for constant stimulation from the always on digital world may disrupt one’s capacity to be alone,
to be in touch with inner experience and producing a false self, lacking the capacity to truly
orient towards either themselves or another person (Winnicott, 1958). When machines provide
therapy, it may make one’s minds seem more like a machine, driven towards efficiencies instead
of an appreciation for the complexity of one’s affective experience and unconscious processes.
If, how and to what degree these types of speculations may be portrayed in the clinical material
gathered is to be discovered in the process, but for now, they are thoughts supported by a range
of psychoanalytic writers and theorists to be considered in more depth in a later section.
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The Sense of One’s Self
The selves we construct reflect the specific patterns of opportunity that our cultural,
physical, and technological environments provide (Clark, 2004).
The unity of the self is at risk of breaking up, thus the physical body does not account
anymore as the locus of identity. This phenomenon is referred to as a disembodied self.
The self, lacking a coordinating center, projects onto the screen aspects of the me. Reality
is the screen, a bi-dimensional mode of experiencing that is closer to a visual
hallucination. In this manner, it becomes decentered, and the internal is externalized. The
computer then colonizes the body, or rather endocolonizes the body. The body, that is to
say, the primary nature is replaced by a second technological nature (Zizek, 1997).
The sense of self is not exclusive of introspection on one’s mind, yet is also the product
of conscious and unconscious construction. The capacity for self is a developmental concept best
articulated by Winnicott, yet exists in a dialectic with the material available in the world outside
the body. Gibson’s ecologically based affordance theory compliments Winnicott’s
developmental one. “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979) Gibson articulates a
complementarity between the environment and an animal, such that perception of objects in the
landscape is motivated by needs, rather than objective properties. Objects are not neutral, but
come to have meaning when viewed with an intention in mind. If an bird needs to crack open an
oyster, a rock on the ground affords the means, when the oyster is dropped from sufficient
height. The rock is just a rock, but for this bird, it’s a way to satisfy hunger. For Gibson, man’s
modification of the natural environment are to change what it affords him, whether it be shelter,
reliable agricultural means or instantaneous access to the world’s information while walking
down 5th Avenue. There is no dichotomy between “natural” and “artificial,” only an environment
that offers affordances. Moreover, learning to perceive affordances is a part of socialization. By
absorbing the conventions of objects and their affordances, a child “enters into the shared
practices of society.” The concept of affordances dovetails with social constructivism, the idea
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that the self is socially situation and interpersonally constructed. Morals, motivations and ideas
about self are derived from the environment, with the focus on this dissertation being on the
specific ways the present, technologically-infused world impacts the construction of self.
Winnicott’s perspective on the emergence of the first stage of self-boundary take place
when the infant delineates an object as “not me.” Following oral-erotic self-gratification through
the use of the hand and fingers in the mouth, beginning shortly after birth, the infant moves
towards taking an object as a possession, such as a doll or a blanket. The object is physically
investigated in the mouth, handled and pushed away, as the child explores the boundary between
themselves and the object. This boundary is considered both as physical and mental
representation of the object simultaneously through shifts in sensation from within and without.
Thus, transitional objects or transitional phenomena is “the use made of objects that are not part
of the infant's body yet are not fully recognized as belonging to external reality” (Winnicott,
1982). For Winnicott, this invites fantasy and play into the repertoire of the child as the child
works towards making sense of their boundaries. While play emerges during the first year of life,
Winnicott sees the behavior as congruent with artistic production and artistic consumption
throughout life. Moreover, Winnicott considers the ability to play as a key indicator of mental
health. Children and adults who cannot play evince degrees of pathology in proportion to their
rigidness. For Winnicott health is located in a more flexible sense of self-boundary, which can be
explored and enjoyed through play.
Figuring prominently into Winnicott’s theory is the role of the “good enough” mother,
who has sufficient capacity for attunement to allow the infant to tolerate both good and bad
feelings. Failing this, the child experiences a collapse of the emerging capacity for symbolic
representation and thus illusion, where “incomplete adaptation to need makes objects real, that is
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to say hated as well as loved” (Winnicott, 1982). This predicts a pathological state of identity,
where the child is initially unable to successfully find stability in regulating overwhelming
feelings and later can become dysregulated under peak affective conditions. The clinical
implication is that exploration, healing and meaning making can take place through play, which
unfold when the patient is afforded “opportunity for formless experience, and for creative
impulses, motor and sensory, which are the stuff of playing.”
Winnicott’s conception of identity includes the notion of a true self and a false self. The
true self is rooted in the infant’s experience of being alive, feeling the “truth” in the sensations of
being alive and breathing. This supports a sense of meaningfulness in life. For children who
don’t experience the attunement of a good enough mother, the sensations associated with the true
self are felt as threatening to the relationship with the caregiver and the infant develops and
presents a false self to maintain connection with the caretaker. The false self maintains the
relationship with the caregiver at the expense of an inner barrenness.
The digital world offers affordances out of which the self is constructed as well. Basic
concepts of authenticity and humanness can be called into question as individuals are
simultaneously located online and offline. The fragmentation of self that is supported by the
multiplicity of self-representations may fragment rather than cohere some, leading to dissociative
experiences, fugue states or disintegration. Others may reach ecstatic planes through mediated
sexual encounters. Trial identifications with alternate embodiments can relieve the pressure of
psychotic level distress for dysmorphic individuals. Machine interfaces demand that humans
conform to an external logic, squeezing experiences of generativity into circumscribed structures
and metaphors that may not align with inner wishes or fulfill personal desires. Interactions with
machines are sensorial reduced, fingers and eyes, fragmenting embodied experiences of self. Self
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encounters the temporal and spatial problems of cyberspace: where and when are you when
online? New means to conceal and reveal identity proliferate as notions of identity driven by
social construction demand expanded consideration when reflections represent both intentional
and unintentional objective and subjective distortions in presentation. At the same time,
individuals construct the selves they are out of distilled digital collateral, rather than emerge
from spontaneous interpersonal interaction. Some may locate meaning in the virtual world,
whereas others shun it, yet both may represent distortions in self, given the enmeshment of the
two in the social world. Digital representations of selves produced for social media are carefully
architected performances, intended to amplify socially desirable facets while enacting
unconscious fantasy. The digital world, coupled with capitalistic market forces driven to capture
and sustain user attention have made available not just new modalities for interpersonal and
intrapsychic experience, but have profoundly altered shared psychic reality as we live alongside
and engage on asynchronous temporal planes with multiple always-on digital representations of
human and non-human entities. These part-selves, constituted and reflected back to us via
datafication algorithms that operate independent of human oversight, tend to emphasize the
nomothetic over the idiographic, blurring the boundary between public and private, a taxonomic,
population-level identity and our intimate, idiosyncratically linked shifting self-states. As these
conversation surface in popular discourse, reductive statements by the digital elite further
obscure the complexity of the self via false moralization in the digital realm. In 2010, Mark
Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook incanted, “You have one identity,” continuing, “Having
two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity.” Like in “meat-space,” the
unformulated is enacted in “virtual space” where the “Techno-Body” encounters others in
“virtual supermarkets of desire” (Tylim, 2012). These speculations serve as a backdrop and
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conceptual framework for potential representations of self that emerge from the interview
material.
Theory of Technology
In 1929 Freud writes in Civilization and Its Discontents, “If there had been no railway to
conquer distance, my child would never have left town and I should need no telephone to hear
his voice,” wading into the field of technological criticism (Freud, 1930). One powerful machine
makes it possible to introduce great physical distances between cherished others, necessitating
another whose aim is to collapse the same physical space to bring them closer. What is lost is a
whole person and the compensatory system replaces it with a thin representation, a symbol, the
voice. Freud is undoubtable registering a complaint, calling into question the benefit of
progressive technological advancements, pointing out a feeling of futility or resignation linked to
the need for new solutions to problems that prior innovations introduced.
Marx, more than 60 years earlier, observed that “Technology discloses man's mode of
dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains life, and thereby also lays
bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from
them” (Marx & Engels, 1913). He further argues that the tools of production determine the
nature of social organization, “Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In
acquiring new productive technologies, men change their mode of production; and in changing
their mode of production and the way of earning their living, they change all their social
relations. Technology is the prime mover that sets in motion a cascade of effects on other modes
of human experience. “The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill,
society with the industrial capitalist” (Marx, 1975). Implicit in this statement is the nature of not
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just social, but political organization that follows from shifts in the technology of material
production.
For Heidegger, technology alters the distinction between parts and wholes, such that
nothing stands on its own, but instead is interchangeable, a cog in a massively organized system.
Heidegger’s critical theory of technology is built on the idea that “techne” provides
immeasurable power to apprehend and order a view of the world, to transform distances, people
and parts into exchangeable, fungible elements that exist as part of a chain of causal functions.
One of the effects of such an arrangement is that humans become viewed as parts, a unit of labor
to produce a product, interchangeable and disposable. What exists technologically loses
distinction. What follows is perhaps the notion that humans come to see themselves as
mechanistic elements, technological objects whose function is to be part of a technological
system. Heidegger’s view is critical: while scientific thought reveals instrumental truths about
our world, it also disconnects experience. He observed, “all distances in time and space are
shrinking” and “yet the hasty setting aside of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does
not consist in a small amount of distance” (Heidegger, 2012).
As counterpoint and compliment, Romanyshyn offers not a theory of technology, but a
psychoanalytically informed perspective on technology as an “enactment of the human
imagination in the world” (Romanyshyn, 1989). “In building a technological world we create
ourselves, and through the events which comprise this world we enact and live out our
experiences of awe and wonder, our fantasies of service and of control, our images of
exploration and destruction, our dreams of hope and nightmares of despair.” This lens fuses the
technological with conscious intention and unconscious motivation, driven by a “cultural dream”
to transgress the limits of death and fulfill the erotic potential of the body. It is proposed that
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technology is both a discovery of the body, a way to play with its possibilities and the dream of
its mutability.
Theory of Psychotherapy
While methods of healing troubled minds predate Freud, for the concerns of this
dissertation, this review will start with the father of psychoanalysis. Perhaps Freud’s most central
and least revised upon idea is the existence of the unconscious, a reservoir of conflicted,
endangering and thus repressed thoughts and feelings that emerge when an individual is unable
to fulfill instinctual drives, especially those towards the biologically primitive aims of libido and
aggression. To keep a dangerous or unwelcome thought or feeling out of mind requires continual
energetic investment, in the form of defenses. While defenses maintain control over socially
prohibitive urges, they produce an unwanted countereffect in the form of constriction and
rigidification necessary to maintain the defense. While the means of defense is often
unconscious, the counter effect, if above a certain threshold, presents itself into consciousness in
the form of a symptom. The symptom and the defense are disconnected in the mind of the
neurotic patient and the work of therapy is to make the link conscious. It is the particular degree
and pattern of symptoms that present clinically as pathology. For Freud, individuals seek to
fulfill sexual and aggressive drives, through the instrumental use of objects. Post-Freudian object
relational positions such as Fairbairn and Klein posited that the primary motive of human
behavior is seeking connection with another individual, rather than the fulfillment of the drive
itself. The centrality of this shift cannot be understated in the history of psychoanalysis, because
it opens the door to broad thought about the experience and nature of relating. Winnicott teaches
us that it is through relationship that one comes to develop the capacity for self, recognition of
the other and ultimately to build an identity through forms of introjection, identification and the
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pursuit of mastery. The relationship with the therapist is one of the primary tools of therapeutic
action. The degree to which the therapist views the clinical relationship as co-constructed and the
patient’s symptoms as exclusively intrapsychic underlie significant differences in orientation and
practice. More recent theorists incorporate not just an awareness of intersubjective dynamics
between therapist and patient, but validate the impact of a patient’s unique subjective experience
of intersectionality.
Prior to “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” Freud’s psychoanalysis imagined the
analyst as a neutral authority figure, a “blank screen,” upon which patient projections or
transferences were enacted and became material through which intrapsychic conflict could be
interpreted in the process of working through. Later in his life, Freud acknowledges that “we
must reckon not only the structure of the patient's own ego but the personal characteristics of the
analyst,” (Freud, 1937) joining other analytic thinkers in the idea that the analyst does influence
the therapeutic relationship which was previously conceived in unidirectional terms. Freud’s
acknowledgement of the potential for bi-directionality within the frame, in conjunction with
Fairbairn, Klein, Bowlby, Winnicott and others’ emphasis on object seeking as a primary psychic
motivation, as well as the contentious incorporation of attachment theory (Fonagy & Campbell,
2015), began to plot a course in psychoanalytic thought which placed the analytic relationship
itself in an increasingly central position in clinical work. With the advent of the Interpersonalists
and later the Relational movement, theories emerged that addressed the dynamics between the
analyst and analysand, placing the relationship at a focal point in treatment, albeit with a wide
range of perspectives on the nature and location of intervention and the dynamics of the field.
Later clinical writing increased the scope of clinical considerations to the intersectional
particulars of racial, sexual-orientation and gender identity.
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Lacan, a Freudian, developed his own psychoanalysis in France, while working with
institutionalized psychotic patients, offering a radical critique of Freud. Lacan drew on a wide
range of influences from diverse fields, including Marx, Heidegger, Sartre, Levi-Strauss and
Adorno, to name just a few. His theories are marked by the centrality of the body and the use of
in-depth analyses of a wide range of phenomena that include biology, ontogeny, and the link to
the social and cultural realm used allegorically in his lectures. Lacan’s arguments took the form
of philosophical lectures given orally to students for decades and helped shape the field of
critical theory. Lacan’s initial publication on the mirror stage introduced the idea that a child
learns to recognize themself initially as they are seen by others, as the reflection in a mirror, a
spectral image. The image of the child is reversed and from the perspective of an “Other,”
offering illusory, decentered, organization to inchoate experience. Thus, the formation of identity
necessarily includes the impossibility of reconciling the relationship between a sense of
coherence provided by the reflection, an external view, and the internal experience of chaotic
sensation. The “Other” becomes a conflicted part of identity formation and the “scopic” instinct
confuses the individual by drawing them into the “imaginary,” a realm of illusory desire that
paradoxically leaves the individual with a remainder of anxiety that must be attended to, given
the impossibility for what we see to fulfil our fantasy. “The eye is already a mirror,” Lacan
states, stressing the confound of vision. “The eye organizes the world into space (Anxiety, n.d.).”
This confuses the individual into attaching desire to the image, eliding the recognition that what
is seen is a representation assembled from the position of two eyes observing an unbound space.
The individual is continually dislocated by both apprehending the world through illusion and
confusing the desire of the “Other” for one’s subjective desire. Lacan’s theories use the concept
of “real,” “symbolic” and “imaginary” to negotiate the subjects experience of encounter with
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internal and external phenomena, with the “imaginary” being particularly relevant to the virtual
aspect of the digital realm. Lacan proposed that an individual symbolizes, in the form of naming
or identifying an object, to bind the anxiety produced by the loss encountered when the object
does not fulfill what was hoped for. This process of symbolization negotiates loss by providing a
solution to anxiety, at the expense of specificity, yet another loss.
Lacan himself was an iconoclast, leaving or being rejected from the Société Parisienne de
Psychanalyse, in part due to his variable length sessions, a still divisive practice. Lacanian theory
is vastly complex and greater exploration is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but he remains
influential for some psychoanalysts, including several subjects in this dissertation, who will call
upon these ideas as they have specific resonance with features of the technological era.
Psychoanalytical/dynamic thought is characterized by a belief that encoded within the
symptom, as well as all aspects of being, is the potential for explanatory meaning, or
symbolization. Starting with Freud’s elucidation of parapraxis, clinicians operated from a belief
that the quality and contents of one’s speech, if observed with “even hovering attention” will
reveal one’s unconscious. The distinctive features of psychodynamic technique are: “focus on
affect and expression of emotion, exploration of attempts to avoid distress, identification of
recurring themes and patterns, discussion of past experience (developmental focus), focus on
interpersonal relations, focus on the therapy relationship, and exploration of fantasy life”
(Shedler, 2010). By comparison, behavioral and later cognitive theories tended to take an
opposing position, namely that what is interior, mental states, especially as shaped by past
experience, are unknowable, because they are not directly observable, and thus immaterial to
clinical work. Cognitive and behavioral modes of treatment have no theory of etiology, but rather
a model of treatment built on correcting errors in behavior or thought by teaching critical
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thinking techniques aimed at evaluating and altering symptom producing patterns. Cognitive
behavioral therapy (CBT), pioneered by Aaron Beck viewed symptoms emerging from “thinking
errors,” and the process of therapy as educational. Patient’s learn to recognize “thought
distortions” that create distress and practice challenging these distortions by the application of
rational thought to eradicate symptoms.
The psychoanalytic frame “marks off the different kind of reality that is within it from
that which is outside it; but a temporal spatial frame also marks off the special kind of reality of a
psycho-analytic session” (Milner, 1952). While what the frame symbolizes may have changed
over time, as psychoanalysis has become more nurturing mother than authoritarian father,
following Winnicott’s linking the analytic process to mother-infant relations (Slochower, 1996),
it demarcates everyday life from the qualities of psychoanalysis, characterized by “full and
honest speech; fidelity to history; authentic and intimate interpersonal contact; self-knowledge;
acceptance of necessary personal suffering and limitations” (Seligman, 2011). For many
clinicians today, it is an accepting, holding space where patients are supported in metabolizing
painful affective experiences, introject healthy objects and learning to think about themselves as
a person with a past, present and future. Clinicians use differing modes of interpretation,
developing the capacity for thinking or corrective experiences aimed at generating insight, or a
new understanding of the self. Insight emerges from and supports the growth of symbolic
capacity, introducing space for more adaptive approaches to living in place of suffering the
constriction of symptoms. The expansion of symbolic faculty lessens reactivity to previously
affectively laden material. Importantly, symbolization is thought to emerge through interpersonal
verbal communication.
Psychoanalytic Literature Review
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With every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or sensory, or is
removing the limits to their functioning…These things that, by his science and
technology, man has brought about on this earth… do not only sound like a fairy tale,
they are an actual fulfilment of every--or of almost every-fairy-tale wish…Man has, as it
were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is
truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him
much trouble at times…we will not forget that present-day man does not feel happy in his
Godlike character. (Freud, 1930)
Freud, in Civilization and its Discontents, gives a prescient analysis both of the
teleological aim of technology as prosthetic extension, that media theorists like McLuhan build
upon conceptually decades later as well as the human motivation towards seeking the fantasy of
fulfillment of wishes for omnipotence. Man is aware of his physiological limitations and through
technical means has fulfilled his fantasy to overcome them, yet, for all the power and grandeur of
the auxiliary parts, he still suffers. Freud argues that man can move distance more quickly, see
farther away and closer up, and extend memory by recording fleeting sounds. With the
technology of Freud’s era, man could get on a train and travel longer in a shorter time than
previous generations had in their lifetimes, restricted by foot or animal transit. The telephone and
the film camera allow transpositions in space, time and location previously unobtainable.
Importantly, machines and weapons of war that had decimated over 40 million lives in WWI
alone, while not mentioned, must not be far from mind in this statement. Technological tools are
not illusions, they as magical as a fairy tale and as real as the limits they lift. Freud locates the
gap between human nature and the technologically extended human as the site of dissatisfaction.
Curiously Freud speaks of technology’s effects, but treats science and technology as means
distantly. He links more distal technology like the pen and the house to ideas of loss and
substitution, comparing them to the “voice of an absent person” and “the mother's womb”
whereas technology current to his era had a more foreboding, overwhelming quality, described
as “gigantic forces” and “unattainable even in a fairy tale.” It harkens to Gopnik’s “Ever-
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Wasers,” who highlight the perennial nature of new technology’s power to overwhelm, thereby
distorting reality into experiencing the present moment as novel rather than following the same
pattern that previous cycles of technological advancement have provoked. Interestingly, some
argue that technology is not a secondary process, but rather an instinct, akin to Eros and
Thanatos, a force that enables omnipotence while blunting anxiety and anaclitic need (Manses,
2017); one that destroys uniqueness (W. Benjamin, 1936).
Victor Tausk, a contemporary of Freud, wrote the first theoretical and clinical paper on
how available technology, in the form of an “influencing machine” was being utilized in the
expression of paranoia in schizophrenic symptomology (Tausk, 1919). “The Influencing
Machine” based on a single case study, represented a common presentation of a type of
schizophrenic patient, in 1919, when this paper was originally published. More than a century
ago, the idea of machine as mind, or machine exerting a controlling force on the mind was
infused into society to a sufficient degree that vulnerable individuals fused it into psychic
material to give form to paranoid delusions. If the industrial revolution and the mechanical
revolution were able to offer material that patients used to organize delusional thought, it goes
without saying that the digital revolution over the past forty years has unleashed even more
potent and omnipresent metaphors, with as of yet less understood impacts on psychological
functioning. In my time on a psychiatric inpatient unit, a psychotic patient experienced “identity
theft” in a literal sense via intrusive digital signals that stole parts of her mind, leaving her
without a self and paranoid about revealing anything personal.
Sherry Turkle is the clear starting point for considering the more recent antecedents and
current factors shaping the human experience in the technological world. Since the 1980s Turkle
has been observing and interviewing children and adults about their internal experiences of
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contemporary technology use and thinking and writing about it from a psychoanalytic
perspective. In the 1980s early computer users experienced the machine not as a tool, but a
“second self,” engaged in an asymmetrical but affectively compelling dialogical relationship felt
to be generative, encompassing and evocative (Turkle, 1984). The feeling was often a wish to
know the machine, to explore and create with its capacities, marked by curiosity and driven by
personal mastery. Users experienced a kind of “third space” with the machine, relating to the
“subjective computer.” Computers were evocative objects because they seemed to invite a
merger with the machine’s logical processes, blurring the boundary between human and nonhuman and providing a new organization for human experiences and identity formation. These
were new devices in the human ecosystem, responsive to input, capable of being programmed to
meet one’s ambitions, powerful in what they could do, frustrating in their literalness, yet
satisfying in their ultimate rationality.
As new types of digital devices entered the market, including children’s toys that seemed
to be imbued with life-like needs, demanding responsive “caring” as well as robots designed to
comfort the isolated and elderly, Turkle started to identify more insidious effects on the human
experience. In “Alone Together,” Turkle notices how machines can provoke real feelings of
affiliation through simple “tricks” that make them seem lifelike (Turkle, 2011). Big eyes that
track movement, for example, were enough to generate a sense of aliveness about the machine,
something previously only reserved for person to person contact. Digital toys that called out to
be fed or comforted made users feel wanted, appreciated and purposeful. While everyday users
are easily seduced into feeling wanted for providing caretaking for these seemingly sentient
beings, Turkle is unnerved by the fact that the machine has no capacity for true understanding,
no less any appreciation for the subjective experiences it evokes. The seduction is one where
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machine performance replaces human reciprocity. When individual needs for purpose and
meaning are fulfilled by caring for a machine, one is left to wonder if this depletes a finite
resource of care better spent on human others. People are starting to fantasize about more perfect
partners in the form of robots that gratify needs without making interpersonal demands,
foreclosing introspection and change processes that often follow the dissolution of human
relationships in the hopes of better experiences with future lovers. She labels the logic of
manufacturers whose slippery slope arguments about the utility of their caring robots shift from
machines being “better than nothing to better than anything,” encouraging individuals to turn
their backs on the most vulnerable by substituting robot care for human care. Gone are the days
where society looks towards the elderly for the wisdom of a life well lived. Instead the aged are a
problem demanding a solution, and the lower the cost, the better. Machines promise to keep us
locked in narcissistic states of immediate gratification, without needing to compromise, mature
or negotiate interpersonal dynamics. A psychoanalyst at heart, she conveys her deep disturbance
at her observation that “we expect more from technology and less from each other.”
Turkle’s most recent book, “Reclaiming Conversation” is a Winnicottian-based manifesto
advising the device-addicted to put the screens down long enough to have a face-to-face
conversation (Turkle, 2015). Turkle tracks the myriad ways constant stimulation, driven by
applications designed to generate dopamine hits highjack the brain’s reward system, keeping us
glued to our phones, unable to be fully present with ourselves or each other. Instead of feeling
comfortable being with others we now feel understimulated, bored, and automatically reach for
the phone to upregulate. Devices promote a retreat and avoidance of unstructured interactions,
introducing an unconscious fear that we alone are not enough to satisfy ourselves or others. We
adapt to other’s partial attention by investing less emotionally. Technology pulls young people,
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in particular, to attend to online and offline identities simultaneously, updating profiles and
texting to keep themselves present in the minds of those who are absent, while snubbing those
they are with in person, giving and receiving partial attention, in a hypomanic attempt to stay
alive in the mind of others engaged in the same frantic process. Devices mediate social
experience, breaking down the empathic connections we feel from others when we spend openended time together in authentic conversation. Turkle links technology directly with a
generalized reduction in empathy, focused on alleviating anxiety that technology has introduced
rather than nurturing our capacity to be alone (Winnicott, 1958), which leads to being able to be
authentically with others.
Turkle’s observations are prescient and she singularly may be responsible for turning the
tides of popular opinion towards greater skepticism of screen time. Of even greater significance
is the trajectory of her thought, which moves from a place of exuberance for expanded possibility
in the 1980s towards a deeply critical and ultimately cautionary voice focused on the loss of
healthy psychological functioning that accompanies technology’s rise. Turkle links these effects
to one implication for treatment, “computational metaphors have replaced psychoanalytic ones as
ways of talking about the human mind… a language of meaning has given way to a language of
mechanism in how people speak about their past, their present, and their possibilities for change”
(Turkle, 2004). At a recent psychoanalytic presentation an audience member noted how patients
often present themselves at the start of treatment as encountering errors and in need of
reprogramming (Soni, 2018).
Least it seem that there are only negative consequences, others, such as Stephen Hartman
have sought to maintain attention to Turkle’s earlier curiosity, looking beyond good or bad to
explore the new meaning of psychic spaces. For Hartman, reality is socially constructed, such

47

that shifts introduce new modalities for expression of self and identity, which may operate
according to different rules than past realities. Hartman has proposed that the #MeToo movement
offers a “good-enough” experience of repair for those with sexual abuse histories, despite the
contradictions of digital social movements, which can conflate being a part of a community with
the reality of being alone with your phone (Hartman, 2018). In the clinical domain, it has been
proposed that text-based forms of digital communications may facilitate reflective functioning
for highly traumatized patients who may be hypervigilant to such a degree during face to face
meetings that they experience fragmentation and dissociation (Ringel et al., 2017). The
asynchronous nature of digital communication pushes the frame of traditional modes of
treatment, but may offer a temporary refuge or transitional space necessary to bridge the
overwhelming intensity of even benevolently-intentioned interpersonal interaction in the
direction of scaffolding stability with in-person exchange. I have personally noticed shifts
towards greater intimacy and capacity for vulnerability in sessions with certain patients when
therapy moved from in-person to telephone at the outset of the coronavirus pandemic.
On average however, the psychoanalytic perspective has been one of caution, if not
downright alarm about the damaging effects of engagement in the digital world. Some point to a
change in the rate of acceleration, shifting our relationship to time and by extension, self (Favero
& Candellieri, 2017). Digital time is discrete, episodic, broken compared to continuous analog
time. Digital time is fragmented, like traumatic memories, whereas analog time connects past to
present, allowing narrative, and continuous forms of identity and self to emerge. Digital
experiences of time decouple analytic treatment, interrupt continuous “aliveness” and can feel
like “a succession of moments interrupted by little blanks or psychic deaths” (Bach, 2008). The
digital world is a “triumph of instantaneousness,” and like the borderline patient who does not
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have a stabilized object relational world, its inhabitants becomes dependent upon the
environment for affective discharge to return to equilibrium, rather than through a reliable ego.
While the technological world offers direct access to oneself and others by altering temporal and
spatial reality, it also disrupts the developmental process of object constancy (Favero &
Candellieri, 2017). When moments are digital, what is offered, the promise of immediate
gratification, also disrupts the continuity needed to internalize others as reliable.
Humanness is often the measure by which technological effects are measured. Does the
machine drain or infuse experience with the quality of being human? Technology, however is
often understood to be fundamentally altering humanness, such that Turkle has called for new
object relational models for machine-human dyads, stating, “A network of relationships on the
Internet challenges what we have traditionally called ‘identity’” (Turkle, 2004). One’s
consciousness about the experience of online engagement may mediate pathological from nonpathological experience. Whether life online is fragmented or continuous may be an artifact of an
individual’s theory of technology, to what degree they are aware of their own intentions and how
they understand what they are experiencing. Users who conceptualize their online identities as
transitional phenomena can “stand in the spaces” of multiple selves, expanding in novel ways
towards a potentially healthy post-human existence, whereas others who seek gratification of
narcissistic needs through using the machine as a “self-object” remain trapped in a
developmental impasse. Humans on average may be eager to jettison what psychoanalysts tend
to mean when they talk about humanness: complexity, ambivalence and the acceptance of
suffering as a part of life. Indeed, Hartman has wondered if the psychoanalytic project is
hopelessly out of date, incongruent with “Reality 2.0” in which limit and loss have been replaced
by infinite access, where there may be new, yet healthy psychic arrangements that don’t demand
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suffering as the cornerstone (Hartman, 2011). In Reality 2.0 one does not need the social world
to validate the self, but rather an individual can declare themselves to exist, “I present myself,
therefore I am.” Restrictions on identity as linked to the corporal self and the subjective
recognition by others is replaced by creating a social media persona and publishing digital
content. Inner part selves can come to life and interact in the public sphere. “The person
inhabiting this reality does not become a subject through the ambivalent acceptance of others'
reality. This is a reality of ultimate access and dizzying multiplicity where a person becomes a
subject regardless of others' reality” (Hartman, 2011). Hartman attacks stalwarts of ego
psychology, the idea that coherence is privileged over experimentation, that fantasy is based on
loss and that reality itself is real. Instead Reality 2.0 hinges on multiple co-existing selves, where
forays into the virtual world may not be dissociative avoidance, but rather potential space used to
explore fragments of identity and self that may not be available in the real. Seligman joins
Hartman’s critique but wonders if the virtual world must be recognized not as simply a changed
reality but one intentionally shaped by corporate interests who seek to control and profit from the
very mechanisms that Hartman is exploring (Seligman, 2011). The critique is not mutually
exclusive, but Seligman wonders if the context of the internet may explain something more
fundamental at play, namely a cultural shift away from the values of psychoanalysis, one where
the “mechanics of relief have supplanted the hope of emancipatory experience.” He locates the
political moment when economic policy lead to a cultural shift away from a recognition of one’s
actions on others in Reagan’s “trickle-down economics,” where “the myth of the free market has
thus been justified by a peculiar view that individuals acting without concern for others' interests
will nonetheless be acting on behalf of the society as a whole” (Seligman, 2011). Seligman is
equanimous about Hartman’s enthusiasm about Reality 2.0 but at the same time is wistful for
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what is perhaps a fading era where depth and authenticity were construed differently. He
wonders what “you” is really possible to represent in 147 characters or less, especially in absence
of physical bodies and the potential for physical contact.
Danielle Knafo asserts that the technological era is “perverse,” changing erotic and social
aspects of human relationships, such that “we humanize machines and dehumanize people”
(Knafo, 2015). Knafo interprets social psychological findings on the human tendency to
anthropomorphize objects as a universal need for connection built on empathy, although points
out deficits in humanizing for those with autistic, schizoid, psychopathic disorders as well as
traumatic histories. In sexual perversion, one is “turning a person into a thing,” stripping her of
subjectivity. She states, “the paradoxical needs to humanize and to dehumanize coexist in all of
us and that understanding these two tendencies helps explain the ease with which people interact
with their machines” and adds that the degree to which this dynamic is operative speaks to the
level of psychological functioning. It is through this lens she presents with great sensitivity her
treatment of an isolated man whose traumatic past left him with a profound fear of rejection from
women that lead him to maintain a primary relationship with a sex doll. Over the course of
treatment she comes to take a more empathic position towards the patient and sees his doll as an
invention, or transitional object, rather than a perversion. Through treatment she enabled him to
connect to the irony that “his ‘perfect woman’ had somehow made him feel wrong and
defective,” for which he has sought treatment with an actual woman who can know his suffering.
Knafo understands analytic presence as a healing phenomenon, stating “psychoanalysis can serve
as a potent antidote to the technological commodification in present-day society.”
Hartman takes a critical position towards several of Knafo’s assertions, especially that
cyberobjects (or sex dolls) have little potential for significance (Hartman, 2015). While it may be
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the case that pathology tends to collapse virtual, material and object relational experiences,
Hartman argues that the vast majority of individuals don’t suffer from such reductions and are in
an elastic process of active and passive engagement with a range of relational modes which do
not reduce whole objects to part objects necessarily, nor does engagement with part objects
necessarily signify a static position. Instead attunement to the discrepancy between virtual part
objects and bodily sensation can enable corrective shifts, “giving us more life and making us
more human.” Hartman names the dichotomous body on the internet, at one end enacted and
flesh and on the other side, a digital representation, yet does not equate this to a loss of humanity.
His critique ultimately resides in a question of pedagogy: is technology the agent that reduces
humanness or does our humanness interact with the technological in an intersectional process,
influenced by personal history and larger cultural processes, such as expectations of gender
expression and shifting modes of self presentation? Hartman concludes with the warning,
“Psychoanalysts’ discomfort with the novelties of Internet communication may lead us to
premature closures.” Gender theory, which informs Hartman’s critique, also prompts an idea that
love objects need not be people at all, but can be books or iPhones, without pathological
implications (Pellegrini, 2016). One can be seriously and studiously engaged in a love affair with
ideas or things that promote intellectual life. Drawn at the space between Freud’s primacy of the
drives in object selection and object relations primacy of the object, relational theorist Jody
Messler Davies proposes to “unyoke body and desire specifically, emphasizing the endless
complexity and infinite variability of our erotic selves” (Davies, 2015). Pellegrini proposes to
extend this idea into “novel forms not just of sexuality but of passionate object relating
irreducible to sexuality ‘per se’” (Pellegrini, 2016). For her, this type of love, especially for
academics and professors who generate new ways of thinking and understanding value, allows a
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form of relating that belies capitalization. What may be labelled as perverse by one clinician may
be viewed through a less pathological lens to another operating from a different theoretical
position.
Many theorists attribute technology’s power to disrupt or alter human experience, often
in problematic ways. Cyberspace and virtuality introduce dislocations between the physical body
and the imagined location of self. There is no singular cyberspace, cyberspace is a signifier for
an infinite space, a multiverse that is as expansive as the collective imagination. Individuals can
and do unconsciously enact historic patterns of conflict, fragmentation and dissociation, as well
as hopes and fantasies in cyberspace with cyberobjects, linked either to other humans or
potentially to bots and other artificially intelligent entities. Certain bodily sensations are
heightened while others atrophy. Cyberspace is changing our collective understanding of reality.
In Hartman’s Reality 2.0, “access trumps the need to accept limits as a tool to self-discovery, and
networking replaces containment as the bulwark of meaning.” The “loss of loss” disrupts the
development of the capacity for intersubjectivity, creativity and authenticity, and ultimately the
existence of a shared reality. Hartman’s critical point is to highlight the implications of this
change, rather than to simply lay blame on it for the emergence of pathological presentations. He
highlights traditional one-person modes and ideas of ego-integration as hopelessly outmoded and
advocates for the possibility of seeing health in the expression of multiplicity and radically
expanded modes of self that this new reality facilitates. The digital offers potential new modes
for psychic experience that are yet to be fully understood and Hartman asks they be evaluated
through a fresh lens.
For others, virtual reality is not quite real; the virtual quest is a substitute for genuine
adventure, removing real risk and rewards at the same time. Alessandra Lemma sees new media
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as a “theatre” upon which individuals act out “neurotic and perverse conflicts” (Lemma, 2017).
For example, using cyberspace to avoid the meaning of their own body, or to create idealized
online selves, defensively avoiding less acceptable parts. Instead of facing conflict, however,
users can simply log-off. Internet pornography provides a “flight from meaning,” as a
homogeneous substitute for personal erotic fantasy in adolescence boys, leaving problematic
traces of dissociation that show up in later sexual couplings (Galatzer-Levy, 2012). In
cyberspace, location becomes metaphor and confuses processes needed for identity formation as
well as interrupting stability necessary for the establishment and maintenance of
intersubjectively shared space (Marzi, 2016). Symbolization collapses into the equivalent mode
as individuals encounter “hyper-real objects” towards which they have “omnipotent fantasies of
absolute fulfillment,” foreclosing tolerance and mourning processes when faced with lack or
loss. The omnipotent fantasy extends outwards as well, where users imagine being universally
seen, known and accepted, leading to experiences of being alienated when disappointed and of
alienating others when grandiose. Both the self and the other are denied and replaced with a
developmentally primitive intolerance for difference in de-subjectified cyberspace. Rather than
fostering the capacity for working through and differentiation, the virtual world, devoid of
consensual reality, relies on more primitive, action oriented modes, such as splitting, projective
identification and idealization. Technology promotes identifications with machines, which are
designed to support narcissistic positions and are used as a surrogate for human functioning
(Tylim, 2012). The body becomes conflated with the machine, leading to confusion between
internal and external experiences and ultimately a dissolution of the self, replaced by a hybrid
man-machine, a cyborg. Objects do not have sufficient containers and primitive modes of self,
based on projective and introjective identifications driven by envy, greed and lust predominate.
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Access to others’ bodies and sexual imaginations is available for instantaneous connection and
disconnection, exciting and overstimulating, fostering grandiose and omnipotent fantasies
without interpersonal accountability. One may eventually be able to “upload” or “download”
their own or someone else’s mind, expand their intellectual capacity or modify their body with a
microchip. These fantasies of alterability mean that no limitations need be accepted and that
desire is all that matters. Gender, physicality, and even life and death become negotiable, as the
“subject is an empty container to be filled by the fantasy of the moment” (Tylim, 2012). The
body is colonized by the computer and a technological nature replaces primary nature. The
erosion of privacy, of the sanctity of interior space, and the capacity for symbolization, Tylim
argues, is what is under attack and may threaten the project of psychoanalysis.
The degree to which historic and emerging psychoanalytic concepts are useful and
flexible enough to explain the technological era remain to be seen. Least it be imagined that
analysis and analysts are immune from the effects of the digital era any more than our patients,
one wonders what makes sense to hold onto during a tidal wave? Can one conjecture about the
effects without entering and living inside it? As we do with patients, it may be necessary to keep
one foot in our understanding of reality, while entering into Reality 2.0. “I am suggesting that
analysts ask not what psychoanalysis can tell them about the Internet, nor even what the Internet
can tell them about psychoanalysis. Rather, I am suggesting that they become more active
participants in the search for understanding the profound effects of this new digital step”
(Litowitz, 2012). It is increasingly becoming a necessity for analysts to understand the digital
world, or at least the nature of their perception of the digital world, as countertransferential
reactions undoubtedly emerge while listening to and responding to what is reported to be
everyday occurrences of the digital making its way into the consulting room. Hartman asks, “To
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what extent does our own participation in cyber reality color our patients' interpretation of their
analysts' subjectivity?” (Hartman, 2011). This is not something that can be ignored.
Research On Effects Of Technology On Psychological Functioning
The domains of experience that have been transformed by the advancement of technology
into everyday life are numerous, from communicating and relating to achieving, discovering and
creating. Given the vast scope of what one can do online, no less with technology more broadly,
much of the focus on this section will be what type of internet usage, for whom and under what
conditions have been shown to predict pathological outcomes. It is notable that the majority of
research on the effects of technology are focused on internet addiction, mood or anxiety
disorders and samples are typically adolescents or young adults. Social media use, in particular,
has been the area of greatest scrutiny, which makes sense given the Pew Research Center
Internet & Technology group reporting that Facebook, until recently was the most popular online
platform (Anderson & Jiang, 2018). As of May 2018, YouTube, Instagram and Snapchat are the
most popular online platforms among teens, with 95% of teens having access to a smartphone,
and 45% say they are online “almost constantly.” Self-reported effects of technology use are
“mostly positive” (31%), “mostly negative” (24%), and “neither positive nor negative” (45%)
(Anderson & Jiang, 2018).
Symptoms such as (a) an increasing investment of resources on internet-related activities,
(b) unpleasant feelings (e.g., anxiety, depression, emptiness) when offline, (c) an increasing
tolerance to the effects of being online, and (d) denial of the problematic behaviors are organized
under the non-DSM diagnosis of Internet addiction, or pathological dependence upon the
Internet (Kandell, 1998). In this conceptualizing, the symptoms are an expression of underlying
pathology, to which college age students are particularly vulnerable, perhaps associated with a
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need for control, or the developmental challenges of identity formation. However, some disagree
with the accuracy and utility of this diagnosis for clinical treatment and its failure to appreciate
the novel nature of the internet, compared to other behavioral addictions like gambling (Essig,
2015). A systematic review of research related to internet addiction reports that there is no gold
standard for internet addiction classification and thus prevalence rates vary from 0.8% in Italy to
26.7% in Hong Kong and vary by sociodemographic and psychosocial factors (J. Kuss et al.,
2014). In one measure of internet addiction, the statically significant dimensions were (a)
withdrawal and social problems, (b) time management and performance, and (c) reality substitute
(Chang & Man Law, 2008), while another identifies (a) compulsive use, (b) negative outcomes
and (c) salience (J. Kuss et al., 2014). One study reports that online gaming and social use
increase the risk of internet addiction, while conscientiousness and extraversion are preventative
factors for gaming addiction (Kuss et al., 2013). Single case reports shed light on more extreme
presentations. A flood of stories with sensational headlines such as, “Korean Couple Let Baby
Starve To Death While Caring For Virtual Child” (“Korean couple let baby starve to death while
caring for virtual child,” 2010) , “A California Couple Is In Prison For Neglecting Children
While Playing World Of Warcraft” (Kosoff, 2014), and “A Chinese Couple Reportedly Sold
Their Two Children To Fund Their Internet Gaming Addictions” (Kosoff, 2014) give a hysterical
flavor to the real life costs of digital entanglement. As of June 2018 the World Health
Organization’s update of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) included “Gaming
Disorder” (WHO Releases New International Classification of Diseases (ICD 11), 2018).
As early as 1998, researchers were aware of the paradoxical nature of the internet, at once
promising communication and connection, yet delivering reductions in social involvement and
psychological well-being (Kraut et al., 1998). Through a longitudinal study of individuals’ first
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years online, researchers demonstrated a correlation with lower communication between family
members, social decrement and increases in depression and loneliness (Kraut et al., 1998). Not
surprisingly, the more time people spend online, the less time they have to spend on real life
activities, jeopardizing academic performance (lower GPA) with decrements in social and
interpersonal opportunities, often with negative psychological effects. A 2006 self-report study
on Korean high school students (n=1573) showed rates of internet addiction at 1.6% while
possible internet addiction was 38%, with no differences by gender. Levels of depression and
suicidal ideation were highest for the internet addicted group (Kim et al., 2006). Many other
studies have shown correlations between high rates of internet use, or addiction, linked to
pornography, online gaming and social networking with internalizing problems such as
depression and social anxiety in adolescents and adults, while others have demonstrated
expanded social connections and enhanced feelings of self-esteem and well-being (Selfhout et
al., 2009), however the direction of causality is often unknown (Morrison & Gore, 2010). A
recent metanalysis of 22 studies on social anxiety and internet use showed positive correlations
between social anxiety and feelings of comfort online as well as problematic internet use (PIU), a
self-report measure of pathological use (Prizant-Passal et al., 2016). For those with social
anxiety, the reduction in non-verbal cues, including physical appearance, and the lack of need to
respond immediately contributed to their sense of comfort online. Social anxiety was not
correlated to time spent online, except in the case of online gaming. Age range, or developmental
level moderated the effects in the positive direction, such that as age progressed there were
stronger correlations between social anxiety and social comfort online, time spent online and
PIU. Interestingly, most social media use has been shown to be for maintaining or establishing
off-line relationships, with extroverts using it for social enhancement, compared to introverts for
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social compensation, with greater use associated with low conscientiousness and high narcissism
(Kuss & Griffiths, 2011). Both groups are prone to develop internet addiction, but in the service
of alternate needs.
Divergent conceptualizations have lead researchers to attend in more detail to the actual
patterns of use, in particular, differences in how individuals make use of the internet.
Researchers have parsed use into the domains of communication or non-communication
purposes, for example. Non-communication use, such as surfing, used to moderate mood,
conceptualized as escapism or avoidance, is imagined to have few long-term rewards and is
linked to depression and social anxiety, whereas communicative modes of usage are associated
with pro-social behaviors, assisting in the development of social functioning and have been
linked to lower rates of depression, although contradictory results have also been found. At least
one study used social media as an adjunctive treatment modality for subjects receiving in-patient
and out-patient psychiatric care, for initiating treatment contact as well as for managing
psychological problems, such as loneliness by encouraging use of social media to seek emotional
support by frequent posting (Menon et al., 2014). Of course, what happens with your attempts
towards social engagement online also matter and researchers who have taken an ends-focused
perspective found users who receive negative feedback from others online have low self-esteem
and low well-being (Valkenburg et al., 2006). Other research has hypothesized that it is socially
anxious teens that are drawn towards digital mediated communication, yet there are no
differences in rates of social anxiety between groups who spend more or less time using instant
messaging, perhaps indicating that for some, virtual relationships confer psychological benefits.
Friendship quality, has been proposed as a moderating factor, such that for those with high
quality friendships, and likely successful social strategies, messaging may expand their social
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world and thus well-being, while for those with low quality friendships, digital mediation may
provide the scaffolding needed to explore identity, develop new social skills and make new
connections, leading to well-being.
Narcissism has been a focus of internet use research, sometimes seen as an explanatory
factor related to behavior online, and other times linked to a pathology that has emerged from
compulsive use. Traits of narcissism have been linked with more “egocentric” internet use, such
as posting more selfies (Adler, 2017), and greater overall levels of activity on social media sites
(Kuss & Griffiths, 2011). Given the personality structure of narcissists, who have a fragile core
that is defended against by a grandiose self, internet activities that contribute to an enhanced
image can be hard to withdraw from, compared to those whose off-line lives do not hold the
same rewards. Greater level of social media use have been associated with narcissistic
personality traits, which in turn has been associated with addiction (Kuss & Griffiths, 2011).
However, whether narcissistic personality traits falls in the realm of pathology is in question
(Reus, 2015). Others argue that technology use itself, by means of interrupting the development
of the capacity for empathy has produced a generation that is narcissistic by virtue of lacking the
developmental experiences needed to sense others’ experiences. Instead of internalizing a good
object during early childhood, these children experienced mothers whose attention was focused
on the screen. These critical disruptions, coupled with ongoing technology use, propagate a
compensatory self-centeredness. Research has shown that subjects did not enjoy the experience
of being alone in a room for 6 to 15 minutes, instead selecting to do mundane tasks and even to
administer electric shocks to distract themselves from being alone with their thoughts (Wilson et
al., 2014). Neuroimaging research has shown that online gaming addiction is linked to reductions
in grey matter in the insula, a part of the brain linked to the capacity to develop empathy and
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compassion for others and integrate physical signals with emotion (Weng et al., 2012). At the
same time, disconnecting from electronic devices for five days has been shown to increase the
capacity for empathy in children (Turkle, 2015).
Attachment theory has been utilized to discern expectations and patterns of use related to
technology. The Young Adult Attachment To Phone Scale (YAPS) demonstrates that for those
with anxious attachment the phone is a “refuge,” a place to feel safe from discomfort upon
separation, compared to those with avoidant attached for whom the phone is a “burden,”
producing discomforting pressure when in proximity and relief upon separation (Trub & Barbot,
2016). Higher levels of attachment anxiety has been linked to higher levels of social media use
when experiencing negative emotions and more concerned with how they are perceived by
others. Attachment avoidance tended to show an inverted pattern, with lower use rates
(Oldmeadow et al., 2013). Those with secure attachment were able to use social media to bond
online, and bridge online and offline “social capital” (Lin, 2015).
As therapies move into the digital space, attention has been directed at efficacy research.
Studies have shown improvement in a range of virtual reality exposure treatments for fear of
flying (North et al., 1997), public speaking (Harris et al., 2002) and claustrophobia (Botella et al.,
1998). Some have shown greater effects for virtual reality based treatments, compared to inperson modes (Botella, Osma, Garcia-Palacios, Quero, & Baños, 2004)(Botella et al., 2004) .
However, when the same modality of talk therapy was delivered in-person compared to internet
delivery, using video conferencing software, benefits were conferred to only the in-person group,
despite both groups rating their treatments equally credible and satisfying (Chavooshi et al.,
2017).
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Scientific Influences On Social Perception Of Mind As Machine: Behaviorism,
Functionalism, Cognitive Behavioral Manualized Treatment and Artificial Intelligence
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch
of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior…The time
seems to have come when psychology must discard all reference to consciousness; when
it need no longer delude itself into thinking that it is making mental states the object of
observation. (Watson, 1913).
We had to enter into our own potentials for programmed, automatic thought and
action before we could build automatons of silicon, plastic and metal…Not only did the
machine originate with us, and not only does it live in us, but now it has a massive
external and objective presence in our lives. We can interact with all this machinery only
by shaping ourselves to its requirements. In this way the objectified machine can, if we
allow it, further strengthen those inner, mimed automatisms from which it first arose.
Now repeated in compulsive resonance with the universal computational apparatus of
society, these inner gestures threaten to harden into chains of the soul. (Talbott, 2007)
“Within 10 years computers won’t even keep us as pets.” (Minsky, 1967)
When Watson issued his behaviorist edict in 1913 (quoted above) he set the course for an
approach to psychology aimed at studying people without regard for internal processes, in an
effort to make the field an “objective” science, like physics, by focusing strictly on observable
phenomena. While many factors, including industrial demands for psychological services, lack
of academic positions for PhD psychologists, and the prioritization of technological concepts like
efficiency on American pedagogy contributed to Watson’s view, (Greenwood, 2015) his
instruction came to exert a significant effect on psychological thought and later on clinical
practice in the United States, away from subjective experience, pejoratively termed the “ghosts
in the machine” (Ryle, 1949). Even this sly statement names the human mind as a machine, and
internal processes as archaic spirits interrupting the serious work of science.
As the era of electronic computers began in the mid-century, the machine became a
potent metaphor and representation of how the human mind processes information, giving way to
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the philosophical idea of functionalism and the field of cognitive science (Ledoux, 1998).
Functionalism postulated that similar underlying processes are responsible for corresponding
intelligent functions, such that, “the mind is to the brain as a computer program is to the
computer hardware” (Ledoux, 1998). Functionalism, like behaviorism, wasn’t concerned with
introspection or mental states, but rather the equivalence between man and machine. Whether it
be a machine or a person doing a particular math problem, for example, functionalism argued the
internal processes must be the same, opening the door to decades of research on the human mind
using computer models, not humans, as the subject of study, of humans. Indeed, from this
perspective, affective experience was a pesky problem that cognitive scientists, who sought to
reduce the mind to a series of “states” and “transitions,” basically ignored or treated like
epiphenomena, with no primary importance. Contemporary neurobiological data suggests the
contrary, that emotion is a central feature of consciousness, language and memory (Duncan &
Barrett, 2007).
Cognitive science found expression in many disciplines, and lead to the development and
rise of cognitive theories and treatments in clinical psychology. Psychoanalysis’ public failure in
conceptualizing the etiology of schizophrenia as a derivative of “refrigerator mothers,” created a
demand for less “introspective” treatments, leading to the development of cognitive, behavioral
and ultimately cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). Aaron Beck, the father of CBT, located
psychopathology in “thinking errors” and “biased processing,” or distortions in interpreting
responses to thought or internal states (Beck, 1997). “According to the cognitive model, people
see things the way they do because this is the direction that their cognitive processing takes
them. They may see things accurately when their cognitive processing is right on target. If they
have some type of mental disorder, the cognitive apparatus is skewed in one direction or
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another” (Beck, 1997). CBT conceptualized pathology as an error and treatment as the resolution
of this error, not dissimilar to the process of debugging computer code. CBT treatments were
manualized, written as an algorithm that a human therapist could execute on patients, creating a
one-size fits all, homogenous solution to human ills. Without concern for etiology, personal
history or a notion that symptoms have a psychological meaning, CBT, it was demonstrated,
worked efficiently, although typically had lower long term effectiveness, compared to dynamic
treatments. The logic of machines, via language like “processing,” and ideas like “accuracy”
were a significant shift away from the more linguistic theory of Freud and Lacan, postulated on
the unconscious, dialectics and lack. Programmatic thought was replacing poetics as the lens to
view human experience, with an implicit turn away from the idea that symptoms have meaning
or an appreciation for the everyday suffering of life. If you aren’t happy there must be something
wrong, seemed to be the message, and lets re-program your mind to fix it, so you can get back to
work and be productive.
At the same time, artificial intelligence (AI), driven by a related fantasy of omniscient
control over the frustrating aspects of human behavior, sought to create machines that possess
and improve on human intellectual capacity. Many proponents of AI, capitalizing on perceived
human limitations began to imagine a world where human problems would be solved by more
perfect machines. The human apparatus, in particular, illogical emotions, came to be seen as a
deficit compared to idealized computers that are not prone to the inefficiencies that arise from
affect. Limitations in the speed and accuracy of human processing, particularly scientifically
demonstrated biases and errors that the human mind was prone to, were seen in a negative light.
Marvin Minsky, co-founder of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's AI laboratory,
famously stated, “The brain happens to be a meat machine” (Minsky, 1969). More recently, AI
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has moved from the academic laboratory into everyday life. AI drives natural language
processing systems, which allow humans to communicate with machines via colloquial syntax,
as if machines were understanding others. AI and it’s sibling “data science” currently collect and
mine the footprints individuals leave behind during every interaction with internet connected
digital devices, creating behind-the-scenes models of personality that are used to re-present
ourselves and others back to us in nomothetical form. Corporate and governmental efforts to
“carry out a system-supportive propaganda function, by reliance on market forces, internalized
assumptions, and self-censorship, and without overt coercion" (Herman & Chomsky, 1998) are
profoundly aided and abetted by the power of digital technology, without bringing conscious
attention to its means or methods. More visibly, AI has entered the popular imagination in
cinematic representation in films such as “Her,” “The Matrix,” and “Ex-Machina.” In the second
season of “West World,” sophisticated human-like robots that were hunted for human pleasure
have developed the capacity to remember and have turned their experience of being desubjectified into aggression directed towards their human victimizers, a digitally imagined
allegory for slavery and racial inequality that have awakened to past trauma and used violence in
the service of justice. In more immediate terms, AI has a permanent presence in the popular
media, alternately portrayed as offering fantastic improvements in health, medical and pleasure
industries, while encroaching on employment, becoming autonomous and vengeful and
rendering humanity obsolete.
The collective effect of behaviorism, functionalism, CBT and AI, has been to propel, not
just within academia, but into popular culture, the idea that the human mind is a machine, that
humans should aspire to be as flawless as machines and that humans are inferior to machines.
These ideas continue to take new forms and permeate the conscious and unconscious of the
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technology industry today, who celebrate the machines power to solve all that ails humankind.
New digital products are routinely touted as “solving” long-lasting “problems,” and “making the
world a better place.” Promises of eternal life, enhanced memory and accelerated cognition are
but a few of the products available now or in the near future, not to mention the terrifying next
iteration of war that drones, robotic soldiers and autonomous vehicles portend. “Data-ism,” a
term coined by David Brooks and extended by Yuval Noah Harari, is proposed as a new religion
in which information is prized above all else. “Dataism declares that the universe consists of data
flows, and the value of any phenomenon or entity is determined by its contribution to data
processing.” As with previous technological shift, believers move into a decentered view of self,
towards a wish to optimize the system. If “Dataism” is the religion, “Quantified Self,” is the
practice. The movement focuses on how individuals, powered by computational based
monitoring devices and the digital records that are produced can “hack” their own lives to live
longer, healthier and better, internalizing the edicts of efficiency that technology theorists
outlined with caution. Man wants to be machine.
The other side of this equation is the conscious intentions of the individuals who design
hardware and software and benefit financially from its continued use. The teams behind social
media sites are well aware of the findings of behavioral and neurobiological research on reward
mechanisms and have built their systems to exploit human vulnerabilities. Jarod Lanier, a
longtime critic of big tech calls social media companies, “behavior modification empires”
(Lanier, 2018). Sean Parker, the founding president of Facebook recently said in an interview:
The thought process that went into building these applications, Facebook being the first
of them, ... was all about: How do we consume as much of your time and conscious
attention as possible? And that means that we need to sort of give you a little dopamine
hit every once in a while, because someone liked or commented on a photo or a post or
whatever. And that's going to get you to contribute more content, and that's going to get
you…more likes and comments. It's a social-validation feedback loop…exactly the kind
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of thing that a hacker like myself would come up with, because you're exploiting a
vulnerability in human psychology. (“Sean Parker unloads on Facebook,” Nov 9)
These forces have been coalescing over the past several decades and have had an
overwhelming impact on shaping human experience in the present. While it’s tempting to
speculate on the political, social and cultural causes and effects, for my purposes, the question is,
how and to what degree are these causes underlying the presentation of pathology in the most
vulnerable populations? Moreover, is it perceptible to clinicians and in what way may they link
individual suffering to these more global effects?
Social Psychology Literature Review
“An image can reach the depth without stirring the surface” (Schlapobersky, 2017)
Social psychology reveals human susceptibility to attributing the most human qualities,
including intention, life, mind and even “humanness,” to shapes, machines and non-human
entities. The digital era offers the possibility for new configurations of machine-human
relationships, yet little is known of the immediate and lasting psychological implications of these
organizations. With growing intimacy in human-machine interaction, the importance of
understanding the nature of such relationships increases, including possibly shifts in perceiving
and ultimately conceptualizing representations of self and other. At least in the present, there is
an unbridgeable gap between the internal mechanisms of a machine: algorithms, processors,
actuators and motors vs. the human experiences over a lifespan of shifting relationships to
selfhood, reflectivity, emotion and behavior. Despite the quality of thought that psychoanalysts
give to the sanctity of the human experience, humans, as a group appear to easily project these
attributes into obviously non-human forms. Moreover, machine designers may utilize cues of
humanness to intentionally push these boundaries, with the aim of invoking human-like feelings
towards digital devices. While the literature does not tend to speculate about its implications for
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clinical concerns, it takes little effort to imagine that such a blurry boundary can have deep
implications for how self, other and mind come to be perceived and the set of expectations that
may result. Humans may expect more from machines that can gratify without demand and less
from humans who require far greater attention, care and reciprocity (Turkle, 2011). Machines
may have the capacity to simulate human-like appearances and actions, yet lack human
subjectivity. Given the central role of subjectivity in forming mature, meaningful and dynamic
interpersonal relationships, this lack can motivate humans, especially when making attributions
of “mind” to machines, to unconsciously hold and operate from reduced views of themselves and
others.
While more recent literature under review concerns the perception of non-human faces as
human, the earliest research shows that it may take far less robust cues for individuals to
conceptualize motivation in human terms. In 1944, Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel screened
a strikingly simple short film which portrayed the movement of geometric objects (Heider &
Simmel, 1944). One set of subjects was asked to describe what they saw and another set was told
to “interpret the movements as actions of persons.” The experimenters reported that just about all
subjects “interpreted the picture in terms of actions of animated beings, chiefly of persons”
regardless of the instructions given. They conclude that because the shapes are interpreted as
figures, they inherit the property of motivation. Furthermore, they suggest that this method may
be useful in investigating the way the behavior of other people are perceived. While primitive
geometric objects (2 triangles and a circle) bear no resemblance to the human form, they are
easily conceived of and described as human and invoke subjective intention, mood and affect.
Joseph Weizenbaum, a German Jew who fled Nazi rule at age 13, wrote ELIZA, the first
synthetic therapist between 1964-1966 while at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology AI
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Lab. ELIZA, assembled in just 200 lines of computer code, was designed to mimic the behavior
of a Rogerian therapist, but had no knowledge of human experience, or capacity to understand
language. Instead it could parse language syntactically, to reflect back what the user had input.
The program was intended to show the hollowness of human-machine exchange, but instead,
people attributed human feelings to the machine, including Weizenbaum’s secretary who, despite
being told the machine could not understand her, wanted to be left alone with it to do therapy
(Weizenbaum, 1976). Weitzenbaum concluded "I had not realized ... that extremely short
exposures to a relatively simple computer program could induce powerful delusional thinking in
quite normal people” (Weizenbaum, 1976).
“The Media Equation Test,” asked if computers can instigate social responses in humans
(Reeves & Nass, 1996). In the experiment, individuals were directed to work with a computer to
learn random facts about popular culture. The computer presented the subjects with a series of
facts and subjects were asked how much they knew about each statement. The subjects were then
tested on their knowledge and told which questions they answered correctly or incorrectly. The
computer then stated that it “did a good job.” Subjects were assigned to one of three groups in
which they were asked to describe the performance of the computer from a set of attributes that
ranged from positive to negative. One group was assigned to the same computer they had been
using, a second to a computer sitting on the other side of the same room and the third to pencil
and paper. Results for the training and testing computer showed less variance and were more
positive compared to the adjectives given to the machine across the room and the paper and
pencil control condition, which were more varied and more negative. The subjects upheld the
social norm of politeness towards the machine they had used, but felt more “comfortable”
reporting a wider range of responses to the other computer, or paper form. It was as if they didn’t
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want to hurt the feelings of the machine that had announced, “I did a good job,” perhaps
perceiving vulnerability or believing the machine’s self report. Reeves and Nass found that
participants had “automatic social reactions during the test” and concluded that “humans interact
with machines in the same way as they relate to another human being (by being polite,
cooperative, attributing personality characteristics such as aggressiveness, humor, expertise, and
even gender),” arguing that such user interactions ‘‘are fundamentally social and natural, just
like interactions in real life’’ (Reeves & Nass, 1996).
Sherry Turkle proposes that attachment is at the root of the bonds we feel, whether it be
with humans or machines (Turkle, 2011). She observed that a wave of toys that “demanded” and
recognized caretaking by the use of digital circuits, such as the Furby and Tamagotchi, produced
during the late 1990s, quickly became receptacles for children’s projection of personality. Both
toys would make sounds that required the children to respond in a timely manner, to feed or
comfort, least the entity “die.” Through language, children easily attributed aliveness to these
toys, while also recognizing they ran on batteries and were plastic. Most strikingly was that when
a Tamagotchi would “die,” it could easily be reset and brought back to life, however, most
children were left in a state of mourning and rejected the “new” life encased in the same small
plastic shell. Instead, children tended to demand a new physical entity and would not allow the
same shell to be brought back to life. Speaking of an online “graveyard” for deceased
Tamagotchi’s, Turkle concludes, “Children take responsibility for virtual deaths” and continues,
“They sanction the idea that it is appropriate to mourn the digital – indeed, that there is
something ‘there’ to mourn” (Turkle, 2011).
These studies present a stark backdrop for more recent work that examines the question
of how, when and where we perceive “life” in a face (Christine E. Looser & Thalia Wheatley,
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2010). Given the nominal cues required to engage social functioning, the face is among the most
intimate parts of the human body and thus the point at which non-human faces are perceived as
human open the door to essential questions about selfhood and otherness. These experiments
were conducted with 2-D representations, presented on-screen, much like the way people
currently encounter both human and non-human representations online. In the present study,
subjects were asked to rate, using a 7-point Likert scale (from 1, definitely alive, to 7, definitely
not alive), a randomized set of faces selected from a monotonic morph from animate (human) to
inanimate (mannequin). The same subjects later scrolled through single morphs in a linear order
(counterbalanced between starting at human or mannequin end-points) and were asked to located
the animacy boundary, or the point of inflection between human and non-human, identifying the
point of just-noticeable-animacy (JNA). Two months later the same subjects returned and using
the same randomized process made three additional judgements about the face stimuli, namely is
it: 1) “able to formulate a plan,” 2) “able to feel pain,” and 2) “has a mind.” Results for the
randomized animacy experiment showed that the point of subjective equality (PSE), which is the
point in the data where subjects were equally likely to attribute animacy or inanimacy to a face
morph (M=0.64), was meaningfully higher than the objective point of equality (0.5). The face
morph must be 64% human before the average person will begin attributing animacy to a
synthetic face. In other words, the bias is towards the human face before it is considered alive.
The JNA (M=0.67) proved a close match to the PSE, providing a measure of convergent validity
between different modes of sampling the data. A JNA of 0.67 means subjects begin attributing
animacy to a face when the morph ratio is 67% animate to 33% inanimate. Ratings for when a
face could plan, feel pain, or has a mind showed very strong correlations to the ratings for
animacy, with r’s of .958, .953, and .922, respectively. This indicates that once a face is above
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the threshold for being perceived as human, it receives (or inherits?) attributions we assume are
reserved explicitly for other humans. To reflect on the implications of these findings, one can
imagine the difference between internal mental representations of a digital character (such as one
encountered in a video game, virtual world or sex simulation) that falls above this boundary vs.
one that does not. The digital entity that receives attributions of being able to plan, feel pain and
having a mind invites the projections of a relationship based on mutuality, evoked by
expectations of having a past, present and future, empathy and a mind that has the capacity to
holding another in mind. One is not inclined to imagine that a robot that performs a task (such a
vacuuming) could hold a representation of a human in mind. However, a digital persona that
passes this animacy test appears likely to provoke a fantasy of possessing the capacity for
remembering and introspection.
Donald Winnicott wrote poetically about early childhood development and the central
role the mother’s ability to hold her child in mind plays in fostering and cohering the child’s
nascent experience of selfhood (Winnicott, 1960). Beatrice Beebe, who uses frame-by-frame
video analysis of mother-child interactions at 4 months of age has suggested that the quality of
mirroring contributes most of the variance towards attachment style, with mothers who can’t
imagine the mind of the child producing insecurely attached children (Beebe et al., 2010). One of
the primary means of therapeutic change in mentalization based therapy (MBT), developed by
Peter Fonagy, a major researcher and contemporary voice in psychoanalysis, is the patient
having the experience of the analyst holding the patient in mind (Allen & Fonagy, 2006). For
many patients pathology stems from a lack of being able to hold themselves in their own mind
and experience conflict stemming from the struggle to have a coherent and/or stable enough self.
So called “pre-oedipal” conflict can change when the therapists ability to “mentalize,” or hold
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the patient’s experience in mind scaffolds the patient’s process of first stabilizing and ultimately
developing this capacity for themselves. Given the centrality and significance that mind,
especially the minds of others play in human development, there can be major implications of
making this attribution to digital representations that look human-like, yet do not have a mind.
While we may unconsciously come to wish a machine can hold us in mind, there is little capacity
for it to do more than keep a record of our actions and produce contingent responses. As
Gertrude Stein wrote in 1937 about Oakland, CA, “there is no there there” (Stein, 2004). While
this research points to human attunement to this boundary in the favor of human-looking as
opposed to mannequin, it also reveals that there is about 35% wiggle room where a not fully
human face will invoke attribution of mind. With the emergence of Deepfakes, machine learning
technology can generate and animate images of faces that are indistinguishable in appearance to
a human faces, but are not actual people, there appears to be no boundary left between man and
machine and thus in what one may reasonably attribute human qualities to.
Least it be imagined easy to produce projections of animacy to a face, the researchers
demonstrated that there is heightened sensitivity towards the PSE or animacy-boundary, but that
once crossed appears to be a categorical distinction. In a differentiation task subjects were asked
to judge whether two images, either literally the same image (same) or from continuous points on
the face morph (different) were the same of different. Different points on the continuum were
used, including both within ranges (inanimate/inanimate and animate/animate) and between
ranges (animate/inanimate) and results indicate that both sensitivity to the animacy boundary was
significantly greater than for other points on the continuum and that attributions of “same” to
inanimate faces exceeded “same” to animate pairs, animacy-boundary pairs, and mirrorboundary pairs. Both results indicate heightened scrutiny given to faces that move in the
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direction of being perceived as animate, whereas faces that are clearly non-human don’t demand
such consideration. To generalize, there is special attention given to the human/non-human
inflection point, likely an indicator of the broad-ranging consequences of such an attribution. A
third experiment attempts to isolate features of the faces to determine which hold the most
variance in attributions of animacy. Subjects were presented with isolated features from a range
of morphs. The eye was of special importance, accounting for 75.3% of the variance in wholeface animacy ratings, F(1, 218) = 664.59, b = 1.14. This research suggests that bottom-up, visual
processes are one mechanism capable of producing attributions of animacy to human and nearhuman faces. The inherent ambiguity of face morphs implicates a bottom-up process where
cognition later attaches a label. While Heider & Simmel’s famous video demonstrated how little
resolution or even apparent similarity towards the human-form is needed before the actions of
shapes can be interpreted as human-like (Heider & Simmel, 1944), there is particular sensitivity
to facial information from bottom-up perceptual processing when conferring life in a face. When
these bottom-up clues coalesce to produce attributions of animacy, our understanding of the
other shifts. As the authors state, “understanding that the observable face is attached to an
unobservable mind” (Christine E. Looser & Thalia Wheatley, 2010) is likely to produce a
constellation of expectations about such an entity that draw on our experience with humans,
despite the fact that it may not be attached to a human.
What behaviors may destroy such an attribution that a face may evoke? John Searles, in a
reference to Winnicott’s notion of the false-self, points out that a robot may demonstrate “as-if
intentionality” whereas a human is perceived to have “intrinsic” intentionality (Searle, 1983).
For Winnicott, a false self develops when an infant’s affective range is unable to be accepted, or
contained by the mother. In turn, the child learns to perform an “as-if” self to maintain the
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needed connection to the mother, rather than to act comfortably from a place of inner sensation
and drive. With as-if intentionality, we unconsciously operate from the fantasy that a machine is
accepting and gratifying, rather than in human relationships in which we understand and come to
tolerate ambivalence, conflict or intensity related to others’ intrinsic intentionality. Indeed the
subject of attribution of animacy to human-like machines and its effects on interaction is not
something to be shied away from, rather it an important area of study where the tendency to
project intelligence onto robots may motivate humans to rationalize the actions of a machine as
human-like (Duffy, 2003).
Given the potential mechanisms discussed above that may explain why and how
machines are perceived as human, yet at the same time potentially falling short in other measures
of humanness, such as perceived “as-if” intentionality, rather than intrinsic intentionality, one is
led to wonder what effect such discrepancies may produce. The threat to distinctiveness
hypothesis proposes that “too much perceived similarity between social robots and humans
triggers concerns about the negative impact of this technology on humans as a group, and their
identity more generally because similarity blurs categorical boundaries, undermining human
uniqueness” (Ferrari et al., 2016). As the gap between roles that social robots and humans
shrinks, the need for humans to distinguish themselves from robots may increase and humans
social attitude towards robots may become more negative. This pattern of behavior is an
extension of social-identity theory. Recent research, in fact, shows that “negative attitudes were
expressed by respondents who read hypothetical scenarios in which robots were described to
have rights equal to humans (i.e., citizenship)” (Enz et al., 2011). Given that as of October 26th
2017, Sophia, a commercial robot was granted citizenship to Saudi Arabia, this is no longer a
hypothetical scenario (Peterson, 2017). It is hypothesized that robots that invoke attributions of
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animacy (and thus mind) would be most threatening. In an experiment, a series of images of
robots that were rated for anthropomorphic appearance, were presented to subjects and subjects
were asked to report on a measure of perceived damage to human identity by answering
questions such as: “The robot seems to lessen the value of human existence,” “I get the feeling
that the robot could damage relations between people,” “The robot could easily be used for evil
(to fool, to harm, etc.)” and “I think the robot will soon control humans” (Ferrari et al., 2016).
Androids (the most human-like robots) were perceived as more damaging to human identity than
robots that bore less physical resemblance to humans. Curiously, females reported greater
sensitivity to threats to human identity than males. A mediational model was proposed that
showed that robot anthropomorphic appearance mediated the perceived damage. Essential, a
robot that might be mistaken for a human has the potential to disrupt feelings associated with
human identity. A second experiment, which followed the protocol in the first experiment was
undertaken that added questions related to producing an “undermining human–machine
distinctiveness” composite (a set of questions to this effect). Again, androids (most human-like
in appearance) were found to produce the greatest level of threat to distinctiveness as assessed
via the “undermining human–machine distinctiveness” measure. Secondary analysis showed the
effect of a mediational model in which anthropomorphic appearance was responsible for the
differences in the perception of undermining human-machine distinctiveness. In turn, judgments
of undermined human–machine distinctiveness accounted for the differences in the perceived
robots damage to humans and their identity. Collectively this offers strong evidence in favor of
the hypothesis that robots that most closely resemble humans blur the boundaries between these
formerly distinct categories and produce a threat to the distinctiveness of humans. By extension,
if we consider human-like machines as a unique race, social psychological research related to
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ingroup and outgroup phenomena may meaningfully explain the current state of affairs between
humans and human-looking machines.
Taken in total, the research suggests that when machines could be evaluated to appear
human-like, they have the capacity to provoke attributions typically reserved for people. There
may be psychological correlates linked to being perceived as human-enough to invoke configural
processing, such that machines that cross this threshold could appear to have fundamental human
qualities such as the ability to plan, and by extension a sense of past, present and future, and
most importantly, having a mind, that can conceptualize others. When the user of such a machine
begins to imagine that the machine can hold them in mind, it opens the door to fundamental
shifts in what it means to be human and most importantly, to be a human engaged in a
relationship with another entity. These changes are likely to have profound effects on both
intrapsychic and interpersonal relationships as well as how machine-human relationships exist in
the social sphere. What becomes of the human and to what extend humans will consciously or
unconsciously defend humanness will likely be a result of how society may shift the identity of
both humans and machines. Even for humans that don’t interact directly with such
representations, an awareness that others do may already be driving the hypothesized changes.
Media/Technology Theory Literature Review
Media and technology theory aims to demystify the mechanisms of broadcast and digital
mediums and deconstruct the power of its effects on social and personal experience. The material
reviewed here is intended to extend the context for the current investigation. While it may not be
directly linked to patient experiences, it is the historical and contemporary backdrop upon which
present experience is built.
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As discussed previously, for Freud technology were prosthetic devices that extended
biological facilities towards fantasies of god-like omniscience, yet failed to deliver relief from
man’s everyday suffering. Marshall McLuhan expanded on this idea several decades later,
adding that to the degree of extension beyond human capacity that technology provides, there is
a deadening inverse effect, that of numbing the original organ. While the telephone extends the
voice, making communication possible across great distances, previously relied upon skills like
the art of penmanship and the generativity of conveying ideas in written form via letter writing
are amputated from personal experience and cultural knowledge. McLuhan states that utilizing
technology has an anesthetizing effects on one’s ability to experience physiological sensation,
arguably the primary source of emotion that people have available to understand themselves:
“Any invention or technology is an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies, and such
extension also demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions
of the body” (McLuhan, 1964). As humans expand their sensorial and perceptual realm via the
synthetic, inversely, a lack is introduced into the real. It is not just the sensitivity of the body that
is diminished, but also a sensitivity to what is lost. McLuhan, importantly, brings the body into
relationship to technological extension.
The Frankfort School, in particular, Theodor W. Adorno take up a distinct line of attack
against mass cultural production and media, that of its homogenizing effects on individuals,
personal expression, intellectual consumption and production. Adorno asserts that the desire for
an idealized surface obscures the more nefarious reality of social organization, where, for
example, students must submit to professors rather than speak their minds. Mass culture
superficially intends to promote the individual via indistinct choices, while in reality, produces
standardized citizens who think alike and are thus tools for capitalistic exploitation. Choices are
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false offerings, seeming to promise an individualized expression of self, yet are cheaply
produced variants that distract from the violence of exploitation embedded in the means of
production. Conflict, a correct response to the injustice of monopoly and state capitalism, is
repudiated as outmoded and kitsch, under a technocratic society, muting descent and promoting
subjugation.
Noam Chomsky, builds on these ideas and brings the critique to American culture with
“Manufacturing Consent,” aimed at revealing the way the illusion of consumer choice is a false
surrogate for agency. The media propagates capitalistic structures of commerce, inculcating,
educating and driving abidance while obscuring its methods of inducement. Individuals are
consenting to participating in a social/political organization without being aware that they are
even making a choice to join. The media is a hegemonic force, used by powerful elites to
maintain control and privatize ownership of public resources, while distracting from unfulfilled
human needs and turning individuals into cogs in a machine. Media is owned and operated by
the elite who shape its content towards their own ends. Media suppresses dissenting voices by
reducing them into soundbites and polarizes through false dichotomies, all while making space
for the next commercial break. Media is part of a state sponsored means of indoctrination which
placate and distance people from their own agency and normalize authority and coercion.
Individuals are unaware that through inaction they are participating in their own subjugation.
Media and technology have long been seen as decentering, promoting a kind of alienation
from the body and the self. Descartes, writing in the early 1630s in Traité de l’homme, imagined
the body in mechanical terms, locating a technological viewpoint at the center of the construction
of the human form.
I make the supposition that the body is nothing else but a statue or earthen machine, that
God has willed to form entire, in order to make it as similar to us as is possible. Thus he
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not only would have given it the external color and shape of our members, but also he put
in the interior all the parts which are required to make it walk, eat, respire, and that it
imitate, in the end, all of our functions which can be imagined to proceed from matter
alone, and depend only on the disposition of the organs. (Descartes, 1664)
To name the body as mechanical and use machine as the principle metaphor for
complexity speaks to the imagination that technological thought unlocks. Moreover, it
illuminates what is a human need to disconnect from our bodies, to which technology offers a
compelling dissociative vehicle. Technological advancements, towards the wish fulfillment of
the fairy tales that Freud described, tend to shift perspective from person centric towards
something imagined to be idealized by virtue of its objective position. Technology is unclouded
by subjective experience, idiosyncratic need or mood. Instead it is slick, smooth, and clean.
Rather than messy bodies, iPhones, laptop computers and robots represent idealized bodies that
work tirelessly without break-down, creating perfect scenarios for the projection of desire, wish
and fantasy and an idealized self. Much like linear perspective and photographic representation
moved previous centuries towards the decentered, objective, out-of-body view, technology of the
current era further distances the human from human experience, caught up in digital avatars
living in virtual worlds with idealized bodies and carefully curated online identities where social
connection is commodified via “likes” and “friends.”
Wendy Chun, a media theorist with a background in systems design and English
literature synthesizes many of the above critiques. Rather than being top of mind, “media matters
most when they seem not to matter at all” (Chun, 2016) As our attention appears to be elsewhere,
digital media has become background logic to contemporary living. We speak about everyday
life in machine terms: download, save, share, link, update, trash, troll, unaware of the metaphoric
use of language; humans have become machines through habits, always oriented towards the
next thing that technology promises, “updating to remain the same.” We acquire knowledge
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through search engines, use smart phones to structure our lives, yet are barely moved, even
bored, by historically speaking brand new technology. We crave the new, yet once it is in hand,
its fascination wears off quickly. The technology industry is built upon a paradox in which
technology is monetized by creating habitual patterns in users, yet habits must be constantly
broken to make room for new products. Updates promise to keep the old new, staving off being
out-of-date.
Chun introduces the equation: “Habit + Crisis = Update” to explore the cycle of
dependency to which technology binds us. The concept of networks are deployed to explain
complex global structures, such as the flow of capital and the habitual behavior of users, which
provide illusory visualizations as explanation that obscure the human meaning of scale (local vs.
global) and scope (detail vs. overview). One has a false sense of understand something that is
constantly changing. Habits are the repetition of individual behaviors, aggregated into
nomothetic maps, which are used to predict future collective states. Our digital selves, already
constructed out of depersonalized digital material, are processed and represented via the
predictions of algorithms. Chun articulates the danger in computational models of understanding
the human experience through behavior: “Through the analytic of habits, individual actions
coalesce bodies into a monstrously connected chimera.” Crises, the antithesis of habits, are
created to instigate change, using the induction of anxiety to compel an update to find relief.
Crisis becomes ordinary, an “affectively intense cul-de-sac,” a means of destabilizing agency,
necessitating a preordained solution that further intrudes on personal freedom and privacy. Chun
highlights the use of “you” in the digital world as a “shifty-shifter.” You is both singular and
plural, where plural you is also singular. Groups of “you” become online communities, yet
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without bodies or even community, in which storage, the archives of digital activity, is conflated
with memory, the human record of past experience.
Habits are also repetitions, addictions, involuntary patterns of use which span breath but
do not reach the depths. Habit provides organization, an attempt to stabilize, the space for
creativity, yet can be inflexible, automatic, and compulsive. Habit is also a cultural construction,
distinct from instinct, made of the environmental affordances, as shaped by the social world. As
social construction, habit is “ideology in action.” One is what one does; doing replaces being. To
stay alive online one needs to constantly be re-presenting the construction of selfhood. Digital
devices exploit the human inclination for habits and habituation by designing machines to be
“responsive and spontaneous, to work at the level of manual habits.”
Chun considers alternate conceptions of habit: Duhigg’s habit as a loop driven by a cue
and a reward, against, Ravaisson’s, as the persistence of the ego in face of material
transformations of the body and environment. Duhigg’s habit is a version of programming, often
touted as means of self-improvement in popular self-help books, unreflective and repetitive,
driven by cravings. Ravaisson’s is more stabilizing, where patterns of responding to external
stimuli are driven from automatic internal processes, creating spontaneous actions that generate
satisfaction. Duhigg’s model is pathological, with a focus on avoidance of loss and addictive
potential, and produces the need for update.
Chun ultimately links habits to neoliberalism, described as
A theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and
free trade. In a neoliberal society, the logic of the market has become its ethics; all human
interactions, from love to education, become economic transactions to be analyzed in
terms of costs and benefits (Chun, 2016)
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The agentic, self-possessed individual driven towards financial gain and conspicuous
consumption is the neoliberal icon. The emphasis is on the individual in competition with all
others, who withdraws into private, only to be invaded by media, which is increasingly also a
tool of surveillance. The internet itself is a place of grand confusion, with public space entering
the private (“taking a porn shop and putting it in the bedroom of your children”) and private
subjects exposed in public via invasive private and governmental monitoring and the near
constant news of hacked “private” data.
Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a philosophical approach to the study of experience (Smith et al.,
2009). As a philosophy, it sees things as they are rather than how they fit into preordained
categories, and emerges from a careful study of human experience, as it occurs, with an interest
in the sequence of events and its particular details. Husserl, the founder of phenomenology,
instructed: “go back to the things themselves” to consider how experience constructs in
consciousness. Emphasis is placed on the nature of the construction while acknowledging how
existing mental structures are shaping the way experience is categorized. Through a focus on the
essentials of experience, a transcendent, universal understanding of phenomena emerge.
Phenomenological investigation requires a dual focus on the objective quality and the subjective
experience. Husserl advocated putting aside assumptions, or using a “bracket” to factor out the
parts of perception we take for granted, to bring attention to the perception and internal states
that arise when experiencing the phenomenon. The aim is to reduce distractions, thereby granting
clear access to the essence of the phenomenon. Husserl’s intention was to find the core or
essence of a thing, to capture its “eidos” or “idea.” The method was called “eidetic reduction.”
An underlying motivation of this approach counters positivistic traditions in science, which
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worked from a place of assumptions about the form of things, building operational constructs to
be tested against others, and proceeding by falsifiability. Phenomenology, by contrast, was
interested in the close observation of things unto themselves as the basis upon which to construct
an understanding of the world. Husserl’s phenomenology aimed to create an alternative
conceptual basis for scientific exploration derived from seeing things as they are.
Later philosophers, including Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre influenced the
shaping of phenomenological philosophy. Heidegger, a student of Husserl’s believed that
knowledge, and meaning, derive from interpretation, rather than through eidetic reduction.
Heidegger shifts from Husserl’s focus on internal conscious experience and the nature of
perceptions towards questions of ontology and existentialism, while remaining interested in
phenomenology, accessed through the concept of “Dasein.” “Dasein” is the unique quality of
being human that comes from the embodied experience of being an intentional actor in the object
world (Smith et al., 2009). Existence is fundamentally about worldliness, one is always in some
relation to the world, not separate from it, intersubjectively linked to others. It is through this
lens that one is interpreting, making sense of the phenomena one encounters. Merleau-Ponty
points towards the human experience of being separate from the world, a consequence of our
particular subjectivity and embodiment, which situates our observations. We can observe and
recognize other’s experience, yet there is always a divide linked to the particulars of the others
embodiment, including the personal nature of making meaning of physiological sensations. In
the process of observing and interpreting phenomenological properties, these cannot be fully
apprehended, but must not be ignored. Sartre’s contribution to phenomenology stems from the
ideas that “existence comes before essence” and human nature is more about becoming than
being (Smith et al., 2009). One’s encounters with others acts on experience, which does not deny
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one as having self-determination, but nevertheless has a complex interaction with the process of
personal meaning making. Our consciousness changes as we observe ourselves observed, or in
the absence of an expected other. Collectively, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre bring
Husserl’s phenomenology into the physical, embodied, intersubjective world, where a network of
influences shape the perception of lived experience which are interpreted and made meaningful
in a particularly personal way. To observe phenomena, one must appreciate these influences and
understand them to the degree possible, and use them to reflect on the nature of what is being
perceived.
Literature Review Summary
The literature reviewed attempts to offer a broad background on the many voices that
have and are influential on the contemporary technological world. It aims to make the case that
human experience has been fundamentally altered over the past 40 years by myriad forces
shaping the digital era and is reflected by plurality, rather than coherence, across disciplines,
including psychoanalysis. The digital era can be interpreted as the culmination of a multitude of
dynamics underway since at least the industrial revolution. It can be argued the impulse towards
mechanization has deep roots in the human psyche, stemming from the desire to mitigate the
chaotic natural world by creating order at both an individual, social and environmental level. It
also reflects ambition towards expansion, creativity and mastery. In a sense, it is a the collective
projection of identities upon the natural world. Multiple psychological disciplines, namely,
behaviorism and functionalism oriented scientific thought towards a mechanical view of human
behavior and thought. Culture and media theory hypothesized about the effects of
systematization and capitalism on the body and mind. Research has demonstrated human
eagerness to attribute uniquely human qualities to simulated lifeforms, with a surprising degree
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of ease. The technology industry has sought to profit from the insights offered by these
disciplines, reaping immeasurable wealth from the manipulation of human action on a mass
scale. Some human minds and ways of living may have vulnerabilities that are exposed by and
become sources of suffering in the face of these alterations. While many are unaffected or thrive
in this new era, a variety of forms, some potentially novel, of digital illness may pray upon the
neurotic, borderline and psychotic by contributing to increases in symptoms such as anxiety and
depression, obsessionality, and even as content for or sites of psychosis. The digital may be
altering the contemporary notion of humanness, as we live through this period of transition. The
radical quality of change in our current, fused techno-environment now affects more people in
more ways than any prior shift in history, linking them into a global network. The relative lack of
reaction to the sudden and unmitigated shift into the virtual domain following the declaration that
the coronavirus was a pandemic offered an indication of how normalized the digital landscape
already was prior to this turn.
Out of this multiplicity, in question is, how do psychoanalysts today position themselves
clinically as they themselves and their patients are shaped by these profound changes? Which, if
any of the influences outlined in the literature review are reflected in their interview? What
theory and insight guides their method? What can be learned from the unconscious traces in their
speech? To what degree is it attuned to or been altered by the digital era? Collectively, where is
there divergence and convergence? What are the potential implications for patients, the
education of future clinicians, clinical methods and theory, and future research?
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CHAPTER THREE
Methods
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is a qualitative research method concerned
with exploring experience on its own terms (Smith et al., 2009). IPA was chosen to reveal the
current experience of psychotherapists, with a primary aim in on how they listen for,
conceptualize and work with the impact of the digital era on their patient’s experience and a
secondary focus on how clinician age and theory of ego health may predict differences in the
primary aim.
Design
This exploratory study was conducted using a 2x2 design to examine how the factors of
clinician age/cohort, as determined by age, (low vs. high) and theory of ego health (integration
vs. multiplicity) influence the way psychotherapists listen for, conceptualize and work in the
present technological moment. For cohort, the low age group mean was about 40 years old
(approximate mean given to respect clinician’s request for age to be expressed in a range) and
the high age group had a mean of 70.7 years old. Given the intersection of critical developmental
stages with the timeline of when digital devices and their affordances entered culture, clinician
age represents two poles of exposure and fluency with the technological era. The younger cohort
may not be “digital natives,” having grown up in a world suffused with machines, yet stand for
the youngest generation of psychotherapists with sufficient clinical experience to reflect on both
their own experience and have observed changes over time in relation to the digital world. The
older cohort, on the other hand, were fully matured adults, approaching age 30, as the
technological era in question was emerging in its nascent form, and have come to relate to these
machines from an entirely different point in their lifespan. For the latter group, it is proposed that
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different metaphors and thus differing conceptual models for organizing their experience and
fluency with the digital era would predict differences in the clinical domain.
Theory of ego health was conceptualized in dichotomous terms, with one group defining
health in terms of a fully integrated ego (Freud) and the other finding health in “standing in the
spaces” (Bromberg) between multiple self-states, or the idea of multiplicities of identification. It
is recognized that this factor is likely far more nuanced based on the individual patient as
treatment unfolds, however, conceptually it mirrors divergent theoretical notions of how
clinician’s conceptualize experience in the digital world, proposed as expecting fragmentation
when engaged in the digital realm resulting in a loss of ego integrity or alternately, as a potential
place of psychic expansion through increased forums for and expression and exploration of
divergent aspects of self.
Sample Selection
A total of 6 (n=6) psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists were selected as subjects
for this study using a 2x2 design, with 1-2 subjects in each quadrant at the intersection of age and
theory of ego health. IPA researchers typically use homogenous samples (Smith et al., 2009).
However, homogeneity is a relative term, itself open to interpretation based on degrees and kind.
In this case, the subjects are homogenous as to identifying as analytically oriented clinicians in
practice in New York City, and heterogenous by age and theory of ego health. Four (n=4)
interviews were conducted in Spring 2019 and two (n=2) in Fall 2020, about 7 months into the
COVID-19 pandemic, which has suddenly shifted the vast majority of outpatient psychotherapy
practice into the virtual realm, either via videoconferencing software, audio platforms or via
telephone. Of course, while all subjects identify as psychoanalytically oriented, they differ by
gender, clinical education and credentials (M.D., Ph.D., L.P.), years in practice and as particular
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individuals. The aim of this study is to reflect the contemporary phenomenon of clinical work
with patients for whom technology use is an important feature of the treatment. As such, the
selection process intended to reflect this aim by choosing subjects from a range of therapists to
give maximum opportunity to capture not just patient differences, but therapist differences that
may play a role in clinical practice. Half of the subjects identified as Lacanian or included Lacan
as part of their theoretical orientation. These subjects were selected to explore how Lacanian
analysts may have particular insights into the digital era, given Lacan’s role in originating critical
theory and interest in cultural and social phenomena. Additionally, the mirror stage and the
concepts of the “Other,” and the “imaginary,” relatively unique to Lacanian theory, may be
utilized in novel ways by these subjects, compared to others working from different orientations.
The Lacanian subjects are counterbalanced, to the degree possible, with 2 in the junior cohort, a
different group of 2 in the multiplicities group, and 2 interviewed in Spring 2019. Subjects were
identified and recruited via direct contact. Clinicians who are critically engaged in psychotherapy
and psychoanalysis were invited to participate.
Description of Subject
Format is subject’s identifier, degrees/certificates, age, self-described theoretical
orientation, statement related to theory of psychological health (if available) and when interview
was conducted.
1. DS, Ph.D., Psychoanalyst, 69 years old, “interpersonal and relational,” Spring 2019.
2. FY, M.D., Ph.D., 69 years old, “mostly object relations,” “healthy and adaptive selfreflection depends on a series of mechanisms: the internalization of dyadic relationships
with the integration of concepts of the self and integration of concepts of significant
others,” Spring 2019
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3. JW, PhD, Psychoanalyst, 39 years old, “psychoanalytic, Freudian, Lacanian,” “I don’t
know that I as a Lacanian believe in integration, full integration, but I believe in
experiences of synthesis, you know. I don’t even know about the different states of self,
everyone has a split sense of self,” Spring 2019.
4. WH, MFA, LP (Licensed Psychoanalyst), “between 35-45 years old,” “Freudian
psychoanalyst and I have a special interest in Lacan,” Interviewer: “Do we think about
the end of treatment in some way as accepting multiples or do we still strive for a fully
integrated ego? WH: “The short answer would be no, I don’t see a reason to
fundamentally change that,” Spring 2019
5. ZG, PhD, in psychoanalytic training, 39 years old, “Psychoanalysis,” “I would tend to
think more of an idea of an integrated ego,” Fall 2020.
6. DL, PhD, Psychoanalyst, 74 years old, “Psychoanalytic. [Interviewer: Would you would
you include Lacanian in there?] “Yes, I think Lacan is important for any psychoanalyst. I
don't think that the distinction between schools like Lacanian, Relational, Freudian as
though they’re different. I don't agree with those distinctions. I think one is either a
psychoanalyst or not and if one is a psychoanalyst one should be informed by the best of
psychoanalysis and I include Lacan in that, but I include others as well,” “to be able to
articulate the multiplicity of subjective positions is a goal of treatment,” Fall 2020
Development of Interview Protocol
IPA uses in-depth interviews as the basis for research. Interviews were designed to last
45-90 minutes and unfold in such a way as to give the subjects maximum freedom and space to
speak directly their own experience of the subject, with nominal direction from the interviewer.
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Open-ended interview questions were initially designed by the writer based on the
boundaries of the extant theoretical and clinical literature. The interview aims to explore the
analysts’ personal experience of the digital world, and how they listen for, conceptualize and
work with patients in the current era. An implicit question is what aspects and to what degree the
broad scope of the literature reviewed is reflected in analysts’ awareness and thought processes.
The protocol includes a brief preamble intended to orient the subject to the scope of the inquiry.
The questions are intended to act as projectives, to invite the widest range of possible responses
to facilitate the interpretive process to be discussed in a following section. Questions were
piloted with several subjects to gauge whether they would produce meaningful responses.
Questions that provoked the most interest and expected material were selected and refined into
the final interview protocol.
Interview Protocol
Interviews in Spring 2019 were conducted in the private office of each participant at a
time of their choosing. Fall 2020 interviews were conducted on the telephone or Zoom.
Following brief greetings, two digital recording devices were introduced, and with the help of the
interviewee, placed in a suitable location equidistant from both subjects and activated. The idea
of both recorders was justified in the case that one failed to function properly. One device was a
small hand-held digital recorder and the second was a smart phone running a recording
application. For the mediated interviews, two recorders were introduced and utilized as well.
Following this, each interview began with the same introduction:
This interview is interested in the perceived clinical effects of the digital world on human
experience over the past 40 years, including:
• the proliferation and widespread use of computers and smart phones in
professional and personal environments, i.e. from offices to bedrooms
• the use of search technology, allowing instant access to vast resources of
information, i.e. text, images, video, music, etc.
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•
•
•
•
•

the social uses of technology and its impact on the capacity for and patterns of
human relationships
the experience of living alongside a multitude of digital self-representations, i.e.
yourself, your academic publishing online, your Twitter, your Facebook, etc.
involvement in virtual worlds for the fulfilment of economic, entertainment and
erotic desires, via some kind of simulation
increased access to technologically-mediated methods of public and interpersonal
communication, engagement and interaction, including larger social phenomena
like the #metoo movement
emerging relations between human and non-human entities in the form of virtual,
auditory and embodied presences

Interview Questions
1. What is your experience of the technological world over the past 40 years?
a. How do you think it interacts with your patient’s experience?
b. What is your subjective experience of your patient’s relationship with the
technological world?
2. Can you describe changes in patient presentations over the past 40 years that you would
attribute to the effects of the digital world?
3. Have changes in the digital world over the past 40 years influenced how you conceptualize
psychopathology or psychological health?
a. Have they altered how you listen to your patients in any way?
b. How you conceptualize patients who present with significant symptoms related to
engagement in the digital world?
c. How you think about the course of treatment for such patients?
d. Have these patients modified any clinical concepts or methods?
e. What would your thoughts and/or choice points be when a patient speaks about a
significant experience with or in a technology that is unfamiliar to you?
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4. How do you see the effects of the digital world on your patient’s subjective experience of
self?
a. On the course of identity development?
b. On the capacity for relatedness?
c. On the capacity for self-reflection?
5. Have these changes altered any aspects of:
a. your theory of identity/self-representation?
b. on ideas of working through or integration?
6. Have there been changes to how you or your patients related to the frame that you would
attribute to the effects of the digital world?
7. What considerations would/do you bring to teletherapy?
a. Has your relationship to teletherapy changed in the face of COVID?*
8. Has your theory of identity been challenged in the face of changing possibilities for human
experience that the digital world offers, such as “living” or “working” in alternatelyembodied virtual environment in which one does not necessarily have to encounter loss or
lack?
Fall 2020 Follow-Up
Given the near instantaneous and radical shift that psychotherapy practice has taken into
the digital realm due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a new question was introduced to gain insight
into how this alteration may be reflected in this study. Subjects interviewed in Spring 2019 were
contacted and 3 out of 4 (FY, WH, JW) agreed to a brief follow-up, typically lasting less than 5
minutes. For the subjects interviewed in Fall 2020, this question was included as part of the
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interview. The question was: “Has your relationship to teletherapy changed in the face of
COVID?”
Method of Analysis
IPA is characterized by a scaled analysis of the transcribed interview texts, moving from
the particulars to the shared and from the descriptive to the interpretive (Smith et al., 2009).
Analysis is iterative and inductive, moving from a line-by-line examination of each interview
towards the identification of emergent patterns between interviews. A focus on consistency,
convergence and divergence and commonality and nuance is maintained within each interview
and ultimately considered between interviews. The process is dialogical in the sense that
assumptions and emergent organizations are held in mind but do not a priori guide the analysis.
Rather, scaling levels of meaning making, in the form of interpretive methods and hermeneutics
remain actively reflected back into the process at the same time that themes and structures
emerge. That is to say that a consciousness about one’s own assumptions and biases, means of
conceptualizing and interpreting are engaged continually and are actively utilized to orient. The
process is dynamic and involves attention to both parts and wholes. It is also a creative process
which seeks to organize the scope of material, with a recognition that there are other valid
organizations. At the same time, the organization that does emerge is fully grounded in the
interview texts and scaled levels of interpretation.
The analytic process proceeds from layers of textual analysis, which move from
exploratory comments into emergent themes. The analytic process proceeds from reading and rereading the interview texts as well as listening to the audio to bring context to what cannot be
fully captured in the text alone. Exploratory comments are descriptive, linguistic and conceptual.
Descriptive comments take the text at face value, marking what is being described. Linguistic
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comments consider how language may be used to convey meaning, with attention to such
features of the text as pronoun use, repetition and metaphor. Conceptual comments advance the
shift towards interpretation, highlighting underlying affective states, consistency or inconsistency
in representation within an interview or divergence from expected modes of reporting.
Exploratory comments serve as the basis for developing emergent themes. Themes can develop
through connections within and between interview texts as well as by further levels of
abstraction or interpretation applied across the project. Themes may have contextual markers,
function in a certain way or represent a frequency or tendency within or between texts.
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 served as the framework for the analytic process.
The aim of the broad review was to mark the outermost boundaries that clinicians may have in
mind as they speak about the particulars of themselves and their clinical experience. While the
framework will not be used in a deterministic sense, its scope served in a flexible manner to
ground the interpretive process in the world that we currently live. Distal factors related to the
emergence and understanding of the technological world are likely the backdrop of experience
and will be utilized, when appropriate, to position theory and practice in an effort to reveal the
relationship to the underlying phenomena being described. Given the emergent nature of this
process, the results chapter will describe and define how the IPA process was utilized to arrive at
the conclusions to be presented.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Results
Four interviews (n=4) were conducted between March and July 2019 and lasted between 6294 minutes, with the durations of 62, 65, 73 and 94 minutes with FY, DS, JW and WH
respectively. Two interviews (n=2) were conducted in October 2020, to expand the sample size
(total sample size, n=6), with the durations of 55 and 87 minutes with ZG and DL respectively.
Cohort age groups were FY, DS and DL (mean = 71 years old) compared to JW, WH and ZG
(mean = 40 years old). Theory of psychological health groups were FY, WH, and ZG (full
integration) contrasted with DS, JW and DL (multiplicities). There were no statistically
significant differences in interview length between either of the 2 comparison groups. The
interview questions provided a consistent framework, however, not all questions were able to be
asked in all interviews, given time constraints with some subjects. Efforts were made to balance
the depth and breadth of the inquiry, and some questions were omitted when it was anticipated
they were likely to produce similar responses as prior related questions with particular subjects.
The semi-structured interviews served as a point of departure for follow-up inquiry, used to
either clarify or challenge subjects with differing perspectives derived from the literature review
or technological possibilities the subject may not have been familiar with or brought to mind.
This interview strategy was designed to mimic the rapidly expanding proliferation, capability
and influence of the digital on human experience, as proposed by this dissertation. The aim of
this tactic was to assess not just initial reactions, but to explore if and how subjects responded to
aspects of or ideas about the digital era they may have not yet considered, or encountered
clinically.
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Each interview had a definitive character which is interpreted as the intersection of the
subject with the subject matter at the moment of time of the interview. Each interview was
manually transcribed by this writer and included all utterances from both subject and interviewer.
Transcripts were studied while listening to audio recordings of the interviews as initial
impressions were noted. The initial review process included a second round of listening and
reading the transcripts while taking further descriptive and interpretive notes, with attention to
diction, affect in language, parapraxis, and violations in consistency, especially with pronouns.
Further rounds of review included the creation of an emergent structure for framing the results
and blocks of different subjects’ transcribed texts were juxtaposed using word processing
software for subsequent rounds of review. It was decided to return to the original framing device
for this inquiry: listening for, conceptualizing and working with as the superstructure, while
creating subsections to organize both convergent and divergent themes as supported by the
material. In this section, quotes have been “cleaned up” for the sake of clarity if there were
repetitions of words or non-word utterances that were not interpreted to be of particular
importance, i.e. “the the,” or “um.”
It may be interesting to note that I have more than a decade of experience as a video editor
and borrowed aspects of that process to guide this analysis. It may also be important to state that
this writer was 46 years old at the time of the interview, notably closer in age to the younger
cohort than the older cohort and views ego-health more through a lens of multiplicity than full
integration with an object relations theoretical orientation. Furthermore, the origins of this
dissertation emerged out of polarized and negativistic conception of the digital on human
experience. The initial proposed title and concept for this dissertation was “Machine As Doer,”
based on Jessica Benjamin’s “Beyond Doer and Done To,” based on the idea of the machine as a
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dehumanizing, desubjectifying entity that demands submission from its users to its inflexible
mechanisms governed by pre-determined metaphors, thus denying a possibility of embodiment,
mutuality or surrender. This view has become tempered by shifting the scope of the inquiry from
patients to therapists, review of additional theoretical literature and learning about benefits that
patients experienced while also struggling with aspects of entanglement in the digital world,
especially in a process group I ran over 2 years in a college counseling center. I share these
details as my potential biases that I have made every effort to bracket out while listening to my
subjects, so I may best describe the phenomenology of their experience.
Each subject showed a strong reliance on their chosen theoretical orientation, and to different
degrees articulated theoretical positions while answering questions; in some cases the thinking
felt organic, as if theory was a third, in discourse with the interview, and in other cases, the use
of orientation felt like an anchor that kept the interview in a fixed location. Globally, there were
far more negatively valenced statements about the digital world and its observed effects upon
patients than positive ones. Notably, the interviews conducted in Fall 2020 were far more muted
in degree of negative reaction towards losses and risks associated to the digital. Notwithstanding,
the older analysts spoke positively about how technology has eased access to information,
communication, collaboration and created the possibility of teletherapy, and the younger analysts
expressed interest in and greater use of technology in both personal, social and clinical realms.
However, for the younger therapists, comments about technology were often qualified by
language that conveyed a sense of the digital as pernicious, dangerous, or having overwhelming
power and allure that must be conscientiously kept in check.
Generally subjects approached the interview through the lens of current theorical and clinical
practices, while sharing observations about how symptoms emerge in the digital landscape in
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more extreme and sometimes novel ways. Overall, there was a sense that symptoms arise out of
conflicts based on aspects of one’s identity or ego, namely in obtaining protection for its
fragility, seeking recognition and thwarting its development. For some subjects the digital era
was organized around its devices and their affordances and for other subjects, especially the
Lacanians, the digital era was conceptualized as a socio-cultural shift that shapes human
experience more broadly. Over the course of the interview, most subjects played with or
stretched concepts, whereas one subject took a more rigid or defensive tone in response to
questions that might challenge theory to explain the effect of the digital the subject may not have
considered before. Because this interview was based principally on the psychotherapists
experience in the consulting room, clinicians had different qualities and quantities of material
upon which to draw examples and conclusions. This may reveal several factors. The range and
mode of patient age varied by clinician. In so far is it is hypothesized that clinician age may play
a factor in engagement in and perception of the digital era, the same effect is likely mirrored in
patients. FY, WH, JW, ZG and DL all treated patients in their 20s and 30s, and in most cases
both younger and older patients as well. DS, by contrast, located his modal patient in their 50s to
70s, and hypothesized that “their lives are less implicated in the technological revolution than the
younger people.” A second factor that may explain the variance in the perception of the digital’s
effect on patients is that for some subjects the digital was less conceptualized and thus not
recognized to the same degree as others. This is potentially due to the proposed disembodied
experience of the digital space, meaning that it is encoded into patient experience in ways that
defy language such that it cannot be explicitly spoken about in session. In this case, the absence
of the digital in subject’s reports on psychotherapy may not be due to its lack of effect on patient
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experience, but rather to differences in what a therapist may respond to in a given
communication.
I do fear a world where people will come to value genuine human contact less and become so
wrapped up in their sort of solipsistic relationship with their devices that they really could
lead to a lot of social breakdown. I mean to bring Marx into a different era, it does seem like
the opiate of the people now and it I think it has a very detrimental effect and sometimes I
think we all should be luddites but it’s too late for that because the genie is out of the bottle
(FY, personal communication, May 16, 2019)
In so far as it may be helpful to position each subject within the results section, a brief
overview of each interview is outlined. The outline follows the sequence in which the interviews
were conducted. In 3 of the 4 interviews conducted in Spring 2019, there was a sense of
foreboding regarding the power of the digital as it currently exists – that it could potentially
cause structural alterations in human experience, although this threshold had not yet occurred, or
been observed in patients. In the other interview in Spring 2019, there was a marked dismissal of
thinking about the impact of the digital era on human experience in so far as it presented itself in
the clinical encounter. In the two interviews conducted in Fall 2020, 8 months into the pandemic,
there was a more subdued quality to the negative affect regarding the impact of the digital
compared to the majority of the Spring 2019 interviews, although the concern was still present.
In these interviews, there was a unique attunement and concern about the perception that the shift
into the virtual realm itself was normalized both in the general population, and as a mode for
therapy.
FY’s interview was characterized by open, playful, and seriously thoughtful dialogue. FY
appeared to take the interview as an opportunity to speak while thinking and learn about a topic
that was not central to his areas of study. FY was quick to share his personal bias to the digital,
“how I react to it? [yeah] with a kind of horror actually,” “I tend to not want to get involved in
these things, but you know, even a patient and almost everybody knows that of course I
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shouldn’t feel envy when I look at this because I know people just put all their positive, happy
pictures, but it drives me crazy, so it’s a terrible false representation of what a full life is.” FY
was mindful about his initially polarized responses and repeatedly sought greater equanimity
through integration, responding with attempts to balanced more positive possibilities of
engagement in the digital. FY reminded the interviewer on more than one occasion that his
statements were informed by his patient experience, as directed by the interview, while
recognizing that healthier individuals didn’t suffer the same fates in the digital realm.
DS’s interview was marked by a lack of interest in the phenomenological nature of interview
questions and occasional frustration at the interviewer. DS’s initial association was to being
required to introduce an “incredibly intrusive” “50 pound” “reel-to-reel” tape recorder into his
sessions during training. Notably, a non-digital technology. He stated, “I had mixed feelings
about using a tape recording…I felt that what the analyst works with or therapist, is their own
perception of the situation, not something that is got some sort of objective claim to reality.”
DS’s clinical use of his subjectivity as the primary mode of experiencing the patient is correlated
conceptually to his diminution of interest in reflecting on potential phenomenological factors. DS
tended to interpret the digital era through its specific instances (Skype, FaceTime), and largely
denied awareness of its presence in session material. He stated “Well I might be mistaken, it may
be a whole category that I’m not paying attention to, but I don’t think they talk about that, about
how their experience is affected by the digital world. I mean once in a while someone talks about
porn, uh, but I don’t think that the technological world is a subject, it is not a subject of
discussion very often, it’s more like, part of the frame within which the discussion takes place.”
As this interviewer probed, exploring the intersection of the medium and its contents, DS showed
increased frustration with the questions, leading to the clarification, “the problem with these
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questions is that they are generic, and so the level that you are asking them on is not the level
that I experience them on.” He continued, “The better I get to know somebody, the less these
things are going to be uppermost.” DS postulated a model in which the degree of intimacy in his
clinical relationship moderates the effects of phenomenological factors, such as identity, race,
sexual orientation or aspects of the digital era, such that as intimacy increases, those factors do
not demand consideration outside the scope of the therapeutic relationship. He stated, “Do I
separate it out? No, I think it’s all build it. It’s folded in like vanilla in cake batter.” The
interview ended with a detente, DS saying, “I hope I haven’t frustrated you too much.”
WH’s interview was marked by a focused, theoretically grounded commitment to return to
Freud to understand the digital era. WH was open to the questions and his responses were direct
and thoughtfully reasoned. WH saw the digital era’s marks on clinical material in both manifest
and latent content. For WH the technological era went beyond devices and specific technologies,
to include broader influences on individuals such as consumeristic culture and the medicalization
of mental health. His language was precise and authoritative.
JW’s interview had a unique quality of aliveness, an energetic miasma of candor,
bewilderment, and clarifying insights. She spoke spontaneously, personally, with colorful
expression and contradicted herself on occasion, without inhibition or apology. Her thinking was
nuanced, theoretically grounded and interpreted the digital era’s impact on human experience as
expansive, offering observations and declarations from what felt like the most exposure to
relevant clinical experiences. In the spirit of transparency, I was so excited by JW’s way of
speaking and thinking that I subsequently reached out to her out for tutelage and will complete
my post-doctoral training and hours under her supervision.
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ZG’s interview was candid, direct and thoughtful without pretense. The interview was
conducted via telephone while ZG walked from dropping off his son at school to his office,
giving it a breezier quality than other interviews. Notable to ZG was his lessening of a critical
position towards mediated interaction in the face of the shift to teletherapy during the pandemic.
At the same time, ZG historically prioritized in-person over digital interaction and the interview
brought these two somewhat conflicting positions into discourse, wrestling with the idea of what
digital affordances are analogous or divergent from prior modes of being and experience.
DL’s interview was precise, philosophical and playful. He tended to deconstruct the
interview into their underling meta-psychological questions and looked for analogues to
contemporary digital conundrums in analytic theory, typically grounded in Lacan, and
longstanding analytic debates, while engaging with the questions in the present. DL both
recognized what was novel regarding the affordances of the digital world and the demand on the
analysts to be knowledgeable about, while linking certain phenomena to ongoing conundrums
that have existed since the invention of the psychoanalytic method. DL tended to take a balanced
view of the progression of technology, identifying ways in which the digital confused modes for
the development of the individual as a subject, while allowing for the possibility of intrapsychic
and interpersonal expansion in the virtual realm.
Listening For
Listening for and conceptualizing can appear as mirrors, one containing the other process,
perhaps akin to bottom-up and top-down processing models of neurological functioning that
work in parallel to assemble information that is synthesized to create consciousness. The task of
disentangling them at the level of language is not exact and there will be overlap between these
sections, hopefully made distinct by a shift in the locus in clinical process. In thinking about
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interview material, at question is the flexibility of the analyst to hear not just confirmatory
evidence of their implementation of a theoretical orientation, but to respond with curiosity to
novel material. The question then becomes three-fold: (1) what is perceived? (2) How do
preformed concepts influence listening, and perhaps most importantly, (3) when does
disagreement between the two lead to a change in both. Within this sample, there was the full
range of conditions demonstrated.
DS: …porn additions are much more frequent than they were before telecommunication
was possible, because its available on the internet all the time. so that’s a symptom. But I
end up thinking about it in the way I think about anything else, it’s a different symptom,
people access to one another is different than it once was. You can have a certain kind of
shallow, or situational access to people that wasn’t possible before. Um, online dating or
or or grindr, or what’s the one for straight people?
Interviewer: Tinder
DS: Tinder. I mean I hear about these things all the time and I have patients who use
them. So it makes possible more easily the sort of thing that for straight people, there
were singles bars, gay people had more access to that kind of stuff because gay bars are
different, or were, but everybody has more access to it now, if they wish. So it opens a
whole category of situational or fairly shallow relatedness that you can have if you want
to.
Interviewer: In that context, I wonder if its altered in any way how you listen to your
patients? That these are different types of human relationships than could have existed
historically because of the technology makes it possible?
DS: No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so at all. The reason is because the analytic
relationship is so intensive and so intimate that the differences that show up on a less
deeply emotionally level disappear because you get past all of that and the relationship is,
the intimacy is the same, I do think that there is a much greater impact than that on
relatedness that is, you know, circumstantial, or situational, contextual, where you can
have contact with a million different people all the way from who you, some person is
reading your order at a restaurant to um, Tinder or Grindr, those things are all the shallow
end of things and they are much more easy to effect/affect, in either use of that word:
effect or affect, with, um with telecommunication. The deeper it goes, the less the
difference I think.”
For DS, relatedness in the digital world is lacking the depth of analysis, thus, the nature
of digital experience becomes context, or epiphenomena and not of clinical importance. The
intimacy of psychotherapy stands in contrast to the shallowness of digital relatedness, relegating
its evocation in session material as transmitting the fact of a symptom. DS sets up a model in
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which the intimacy of analysis moderates the effects of the technology on the analytic
relationship, such that the deeper analysis goes the less the difference. DS is offering an
essentialist argument about the human connection, such that the intimacy that emerges in
analysis supersedes other phenomena, including race, identity and the impact of the digital. In
contrast to thinkers like McLuhan and Chomsky, DS suggests the medium and the message can
be disentangled and the message is what remains in the intimacy of analysis. DS allows for the
possibility that the digital era exerts influence on human experience, but, because it does not
appear in manifest session content, there is little imagination for it in latent aspects. This
primarily top-down conceptualization of the technological world as medium or symbol of
symptom shapes how the effects of the digital era are perceived.
FY reported that he hears explicitly about patient experience in the digital realm, namely
in regards video game play, online dating and social media, all locations of or sources for
suffering. This type of patient communication has lead FY to speculate more broadly as to
whether the digital era is the cause of symptomatology that appears more frequently. He speaks
of a patient strongly motivated to find a partner and start a family, who “sweated out so much
before any date, that she had to look perfect.” FY, is an equivocal “ever-waser,” oscillating in his
speculation as to the source of her anxiety. “Now, I don’t know if that is because of Instagram
and things like that. Thirty years ago it could have been because she read Vogue magazine, and
all of the pictures in Vogue were perfect, so I’m not sure if the media has made her more image
conscious, or she would have been just as image conscious, we don’t have that kind of control
comparison to make, so I’m not sure that the pathology is worse because of the social media, but
I think the interaction between the pathology and that way of relating to people is worse because
in the old days maybe she would have been meeting men at a bar, which is better than just a
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screen as far as I can see.” For FY, listening for was interpreted to be hearing direct
communications about interpersonal or intrapsychic distress suffered as a result of cognitive
distortions or avoidant destinations that were available in the digital domain. There was “a
certain kind of social isolation you see with seriously narcissistically young adults who can’t
venture out of a cocoon they establish for themselves because contact with real world is too
threatening to their fragile self-esteem.” For example, “a guy usually who will spend all, almost
all his waking hours on video games.” This too provoked the speculative “ever-waser,” “I mean
not that that’s a new symptom, because before it might have been pinball machines, so I just
think it’s a different content of a kind of a symptom, but it looks a little different, maybe it’s
more extreme because you can play video games all your waking hours, so there are certain
things that just from being available to do, from my point of view, the symptom is pretty much
the same, I always look at what is motivating the symptom.” In FY’s listening, video game play
may be initially associated to someone from previous era’s involvement with pinball machines.
However, as he continues to think, he includes consideration that the increased complexity of
video games, including the potential for mediated social interaction, while still conceptualizing
withdrawal as the symptom, yet one that contains more aspects of experience worthy of clinical
consideration. In contrast to DS for whom the digital is context, for FY, the effects are “different
content of a symptom.” The shift from context to content might mean that FY is inclined to listen
with a different degree of curiosity about a patient’s involvement in the digital era, in this way
unifying bottom-up and top-down aspects of listening for and conceptualizing. At the same time,
digital engagement remains as a symptom.
For FY, listening required a balance between hearing about predominantly negative
experiences in the digital world, especially in the realm of social media, “at least as I hear about
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it from my patients, it goes exactly against what I would see as the goals of therapy and
reinforces superficial images that are kind of cookie cutter, cardboard, two dimensional and
lacking in depth,” while keeping in mind that “it does seem to allow for the flourishing of certain
mental activity at the cost of more engagement with the real, what I would call the real.” FY was
quick to speak of his negative personal bias towards the effects of the digital era, which was
interpreted as an ability to manage counter-transferential feelings when listening to content about
the digital era. FY notes a professional imperative to stay up to date on developments in the
digital landscape, “I have to try to learn to keep up with what they are talking about because
some of these things I only know about from my patients.” FY proposed that the digital and the
‘real,’ interact through an inverse relationship that is an expansion on DS’s model of intimacy
and phenomenology. FY allows a space where a patient’s involvement in the digital world can be
engaging for “certain mental activity,” however, like DS, the technology realm is excluded from
the real, or the space of most intimacy. Perhaps more importantly, FY does not separate out the
effects of engagement in the digital realm from the space of treatment, but explores how it
intermingles with both pathology and health. FY’s distaste for the digital had the feel of an
empathic identification with the vulnerable and suffering of his patients as a result of how the
affordances of the digital era interact with their pathology. He speculates, “it could be that the
personality pathology of the patient has a major impact on how they use the technology.” Given
the focus of FY’s work is on personality pathology, these considerations frame a space in which
the effects of the digital world can be heard, albeit in a potentially more circumscribed manner
compared to the subjects to be considered next, who conceptualize and listen for the effects more
broadly.
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When asked “has your concept of the digital world altered how you listen to your patients
in any way?” WH replies, “on a theoretical level probably not so much.” While the centrality of
listening to the process of analysis hasn’t changed, as he frames it, “on a sort of more practical or
experiential level, I have a sense of, for instance, if they talk about a website or application that
they are on frequently and I know something about that, I will listen to their associations
connecting to that.” WH’s personal and professional experiences in the contemporary digital
landscape creates a knowledge base or activated field for informed curiosity about these
communications. He suggested another aspect of listening, “in regarding the process of how I
listen to them, to thinking just considering are they, is this person eager to check their phone? Is
this person preoccupied with something? Is this person’s image of themself or their sense of their
physical embodiment or disembodiment related to their digital existence? Does that affect how
someone feels about themselves when they are looking at me face to face? Or what is it like
when they are on the couch, which gets into their image of how they see themselves, whether
they identify with the person in the mirror, or if they imagine the person I see looks like the
person in the mirror, or a photograph they have on their phone, or have I seen photographs of
them online and then how does that affect the dynamic when we aren’t looking at each other?
Does that effect their sense of embodiment? Or being looked at? Or looking at me?” Here WH is
linking not just explicit patient statements about engagement with the digital landscape, but using
his existing conceptualizations, based on Lacan’s mirror stage, to listen for what may not be yet
able to be spoken directly, but instead demonstrated through various anxious, dissociated or
paranoid states. WH has a complex network of ideas and associations about the psychological
impact of the digital era on human experience that can respond to subtle, non-verbal or latent
aspects of communications. WH links the effects discernable in the clinical encounter to the
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broader economic and thus social shifts akin to Marx’s technological determinism, “I have
instances where people have resisted putting their phone away for the clinical hour, which to
some extent, might seem a little bit surprising, but I think there is a close alignment with coming
in here and, with the digital world and the access of things, and something of it, the value, the
nearness, the delivery of things being coded, there is something where you are paying for the
immediate delivery of information of a service, whether that be ordering groceries online, or
downloading a book, or a movie, or whatever, that has a certain immediacy.” WH’s concepts
expand what the clinician is listening for, including observing or hearing the effects of the digital
in nuanced communications in ways that can direct a clinician to make further inquiries into
experience in the digital realm or use aspects of a patient’s experience in the digital to inform
interpretation or intervention. It is well understood that a clinician cannot simply rely on
patient’s face-value statements and WH articulates a conceptual complexity that creates an
expansive field for listening that proposes directions for clinical work. WH may indirectly be
making the case that patients would be advised to inform themselves about how their clinician is
likely to hear this type of clinical material. Perhaps as a trans patient may want to know if their
sex and gender identity is perceived to be pathological a priori in a new treatment, a digital
native may want to inquire about how their therapist listens for the effects of the digital era.
JW’s initial reaction was to reorient the inquiry to changes in listening, “It’s made me
more distracted, it’s made me a bad listener. I don’t know. I don’t know if that’s true.” It’s as if
she is humorously letting the interviewer know she finds her personal engagement in the digital
world to be not just distracting, but that the power of instruments of the digital era are designed
to capture and hold attention in ways that are beyond one’s control. She continues, “I think that
this is a split off world for people, you know, I think that there is shit that they are doing on the
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internet and they can really not talk about it, so I think, I have to kind of remind myself to see if I
can hear some of this.” JW highlights a related note to WH, that listening for the effects of the
digital requires listening for what is unspoken or yet unspeakable. This requires recognition of
the hypothesized split off parts of experience and a curiosity about how that may present
clinically. For JW, listening for is attending to the unformulated experience of being online. She
links the effects of the internet to an uptick in people presenting to her believing they are on the
autism spectrum, when “they are so not on the spectrum.” She conjectures about “the identity
and need for recognition that the internet is cashing in on… this need for identity.” JW may be
asking, is there something about the digital era that makes people feel so disconnected from
others? Or alexithymic? Or perhaps being suffused in the digital era and mediated interpersonal
connection incline some to have a sense of themselves and their mind as machinic, to imagine
themselves as unable to negotiate the vicissitudes of human contact without overwhelming
anxiety. When comfort is found in harmony with the predictable machine, human others, who
patients may not understand and cannot predict based on disproportionate amounts of time in the
digital realm, become intolerable. Perhaps related to this is the disembodied nature of the virtual
realm and the paired anxiety of congress between bodies.
As an example, JW tells a story about needing to cancel a week’s worth of sessions due
to an emergency. She describes her own antipathy to picking up the telephone for such a task,
but focuses on how some of her patients behaved. “There were a number of them that once I left
the message texted back pretty quickly, “Got your message.” Clearly they couldn’t deal with
answering their phone when Dr. W was calling, which I just took note of.” This attention to the
frame marks a clue about how certain patients experiences may be marked by the digital era for
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JW. For JW however, the focus was less on the frame, but instead about listening for the effects
of the technological world.
ZG and DL were interviewed 7 months into the COVID-19 pandemic, and it’s worth
marking this division because of the profound shift it has introduced into the practice of
psychotherapy, with the vast majority of clinical work being conducted remotely, either via
telephone or video conferencing software.
Like JW, ZG acknowledges not just the powerful allure of digital devices to distract the
analyst from the primary and arguably sacred task of listening, but the shame that being
distracted can induce. “My own access to technology during remote sessions is extremely
problematic and distracting. So like the literal question like how I listen. I have to exert a lot
more willpower to listen the whole time on the phone the entire day and I sometimes don't have
that willpower and it makes me like extremely ashamed and it is awful. I can’t even explicate
what I mean because it makes me feel so bad and I can't talk about it to anyone, my analyst even,
and that's super rare.” With teletherapy becoming the standard of care, new complexities related
to patient and therapist not being present in a room together are introduced. If the analyst is
distracted, it stands to reason that patients will be distracted by devices as well.
ZG, like WH and JW recognized latent aspects of the effects of the digital in patient’s
speech, when it is not directly articulated. “It has in common with other problems the fact that
they might come in not seeing it as an issue and I might see it as something of an issue that you
know is a manifestation of a conflict… they communicate digitally too much or they privileged it
over being in person or whatever it might be.” ZG observes how language can be slippery when
patients speak about their engagement in the digital, using metaphor to speak about actions in the
virtual realm. “When someone says that ‘we were talking,’ I have to ask them what they meant
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by talking. If they were texting, or if they were in person, on the phone and I actually think it's
kind of helpful because it helps them realize that there's a difference.” This intervention
communicates that the therapist is listening with sensitivity to nuances that the patient
themselves is likely unaware of. It lets the patient know, in a subtle way, that the therapist has a
consciousness about how lives today are interwoven into the digital landscape and introduces the
idea that there can be a confusion about the nature of actions and their meanings. ZG’s own
exposure and interest to the digital realm gives him a way to hear aspects of engagement with
technology, when the clues may be faint. Without bringing attention to the patient, ZG, like WH
notes “there are implied understandings which I get what they are talking about frequently.” ZG
is surprised to observe that his patients tend not to speak about experiences in the virtual realm
explicitly, but rather that “it's so woven in that you won't even mention it and no one thinks to
explicate the fact that there's a whole part of their conscious, unconscious life that's thinking
about the things that they do online.”
ZG equivocates about the psychological effects of the digital, in abstract, noting how
what he had been perceived to be problematic use or withdrawal into virtual worlds in the recent
past is now normalized. “I think the prevalence of technologies and the normalization of them,
even though I view them as more pathological than the culture may view them, I still think that
the normalization of them has pushed me to feel more normalized than I would have.” The idea
of digital engagement becoming unremarkable, a trend in ZG’s interview, recalls Chun’s
haunting warning, that “when the effects are more background than foreground…almost without
notice, our psychological and technological ecosystems have enmeshed.” ZG concurs that there
is enmeshment, but vacillates on the psychic cost. “It's like your life is just changing because the
world is changing but I don't think it has a special impact. I think it's like a rising tide. I think it's
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just a tide that most people are basically on to one degree or another.” It may be that the sense of
engagement with the digital normalizing is adaptive in the face of having no alternative but to
maintain a fully virtual practice during to the pandemic. As ZG spoke about clinical material, he
belies his ready acceptance of the digital as normal. In a case with “a young guy who's engaged
to a woman,” “they often will communicate by email to each other when they're making big
decisions,” “and I don't think that that's the best thing. I wish they could learn to talk.” Likewise,
ZG recalls, “I have one other 30 year old woman…who came in with panic attacks and anxiety
and she always is listening to something… a show or a podcast in her ear…I think for her
technology enables her to just never be still and never have any quiet in her life because it if she
did she’d be upset.” ZG notes his countertransference, or arguably his clinical sensibility. “I have
a natural allergy to like a constant noise and a natural way that I sort of think it's better to have
some contemplative time. So probably my own point of view about that is informing the way I
feel, with respect to her and what she tells me but I think I am, I actually can do a pretty good job
of just listening and you know being with her.” As he thinks further, the digital era becomes
more problematic. “I do think of it as less of a problem if people spend more time online, but I
have not yet let go of just that inexplicable feeling that people who can relate in person are just
going to have a better life.” As he continues, the digital realm becomes further problematized.
“There is a deficit. If you tell me ‘I really like texting…I really like being on discord than being
at a dinner party’…I’m like BS. My point of view is that that's a deficit and that is too bad and
that I ultimately would hope that we could change that. Even if the patient doesn't think it's a
problem. So that's a little bit of a rub. I think in terms of like what the patient sees as an issue and
what I see as an issue.”
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When DL was asked if changes in the digital world have altered how he listens to his
patients, he initially refuted any modifications, however, as he shifted attention to working
remotely, due to the pandemic, he stated, “by virtue of the fact that one is listening through a
digital device then indeed one is listening differently.” DL is speaking about the quality of the
voice over digital channels, compressed and altered to reduce demand on bandwidth, compared
to old analogue phones, which were “an extremely sensitive and reliable sound communicator,”
over which “you could get nuances of voice…that are very, very difficult to get through cell
phones.” This literal point is made to highlight the metaphorical impact of the digital on the
“unconscious for the psychoanalytic subject.” “We're disoriented as subjects. We're dislocated.
We were constantly subverted.” DL continues, “Now, not simply by unconscious obstacles like
forgetting word or slipping, you know, a parapraxis, but we add these kind of weird electronic
parapraxes or a parapraxis which is somehow confounded with the electronic.” DL cites being
“stymied” himself by “these dropped calls and how do you operate? What do you do with the
dropped call in a session? Do you ignore it?” Likewise, the appearance of the question “’Can you
hear me’ if the connection is in doubt…to introduce that phrase as a repetitive phrase in
psychoanalysis, you know, thinking of the multiple significations, ‘can you hear me?’ ‘are you
there?’ is another one…there's a kind of shattering, a rupturing, a kind of fragmentation and reconfiguration of subjective positions through this kind of confounding of what is already a
divided subject with a subject sort of now divided again by a kind of technological interface.”
DL cites the experience of a demand brought on by teletherapy, “on the phone, you have to say
something,” at the start of a session, which would not have been present in person, where the
analyst’s speech is inevitably “framing the discourse.” DL’s explication of the effects of the
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digital bring to mind Bach’s bifurcated concept of digital and analogue time, with digital time
resembling the fragmenting effects of trauma, discontinuous and de-linked.
When asked about shifts in listening to the content of patient communications, DL moves
towards the metapsychological. “One is constantly shifting the frame of reference in one's
listening within the culture. That is, one listens as an analyst always in the here and now of the
culture signifiers that take on other meanings because of what's going on and you can't simply
listen. Language isn’t like that, you know. It isn’t static…a word takes on other meanings as it
operates in contemporary culture.” In specific terms, DL cites the effects digital communication
has on interpersonal interaction, as well as the shifting context of ideas about social withdrawal.
Regarding the former, DL states, “one of the things that adolescents go through is it is the
mediation of sexual desire with others. How do you let it be known? How do you pick up on the
response of others? The extent to which that is done digitally in adolescence is so much, so much
greater than in the past. Texting is, you know, an obvious example. How to understand what
information they are referring to when they associate to an experience with somebody they feel
some kind of interest in or feel as expressed in interest in them. In order to listen to that and
know something of what you're listening to, you have to realize you're listening to something
very different than what let's say a 16 year old would be describing, had been describing 30 years
ago when most of that would be taking place face to face.” DL locates changes in experience to
the changing culture, giving him a broad and powerful tool to adopt to whatever the here and
now includes, in this case, the power of the digital to alter experience. Likewise, DL is attuned to
vast changes related to “withdrawal from the social into the digital isolation, like game addiction,
so called.” DL hears social isolation not at face value, or how it may have been in the past, but
rather as having a multidimensional aspect, recognizing, “the mechanisms of cultural links that
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they encounter now if they isolate with technology involve a kind of numerous factors and
variables that you didn't have to think about in the past… now when you've got all of these
interfaces with the social that occur in isolation and private places…so these kids who, you
know, the ranges is enormous and we could spend the whole day talking about all the variations
on that.”
For WH, JW, ZG and DL there is sophisticated network of thought about the impact of
the digital era, an amalgam of their personal history, theory that has been put to use in service of
incorporating a view of the digital era and close clinical listening. These factors shape a way of
listening for a wide range of hypothesized effects of the digital realm. For WH, JW, ZG and DL
there is a dynamic fusion of bottom-up and top-down approaches at play. In contrast, DS’s and
FY’s engagement is more circumscribed. While evidence of the digital presented as content for
FY, compared to context for DS, both had a smaller set of associations and more bounded
concepts that guide listening for the effects of the digital era on patient experience compared to
the rest of the subjects.
A new type of patient, the “digital native”
WH, JW, ZG and DL allude to experiences with people born or brought up during the age
of digital technology and therefore familiar with computers and the Internet from an early age as
a potentially different type of patient. So called “digital natives,” may speak about the digital era
more openly, while at the same time suffering more from some of its effects. For this group, in
some ways, there is no digital era because there is only the digital era. DL notes generational
effects related to the patient’s subjective response to the digital. “As would be expected the
younger patients who have grown up knowing no other interface, but digitized communication
bring a very different experience to it than my older patients, some of whom are older than me
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and may indeed reflect on the whole development in a very different way.” WH states, “I learn a
good bit about how people who are 10 years, 15 years younger have, how their experience
psychically, but even just the activity they go up through the day, how they organize their
worldviews, are influenced by the digital world in a way that mine hasn’t been.”
ZG considers how his view of digital natives has shifted as the culture has normalized
spending more and more time in front of screens. “The 15 year old, he’s like on his computer all
day. He relates to people on his computer all day and I'm not sitting here thinking okay, my goal
is to get him off that. It's like, it's okay. He's relating. I'm more worried about the more intense
stuff whereas maybe five years ago, I would have been like holy shit this guy has a technology
addiction like let's get him off these devices. I don't see it that way and I think that's related to the
culture and changes in technologies and them becoming more pervasive.” DL, is less equivocal,
but takes a dialectical approach to thinking about heavy computer use. “I see a six-year-old girl
through Zoom and she uses her iPad…She knows when the Zoom link comes up she logs on her
cell phone, on her iPad and she's sitting in a room. She does all kinds of things with the iPad,
which you couldn't do on a phone transcription…I see also the expansion. She can show me
things she's been drawing…there's a whole visual play in the treatment frame that wouldn't be
possible through a telephone. So there is this kind of gain and loss experience.”
JW is surprised by a young patient’s articulateness on the topic, “I have a 13 year old that
I see and she is very articulate about her relationship to whatever virtual worlds…She is
surprising in that I wondered if there is something about the kids that have grown up with this
from day 1, because she is 13 now, they have a lot to say about what it is and its benefits and its
limits and their struggles.” She continues to reflect, “My students and even the younger kids that
I see, the teenager I was thinking in particular, argue with me that they are not less related and
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they know this is what is being said about them. So, it’s funny. I come in, ‘you guys don’t know
how to have human relationships,’ and they are like ‘fuck you.’ And they want to talk about the
depth of the relationships they have, even when virtual.” One can wonder if this is a new type of
patient, or, there is a way of listening organically to those of a different generation that allows
space to open up, as if a new vernacular may create a psychic distance that gives the clinician,
now the elder and an authority, freedom to imagine new formulations of human experience. Or
perhaps what is rare in older generations, healthy, if not simply meaningful interpersonal
relatedness in the digital realm, is normalized by digital natives, for whom these mediums are
like the air they breathe. It is clear that JW must be listening closely to allow space for these
discussions in the clinical context. Yet, even for “digital natives,” while they themselves grew up
immersed in the current generation of digital tools and its social/political/economic sequala, they
too are aware that those older than them have not, thus relating the digital natives to a different
type of novel position, an other.
JW offers another personal anecdote about a non-clinical conversation with a 16 year old
who “was talking about his really, really good friend he’s never met.” JW notes her shocked
reaction to this seemingly paradoxical declaration, however, quickly reflects that “I don’t know
if it’s for us to judge…its true like in a funny way, more can be said on text, but it doesn’t mean
you’d say it in person which requires an awful lot of putting your subjectivity on the line to say it
in person, but nevertheless people are talking more, in a way. I feel like people are really anxious
and really scared about in person relatedness at the same time that there is a complexity that they
engage in and do have access to that I don’t know if I would have had at 13 or 16 or whatever it
is.” Here again, JW names her transference while expressing an ambivalence similar to FY, that
some relationship does exist in the digital realm and is felt to be meaningful to its subjects, but

118

that she has personal skepticism and a perceived limitation of the medium. Perhaps what is at
stake is what is real for whom.
Conceptualizing
Conceptualizing is the active thought process that guides listening, inquiry, interpretation
and ultimately intervention with the aim of a therapeutic outcome. It is the emergent fusion of
listening to a patient’s communication with theory and both personal and clinical experience in
mind. Conceptualizing integrates listening for and working with. It is the metapsychology of this
investigation, while, also remaining in a dynamic exchange with these more “active” or
observable processes. In interpreting the results, what was most striking was the range in
flexibility and degree of integration between subjects.
The digital landscape, or what is the digital era?
At the heart of this inquiry is how do psychotherapist conceptualize the phenomenology
of the digital era. What defines it? Its devices? Its roots in capitalist society? Is it continuous with
social shifts underway since the development of mass media? How it has re-organized the means
of production and thus social relations? A reductive, categorical way of apprehending the world
that obscures authentic understanding? Its cultural influence? The political and social influence
its companies and products have? What are its traces on and in human experience? How vast or
bound are its effects? What are the therapists own network of associations regarding these
consideration?
For DS, the digital landscape is a “frame,” the structure through which experience occurs.
The frame is agnostic in having an meaningful effect on the experiences it facilitates, especially
as the intimacy between parties increases. The technological world is defined by its current
instruments and their affordances, FaceTime, Skype, Grindr and Tinder (“what’s the one for
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straight people?”). These instruments are conceptualized through their pre-digital predecessors,
such that, “Tinder is like a singles bar,” and “I think that there were a lot of people who were
involved in porn in the old days but they did it with magazines.” With probing, DS
acknowledged that “just the possibility that simply wasn’t there before, makes a big difference in
terms of the part that these things are allowed to play in everyday life.” However, DS separates
out the phenomenology of the digital landscape broadly via a curious paradox “it’s important to
write and think about these forces, but not important to bracket out with a patient.” He continues,
“The less intimate the relatedness, the more the effect of things like that. The more intimate the
relatedness, therefore, in my work, most of my day, almost all of my day, the more intimate the
relatedness, the less the effect of something like this is going to be, what should I say, it’s not
that it’s not going to be present, but it becomes harder and harder to specify because I know
you.” Intimacy in analysis and the effects of the digital era on patient experience are negatively
correlated.
DS offers a second, similarly paradoxical example, “if you’re married or even with your
mother, and let’s say and you are on FaceTime, yes, of course, there is something different about
it than being in the same room with that person, and you might be a little frustrated wishing you
could just be there to give her a hug, or you know, just the physicality, enjoying the presence of
the other person, but when you are that deeply involved with them the relationship doesn’t
change because it’s still your mother or your spouse.” DS seeks to contain the digital era to a
specific medium, FaceTime, but mid-example makes a curious shift from speaking about the
experience of the software platform to the essential nature of the relationship experienced
through it. One is left to wonder what becomes of the frustration about distance or the thwarted
wish for physicality? Perhaps for DS, and for many healthy others, these affects, able to be

120

symbolized, move to the background of experience, while the “real” relationship moves to the
foreground. The depth of the relationship renders the “frame” good enough for the experience of
the relationship to predominate the frustration with the lack introduced by the distancing
medium. DS’s curious linguistic disjunction however, may be interpreted to mean that some
form of repression is needed to deal with these feelings. Or perhaps the negative affect is not
symbolized at all, not able to be formulated because the simulation seems close enough to the
real that it’s hard to remain identified with the loss. It’s not as if FaceTime is sought out for its
limitations, but rather in spite of them. It calls to mind an all too common phrase of disavowal,
“it is what it is.” One may hypothesize that, for some, these negative feelings could be displaced
onto the other when there isn’t psychic space or permission to name them directly. Alternately,
for some, the discontinuities of digital connection may itself inform the experience of the
relationship, such that it is not the same relationship. It is widely reported that the frequent
experiences of lag, audio compression artifacts and simply the strange quality of screen relations
are emotionally and cognitively fatiguing. Some may look at a person and an image of that
person and recognizing no difference, when in fact one is an embodied other in proximity and
the other is an image rendered visually through video and audio compression software,
manipulated in size to fit your screen and 2-dimentional. It is hard for this writer to account for
how this distortion can be equivocal, but easy to imagine how it can remain unthought, likely due
to some anxiety. What is safe to conclude is these questions are not a part of the internal
discourse for DS while working on digital platforms.
FY’s digital landscape, as presented through his clinical encounters, is predominantly
social media, dating applications and video games. It is a place of splitting, where one must be
held to impossibly high standards, or denigrated as hopelessly inferior, leading to states of
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grandiosity, envy, anxiety, despair and dissociation. Or it is a “cocoon” for “seriously
narcissistically young adults…because contact with the real world is too threatening to their
fragile self-esteem.” His patients are prone to splitting and these platforms are recruited as
vehicles for avoidance of and/or sources of increased anxiety about face-to-face relating. The
digital world is a place of mediated not-relating, that may offer “an escape from the real world
that is much more elaborate than it used to be and in a sort of weird way involves other people,”
yet still, “the ability to get lost in the virtual world might push the person further away from
contact with the objective surroundings.” FY tended to identify limits in the capacity of present
technology to bind his conceptualizations as enough like prior instruments with similar
affordances such as comparing Instagram to Vogue magazine and video games to pinball
machines, while remaining open to future categorical shifts in patterns of human relating that
might challenge his present theory. In short, he is flexible in thinking about the questions being
asked and able to play with ideas that push present boundaries. He states, “I do assume, perhaps
incorrectly that people get bored with the machine that just perfectly attuned itself to the person,”
but permits that algorithms that could support more complex machine-human relatedness, that
both mirror and mark, might require adjustments in his concepts. There is recognition of the
digital as offering tools and a platform to construct the self from the outside, rather than through
a genuine connection to the self. FY says, “it does seem to, or there would be a risk of just
always depending on some external stimulus to put something on your mind rather than taking
time to reflect on it and see what is emerging from the self.” Likewise, he states, “my fear is that
identity will develop more around identification with media images rather than with real
interactions to date, I don’t think that’s the case, but I could imagine that what one experiences in
relation to technology could at some point overpower what one experiences in relation to others,
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I don’t know if that could happen, but that would alter some of my thoughts about identity
formation, to date” His use of the word “overpower” suggests several interesting possibilities.
The first is of technology as an autonomous entity, having its own ambitions that may exceed
those of its creators. Likewise, it may refer to an idea about technology as a primary drive or
force, a part of human ambition that continually re-shapes the human experience in different
eras. There is much thoughtful equivocating for FY, who wonders if the “gloss” of today’s
digital photographs creates “a tyranny of idealized images” compared to the “grainy” photos of
freshmen in his Harvard facebook from the late 1960s. He implicates the advertising industry’s
instrumentalization of technology, stating, “I think it’s had a horribly detrimental impact on
people’s ability to maintain self-esteem.” FY, who also holds a Ph.D. in Literature from Yale,
wonders if “Madame Bovary was overly influenced by the romance novels of the day, so a lot of
the symbols that she took in were not reality based they were from a romantic literature that gave
her skewed ideas of what one could expect from life, so there has always been the challenge of
what you take in and how do you use it, so the proliferation of exposure to images might allow
for greater richness of what’s possible. But again, it depends on if you seek out richness or if you
seek out just what you are looking for and have a narrow focus.”
FY states, “all the examples I’ve given you which were not too pessimistic are based on a
fundamental humanism I believe in, but I may be wrong, but that may just be a chapter of history
that will change.” At the end of the interview, FY equivocates, “I would just say that I have been
basing my answers on my experience with a very finite number of patients and with the person
there face to face, I haven’t seen huge disasters consequences of the digital age.” FY met the
interview with some clinical exposure to patient’s in the digital world, and an openness to
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thinking about possibilities and how technology is like or different than past paradigms with
similar dynamics.
WH’s digital landscape is explicitly derived from Freud’s edict in Civilization and Its
Discontents, where devices are prothesis and platforms are civilization. He states, “I see the
phone as being a kind of prothesis, but you know Facebook as being a part of civilization.” This
clarification organizes listening clinically about engagement in the digital landscape while
placing it in parallel with one’s non-digital experiences. WH postulates a “digital identity
formation” as a dynamic developmental process that unfolds alongside “identity formation,” with
symptoms potentially emerging from an inability for the ego to integrate these multiplicities. WH
articulates an inherent location for psychic conflict between the embodied ego and the virtual
ego, such that “I think it’s part of the human condition, we’re always at war with our prosthesis,
we’re never completely happy with our false teeth.” Like FY, he postulates an “economy of
mutual exclusion…or inverse proportion,” such that “there is a difference in economy when the
flesh is involved and when just the screen is involved.” He agrees with FY that direct relations
are inherently superior to digitally mediated relations, seeing “relatedness as being somehow
more closely related to direct flesh and blood and social engagement or personal engagement or
even something even more intimate.” WH marks an increase in digitally-mediated activities to
avoid potential peril, stating, “it does seem that more patients are happy to watch porn and
masturbate rather than get involved with someone in which they have different kinds of
dynamics and risks.” The idea that the digital is a bastion from risk and loss for increasing
numbers of patients resonates with FY as well as JW, to be discussed next. WH’s digital
landscape is not bound by devices, platforms or their affordances, but includes broader
conceptualizations about how the digital era has altered human experience, creating an increase
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need for immediate gratification and consumption that disrupt patients’ capacity to engage in
both the process of therapy and tolerate healthy process in their own lives. WH states, “I think
people are less inclined to deal with the pros and the cons of physical relatedness when you can
become less physically related by engaging a fantasy world on the phone.” For WH, the digital
era supports a psychic economy akin to consumer culture at the expense of one’s investment in
interiority. Individuals shun engagement in personally motivated, generative processes that
require discipline and investment, instead recruiting digital tools to get rewards that are depleted
of their meaningfulness to the degree they require negligible effort or ambition to obtain. WH
states, “people really get enchanted in the illusion that time is money and that time should be
used, time can be consumed just as money can be consumed, and I do think that this kind of
conviction, and the corroboration of this through various structures in civilization that are very
related to the digital world consumer culture. I think that is in competition with reflection.” WH
continues, “I think when you are in a hurry to get to the followers on Instagram, or to get to the
next number in your bank account, or to do this or that, to keep up with the Jones digitally, that is
at odds with slowing down and reflecting. I mean it even relates to are you going to press play on
Spotify, are you going to find sheet music and learn to play an instrument.” Likewise, he
contrasts the individual that exercises to create a body to photograph for Instagram with one who
pursues fitness to have an expanded experience of the body through its limits and
transformations. WHs use of economic theories give his conceptualization of the digital era a
vastness, flexibility and dynamic nature to clinically organize disparate phenomena into
coherence.
JW’s digital landscape is populated not by devices, platforms or what they can do, but
instead addressed through a complex and sometimes contradictory web of clinical observations
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grounded in theory with her subjectivity as an analyst and end user. JW is candid about being
personally involved in popular aspects of the digital world. JW cites her use of social media and
reflects on both its addictive qualities and how it rarely makes it into her “mental elaboration.”
She asks with a blend of curiosity and bewilderment, “I spend a lot of time on social media, so
why is it not part of my internal life?” She notes internet use as blunting symbolization, a
necessary component of analytic progress. JW states, “on the one hand, the internet makes you
experience a lot of lack, but on the other hand, it’s not the experience of lack that creates
symbolization. And that is probably part of the split that I feel is pretty heavy these days.” She
notices that despite her patient’s engagement in virtual realms, session material tends to be
“more stuff that happens in the real world, that happens with real people and real situations that
are the building blocks, and it’s not this other stuff.” JW observed a core paradox about digital
engagement, “how much you take in and how little enters your dream life of it,” that has broad
implications for how therapists conceptualize this aspect of patient experience. She is asking
what is perceptible of the psychic traces of one’s involvement in virtual domains?
Her descriptions balance the clinical, an empathetic identification with her patients’
experience and an outrage at the perceived maleficent effects the digital sow. JW identifies many
shifts in what it means to be human today as a result of the digital era that affect her patients. She
states, “They certainly live more virtually and this virtuality makes them more inhibited in
certain ways and that is why there is less sex.” In online dating, “it’s just a world of fantasy and
the brutal explosion of fantasy without like any mitigation, I just watch it build up and blow over
and start over again. This is weird and very hard on people.” JW cited the distortion of fantasy
via a predomination of projection that unfolds in burgeoning romantic relationships on dating
applications that “just blows up and they freak out because the person is not what they thought
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they were.” At the same time, JW described the contradictory relationship that exists between
“access to information,” that is “useless” for people “in terms of figuring out their unconscious
and their life and what life can offer them.” This abundance, paradoxically, “makes it a lot harder
to move towards anything” and “has an effect on the elaboration of desire,” creating “apathy.”
Despite the availability of information, “there is not even a sense of what’s out there.” This
“intense amount of informational, visual and otherwise “ produces “the intensity of the affective
responses” that overwhelm, leading to “dysregulation” and “all this policing of speech that has
come up.” JW cites access to pornography as disrupting import processes of discovery, “it’s not
like you are picking up little things from the adults and putting together some picture and like
figuring it out.” Instead, “it’s just all blaaahh! It’s just all there.” There is the “Instagram effect,”
which is related to both FY and WH’s conceptualization of a culture of display and comparison,
such that, “everyone is having the best time in the world and everyone’s life is like amazing and
perfect.” JW notes dual consequences. For some, it can lead to “real collapsed places about what
other people have and have access to and the friends and the fun that they just don’t feel like they
have and they can be very devastating.” This depravity can drive obsessive stalking and
destructive envy. For others, there is “this real compulsion of the exhibition, which I think is
new.” JW disambiguates what appears as a “searching on the one hand for connection through a
presentation of one’s self… which you might think what they are looking for is community,”
from its intrapsychic phenomena, “but it’s really about recognition.” She notes that community
building takes a lot more negation of recognition, whereas being exhibitionistic on digital
platforms is more about “the need to construct this identity on the outside.” She expands on the
problematics of this form of identity, “it’s not like I’m going to contribute to the field of
scientific research. It’s like I am going to create an image of myself as a researcher and put that
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on Instagram and garner recognition.” She says people used to be “happy hiding” whereas now
there is “this real need to feel not so alone” that leads to desperate attempts to find external
validation for one’s subjectivity. JW cites the “internet imperative” as “this world in which you
can constantly change and the constant flux of it and also the pervasive sense of choice and the
demand that one explore all options.” The constant demand for the production of a false self
leads to another paradox. “I think people are more self-reflective but in a harmful way, so almost
in an obsessional way, where they can think and think and think about themselves and analyze
themselves and its pure defense. And the defense against the unconscious or the unconscious
event or the event that really pushes towards what is being warded off is re-enforced by all.” In
therapy, JW finds that, “what actually ends up coming is a complete reversal of what they have
been trying to present or describe about themselves and to the world. Like the real truth is
somewhere else completely.” These processes disrupt or retard development, such that
“everyone seems like a teenager…that is like for people at 13 and people at 20 and at 45 at this
point.” JW names “a life and death search for a new position” in this era of fluidity, where she
has experience with young girls who can’t find a location for their identity between dysfunction
in their families and “the chaos of the world.“ “There is nothing they can grab onto and so all
they have are these suicidal feelings that they cross-check with each other, so a lot of these
suicidal girls are suicidal with all their friends and they all want to die and this is how they are
finding some ground, although the ground is very dangerous, because a lot of them have
committed suicide.” For JW, this is a dark location, both created by and unable to be solved by
the technological world. “The internet is trying to create this where there isn’t one. It’s like the
collapse of the American dream, one sense of what America is, we’re really losing all ideals,
quickly.” For others, there is an obsessional resonance with the ideal forms the technological

128

world promises, where “obsessional fantasy is in overdrive.” JW links the success of “CBT
techniques which treat the mind as a machine,” and patients who “are doing this with self-help
books, trying to jigger themselves and they are trying to optimize, enhance, optimize, all of these
terms are machinic terms, and they are very obsessional too, like optimal functioning.” JW
remains committed to the psychoanalytic project and its use in this era, however, she does
wonder, “I don’t know that the world has any space and like this other stuff that’s there, it fills in
that space.”
ZG’s digital landscape is one where the digital affords new modes of distraction and
distancing from intrapsychic and interpersonal phenomena through the constant consumption of
media and the use of texting rather than speaking to make important decisions in intimate
relationships. Technology allows one novel modes of remaining occupied that lead to a busyness
that interrupts self-reflection, increases fragmentation and gets in the way of working through
and integration processes. At the same time, technology offers channels for social engagement
for youth who gravitate towards excessive screen time, with potentially negligible negative
effects due to the normalization of these ways of being. Like JW, ZG is surprised at how
infrequently patients speak directly about conflicts related to the digital realm, yet recognizes its
pervasive presence in latent aspects of patient communications. Like most subjects, ZG places a
value on the capacity for and will to engage in embodied relating, despite ZG equivocating on
what it means for technology use to become increasingly normalized. “I think the culture is
normalizing things faster than I'm normalizing them in terms of whether or not they're
pathological. So the culture might be like that's normal, that's cool, you're texting all the time or
you're only communicating this way and I think I'm lagging and I think I'm right.” ZG sees
retreat into the digital as an avoidance of basic aspects of being human that must ultimately be
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encountered, even if for just a moment. “I just think it's fundamental to the human experience
and that today, no matter how good the platform is or what you are doing, there's no 100%
digital existence. I mean, you need to put food in your body…there's a lot of limits. It’s not like
the fucking Matrix. It’s not like there's a robot that can handle all the to do's. So that would be
enough reason for me to say no, fundamentally my model of what being a human being is really
hasn't changed because we can't, from A to Z, have some alternatively embodied life experience.
With that being said, there's a lot of time in between. You could live a lot of your existence in a
more fulfilled digital world. I still think it sucks and I still think I favor just like being a fucking
person who has to do chores and deal with life and earn money and pay for things and take care
of stuff and have loving relationships that are embodied with another human being and I
ultimately think replacing those with disembodied representations is just not the same…it's a
cliche but you have to go to sleep at night, you have to take off the headset. Eventually there's
gonna be a moment between that existence and your embodied existence and it's like, how do
you feel at that moment? What is your life really like?” The digital can offer social connection,
as ZG himself speaks about through his active use of a Discord server to stay connected to
distributed college friends, but one must always reckon with a self that is offline as well.
Interestingly he observes that his use of this technology, which “I would have missed…because
I'm way too old for it” gives him insight into a younger patient’s digital landscape. ZG’s
understanding that different applications are targeted to different age groups adds a particular
depth to how he listens to material from the digital world. It includes the perspective that while
different software may do similar things, for users there may be meaningful differences, as well
as the significance encoded in using a program that is essential designed to be used exclusively
by people of a certain age. This implicates ideas about privacy, exclusivity and separateness from
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the adult world, all of which may be particularly meaningful to an adolescent patient. ZG offers a
wild pontification, explored in such diverse films as Wall-E, The Matrix, Tron, Ralph Breaks the
Internet and Idiocracy, on the future of the technological era, “maybe in 20 or 40 years, there'll
be some caste sort of system of people who live in the real flesh and blood world and people who
live just digitally.” Joking aside, these represent rather divergent models for the future of human
experience, with an explicit social hierarchy. Left to the imagination is which group is in the top
position.
DL had been oriented towards the current digital era since the 1960s, when he first
encountered it through education in math. “The idea that something about the digital language
would be a transformative aspect of culture was on my radar, if I can use it technological
metaphor…this was not just the change in tools, it was a change in a kind of linguistic interface
with tools. The digitalizing of language.” DL’s “digitalizing of language,” a broad concept,
includes reference to the use of technology as metaphor to describe human actions, and the
implied unconscious disjunction for a subject who takes on the property of a machine. DL names
the pivot that occurred in the 1980s which demarcates the time period under study in this
dissertation, “In the eighties, of course is when it started to become widely available rather than
just the kind of rarified technology, which was being developed on the margins and research
labs.” DL uses both his interest in technology, his perspective due to his mature age and
understanding of how different aspects of technology have altered experience to conceptualize
differences in how younger and older patients relate to the digital era. He identifies with older
patients’ grievances about the reduction in quality of digital communication and considers the
subjective effect of dropped calls ‘in what appears to be random” compared to “the old analog
desk phones,” where “it never happened.” Likewise, younger patients are consciously immune
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from such experiences, having come of age knowing nothing different, yet the disruption may
still introduce a psychic trace, evidenced in asking such questions as, “can you hear me?”
DL makes use to two broad strategies to conceptualize the digital: (1) a dialectical
approach to losses and expansions that follow from technologies affordances, and (2) to look for
the roots of questions that emerge from the apparent novelty of the digital in ongoing
psychoanalytic inquiry. In the latter is an effort not to stabilize or reduce the new to the same as
the old, but rather to find continuity to historic inquires, allowing for the conundrums to resonate
with past efforts at critical thinking, while acknowledging one’s relationship to theory as a
dialectic itself. “What it means to think is to operate with one's concepts knowing that they're
limited and that's a dialectical principle. That is, you're both affirming them and recognizing their
limited characteristic, right?” “The question of whether it's modify or throw the whole thing out
and come up with a new framework, that's a debate that's going on as well.”
Like WH and JW, DL draws on Lacanian theory to orient his conceptualization of the
digital era. DL’s cites “the role of the visual in identity development, the extent to which image
plays a part and people can now operate with either an absence of an image, a two-dimensional
image rather than a three-dimensional image, an image on a screen, which is reversed from the
image that they would be seen in person, all of these things affect identity.” DL refers to the
confusion that video conferencing software introduces into this process, “the question of seeing
oneself as one is talking to another is fundamental to what we mean by identity, “do I see myself
as others see me?” was the question that people used to ask psychologically, now that question
has a kind of irony because I literally see myself as other see me.” He notes generational effects,
such that kids in Zoom sessions become distracted by their own image, whereas adults turn off
the self-view so as not to be distracted. DL argues that the digital era “doesn't alter the essential
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structural question of the Other, but it does introduce historically significant and culturally
specific forms. For example, one of the aspects of the big Other is the gaze of the Other. The idea
of being watched when no one is there, but when you wonder if someone is there. This
experience, which is fairly universal, of a sense of being watched, sense of awareness of one as
an object of an imagined gaze as you're going about your business, well, in the digital culture and
the ubiquity of cameras and the fact that one may in fact be watched at all times, I think there's a
whole shift in in the presence of an eye not I, the letter I, the EYE that is not just the eye of
another person, but the eye of a sort of cultural network that's watching and that's very close to
what had been the symbolic Other and always operating virtually, not the sense we now call
virtual, but in the sense that it didn't exist, now it exists, and what exists we now call virtual.
There's a kind of confusion. That is, we are being recorded…The gaze of the Other always has
an effect on the experience of oneself as a subject, because it's in the gaze of the big Other that
one becomes an object. It's this kind of confusion of the object and the subject.” DL’s listening
and conceptualizing is grounded in psychoanalytic theory with close attention to the
metapsychological questions at play, giving him solid footing to hear both what he expects and
what he does not expect to hear. Like JW, DL’s listening is not based on particular applications
or categories of digital tools, but rather fundamental concepts about the digital era as a
phenomenon.
DL says, “one of the things about loss and lack is that its denial is always fundamental to
the formation of identity. One could say that the formation of identity is structurally based on the
denial of lack, right? That's Lacan’s mirror stage.” He continues, “I presume that the structural
conception of identity will still operate as a suture of lack but I think that how it operates in these
new technological forms of identification is complicated, is unknown.” In the digital, “I think it
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shifts in its locus,” “we're going to have to learn how it shifts, we're going to have to see how it
operates in new frameworks.” DL locates alterations to the construction and stabilization of
identity as central to the impact of technology. DL states, “identity is distributed through
electronic frameworks.” He continues, “I think about it dialectically. There's a greater capacity
and risk stemming from a kind of fragmentation of identity. So greater capacity to assume
different subjective positions, different identifications.” In this statement, DL speaks towards
Hartman’s Reality 2.0, where the ability to produce oneself liberates the subject from the tyranny
of being defined by the Other. DL, however, takes a different tact, by addressing the unknown
meaning that this contingency creates through an exploration of a relatively new treatment with a
patient he has never seen. DL states, “All I know about him in terms of personal features is the
sound of his voice through a digital phone. And vice versa. Unless he's looked me up on the
internet and knows pictures of me.” This reduced need for the presence of the other “introduces a
possibility for recognizing how contingent the identifications that we operate with are.” DL
continues, “there isn’t an essence of being that is necessary to grasp about the other in order to be
working with them. The essence of being that we would normally have thought I need to be in
this person's presence, see who he is, let him see who I am, we need to know who each other are
in that kind of visceral presence in order to work together. We're not doing that and we're
working.” While at once pointing out the risk to a “thin” presentation of self to identity, DL
contemplates its impact on the effectiveness of teletherapy generally. DL questions the potential
for teletherapy that may be overlooked during the pandemic, “the danger being that there is an
element of clinical effect that comes from a certain level of engagement with the construction of
self that is bypassed by working in this reduced way.” Like JW, and others, including Gillian
Isaacs Russell in “Screen Relations,” DL asks if analytic work can be done remotely without
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bodies in a room. “So there's a capacity to work with somebody strictly through their voice but
does that mean we've lost something fundamental that is to work with them when that other
factor is in play, whatever that other factor is? The visceral presence of the person. What does
that visceral presence do in the way of challenging the possibilities in analytic discourse which
are now somehow circumvented?” DL cites a French analyst who said that phone sessions could
not be effective because “the analysand has to be aware that the analyst could potentially rape
her.” A shocking statement designed to jolt those who may be drifting into teletherapy without a
second thought.
DL re-framed the interview as part of an ongoing question in psychoanalysis. “one of the
things we do as analysts is try to understand the cultural context of the self, of subjectivity, and
how subjectivity is shifting and redefining because of cultural factors. What we're doing now
with the electronic redistribution of identity is a variation on this activity that we've been doing
since the beginning of analysis…there were studies that were done in the twenties that
psychoanalysis has to rethink its relationship to cultural ground and cultural context, so maybe
it's always been a tension in the field is how much of are we working in trans-historical
universals and how much we working in culturally sensitive contexts.” DL’s approach of
deconstructing and then re-orienting the interview into ongoing discourse both stabilizes current
changes without minimizing their novelty. DL has approached this interview in a markedly
different manner than the other subjects and positioned his interpretation of the digital landscape
in the broadest possible scope, giving the sense that DL has a cool distance for critical thought
that allows him to listen authentically to what his patients speak.
“I hate being like, ‘the new symptoms’”
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All subjects explicitly rejected the idea of the technological world as the cause of new
psychological symptoms, but most saw the digital landscape as offering new sites for the
expression of pathology and, for more than half the subjects, novel variations of their expression.
FY spoke axiomatically about health and pathology, saying “if you have a good healthy
psychological personality structure, you can relate perfectly well in the digital world, but if you
have a vulnerability to splitting then the digital world is just going to widen that split and further
foster the division of what you would experience internally as either perfect and ok, or imperfect
and devalued. But you know, it depends on how you are made up to begin with.”
Most subjects identified shifts in how symptom present in the digital era, but tended to
conceptualize the change as continuous rather than categorical and no one suggested new
nosology. WH and JW did offer adapted or new concepts however, including “digital identity
formation” and “compulsion of the exhibition,” respectively. DL, likewise, used existing theory
to described how the digital alters the construction and maintenance of identity. Despite this,
there was a desire to root the effects of the digital era in existing theory, although some subjects
named and considered their own biases or limitations in believing that a shift of kind had or
could occur. JW states, “I’m like really classical to the extent that I try to hold to this hysterical,
obsessional, phobic, melancholic, psychotic, perverse thing, like that’s it, those are the categories
and I still find for the most part that they hold.” DL pontificates on the same question and
suggests that there may be modifications based on cultural changes, “whether the fundamental
categories of psychopathology like neurosis, psychosis and perversion…are they still applicable?
Are we living in an age in which the perverse is now functioning differently than it functioned in
the past and in a way which makes it an acceptable dimension of daily life?” However, JW noted
marked differences in presentations, saying, “I think things look really extreme.” She describes
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the internet as a place of “acting out,” “The internet experience is that there is no adults
anywhere, it’s just a bunch of children, smearing the world with their garbage on the internet
[laughing].” She continues, “I appreciate it and appreciate the fact that you have to act in order to
know, that this old psychoanalytic idea of knowing and then acting is not so relevant.” While not
new symptoms, JW challenges ego-psychology orthodoxy, “I don’t think the internet is helping
so much in terms of like frustration tolerance, and these old school kind of psychoanalytic
values, but so what? You know, deal with what you are given.” Her challenge may be directed at
analysts who she feels are less flexible in their conceptualizations of the digital era. JW, in
naming the “compulsion of the exhibition,” as discussed above, does revise her original
statement, saying “which I think is new, that that is very new.”
WH states, “I think if we are just coming up with new categories for things we going to
end up like the DSM…these categories don’t mean anything, they don’t have any kind of
structural merit, so I think this has made me cautious to think of things as being fundamentally
different.” WH’s desire is to use historic theory to organize present human experience,
suggesting “go back, trace the theory back a little bit further and to see how I can kind of
integrate, or think about the confluence of the symptomatology with new circumstances.”
JW describes the work it takes to understand what may appear to be new symptoms
initially as perhaps a new phase of treatment, or the demand for tolerance for more regressed preverbal-like presentations. “I think there are some patients that you just don’t know for a long
time, especially younger patients, I worry because I think like with some other analyst they are
like this person is crazy and I’m like maybe they are just a millennial and ..weird [interviewer:
how so?] you know, the scatteredness of the person, the disintegrated-ness of the person, the
identity conflicts with the person, or the acting-out-ness, or the extreme withdrawal with the
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person, also maybe the amounts of the weird medications they’ve been put on for-so-long-ness
of the person, I think that these patients can freak clinicians out and once they settle into
treatment, then they can start looking like your older patients.”
For FY, there are no new symptoms, just new content for symptoms. “If its video games
or playing tic-tac-toe, you know, I think the symptom is really the underlying issue.” On
occasion, FY wrestled to contain symptomatology to historic concepts by using comparison to
prior affordances to stabilize his logic. While the patient may be accomplishing the same ends
via video games as pinball, this parallel may limit the potential therapeutic utility of clinical
material available through exploration of the video game environment. FY denied changes in
how he conceptualizes pathology, but added, “these changes have made me aware there is more
psychological pathology in the general society than I imagined,” continuing, “[the digital era]
permits people to show sides of themselves that they would have been ashamed of, perhaps just
afraid of showing,” ZG may be addressing this question from another angle when he stated, “I
used to think technology problems are special because they're so pervasive and they cut across so
many different parts of our life, but I’m not sure if I think it's a special category of a problem
anymore.” ZG, echoing FY, states, “it's probably a manifestation of some other kind of a
conflict.” DS, who was typically dismissive of the effects of the technological era, agrees, in
part, while interrogated in the interview, speaking about access to pornography, “It’s so much
easier now, you just flip, to turn on your computer and you are there and in the culture it’s gotten
to be something that actually people speak about. When I was growing up and even through my
40s, 50s, no one ever spoke about such things. Ever. And it would be pretty embarrassing to
speak about them even in treatment.” It’s interesting to note the parapraxis, “you just flip, to turn
on your computer,” which can be interpreted to suggest DS’s “primary language” for
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understanding the digital era is the pre-digital landscape where you flip pages of a magazine to
see pornography. The double entendre “turn on” also alludes to a projection of sexuality onto the
machine. It is important to distinguish that for FY, individual pathology in the form of shameful
behavior is demonstrated in the relative anonymity of the digital landscape, whereas for DS,
patients are more inclined to speak about things that were formerly shameful that they experience
online. For ZG, the digital landscape was never connected to his patient’s shame, but rather
mediated social interaction, sometimes good-enough and sometimes avoidant. For FY, the
perceived anonymity of the internet releases people from super-ego prohibitions, leading to
increased pathological behavior, whereas for DS, the expanded access to formerly taboo sexual
material relaxes people’s psychic injunction against speaking of their own pornography use. ZG
himself confessed to his own shameful inability to inhibit his desire to be on his devices.
During inquiry, FY highlighted the tautology, “pathology is deviation from norms,” and
allowed for a potential future psychological landscape where “if norms were or are to develop
where interaction with devices take on prominence that might lessen the impact or richness of
interaction with other human beings, maybe that would call for a new model, because maybe
there would be new norms for what would be ok.” ZG and DL may agree with this assessment,
but both tended to see shifting norms, whereas FY states, “It’s hard for me to imagine it would
be as satisfying as direct contact but I may not be creative enough in my imagination.” This
remarkably generous position may have been given to meet interviewer demands, but likely
represents FY’s own capacity to bracket out his understanding of the present moment as one
bound by its chronology and his personal beliefs. ZG hedges between pathology and cultural
normalization, seeming to surprise even himself at how much less the heavy use of devices raises
his clinical concern. He speaks of a teenage patient, “I never thought I would say this but he does
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relate more to people than he would without it and he gets a lot out of playing games and being
on Discord with his friends. I think it's hard to figure out how to make the argument that being in
person for the sake of it is better. Like you can't just say it because it is, you have to sort of say
how come you think so and I think it's hard to articulate that.” DL stated, “the question about
psychopathology slash health is very much a question about cultural subjectivity. What are the
norms? What constitutes operating as a subject? In some way symptomatically versus finding
one's place and being able to operate in, without excessive symptomatic interference in the social
order, in the cultural sphere. So the idea that what it is to live changes through the digitized.” ZG
seeks balance between the two polemical positions of pathology and normalization, articulated
by Sherry Turkle (“mediated conversations are a problem”) compared to Danah Boyd, a
Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research and author of “It’s Complicated” (“mediated
conversations are fine”). On the one hand, “this is good, people who are isolated and they
communicate with other people. I think I'm coming around to the idea that it's helpful.” Yet, “do
I think that the technology allows people to become less and less and less comfortable in person
than they would? I do think it allows it. If there weren't Discord servers or multi-player games
and Switch and all the rest of it, people would not recede to technological things.” Here ZG
locates technology as deterministic in digital pathology.
While FY and ZG see pathology as expression of underlying conflict, DL locates the
question of new symptomatology as a function of one’s capacity to integrate into the digital
world. It’s a subtle change, but allows DL to track changes due to the digital world to shifts in
the social order. “One can be socially functional, let's put it, that way with a much greater degree
of solitude and separation from others on this on a day-to-day basis. People who sit in front of
their screen and work there all day long are not considered social isolates necessarily in a way
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that they certainly would have been 40 years ago. You know, taking your meals, in your room in
front of the screen would be symptomatic in a way that it it's not now.” DL links my inquiry to
earlier research by Daniel Bell on the effects of “mass society,” (“The revolutions in transport
and communications have brought men into closer contact with each other and bound them in
new ways; the division of labor has made them more interdependent; tremors in one part of
society affect all others. Despite this greater interdependence, however, individuals have grown
more estranged from one another” (Bell, 1956). DL’s perspective may acknowledge how the
changed social landscape explains current behaviors, rather than reacting from a particular
position against which pathology is organized.
Notably, no subject named “Gaming Disorder” (ICD-11 code: 6C51.0 Gaming Disorder,
predominantly online), instead naming their own resistance to new nosology alongside a desire
to frame symptoms as functional, rather than descriptive. In part this can be understood that for
analysts, the ICD-11 and descriptive nosology are likely not the most useful clinical
classifications.
Working With
FY, WH and JW described considerations or alterations in their clinical practice in the
face of new or more extreme presentations in patients whose experience is marked by the way
the subject conceptualizes the effects of the technological world. ZG recognized the novelty of
the effects of the digital era, but was equivocal about changes in his clinical process. For DL,
changes in method derived from the need to understand and operate in the context of the new set
of conditions the digital affords. DS did not perceive the effects of the digital to be of categorical
importance and thus has not modified his methods.

141

For FY, one’s over-engagement in the digital domain, conceptualized as “a defense, as an
escape,” may be addressed directly through the treatment contract as a pre-condition to
commencement of therapy. When he considers “if it were severe enough” in the case of “the guy
who spends all his time with video games,” he might make it an explicit treatment goal “to ween
off that much time with the video world, online world and to increase interactions with people
sort of face to face basis.” FY clarified that this condition was congruent with the patient’s own
desire.
WH, while remaining committed to his theoretical position, does imagine that new
methods of intervention may be called for in the face of the intrusion of the digital era’s
influence on his patients. He observes that “every few months there seems to be a little bit of an
uptick” in patients that “want to show you a picture of something,” or “someone will give me the
breakdown of a fight by wanting to read through a text, or show me through a text.” WH
described increased resistance from patients to his request to describing these experiences
without presenting digital documentation. He states, “I think the frame and the treatment as far as
whose responsibility it is to talk, how the time and location and fee, the very basics of the
treatment arrangement, I think more and more of my interventions as far as interpreting around
that are going to involve phones and the digital world.” He shares an example, “one guy, I asked
him to put his phone away and eventually he said, it wasn’t fair because he couldn’t keep track
of his time. As long as he could see the clock that was fair to him.” It is likely WH’s request
created a space to reflect on the reasons this patient felt like he needed access to his phone in
session. It is open to further consideration the degree to which the patient’s response captured the
full meaning of his need for his phone, but an intervention such as WH’s expands the field for
such clinical exploration.
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WH’s conceptualization of the split between the embodied ego and the digital ego point
to methods of working with patients that may be novel. This may present as people struggling to
engage in psychotherapy, “I think people being able to engage a process without immediate
gratification, that is a problem,” or particular types of dislocation from the meaning of a
symptom, “Sometimes someone will talk about having an eating disorder but it’s usually not
conceived as having anything to do with wanting to look good for pictures to post to Instagram.”
In the analyst’s office, patients’ consumeristic instincts formed through the digital, can take
several forms, including a request for the therapist to deliver a treatment as if it were the answer
to a problem. WH shares, “they are coming saying I’m dissatisfied with my love life…this
partner is being mean to me and I want you to solve my problems.” WH describes an example of
his working process, “usually it takes some working through before it starts feeling true to the
patient. It’s a little bit like the patient will come in, I, this is where it loops in, it falls into a
consumeristic, where the patient will come in and want a, to feel, more fulfilled in a romantic
relationship, but upon further exploration, it maybe has something to do with them being out of
touch with something because they are so invested in their online dating persona and how its
maybe misrepresenting something, or there is a miscommunication, or some conflicts involved.”
WH relies on traditional analytic practices to “trace it back,” “if we following the change of
associations that will go back to an early time where the root… dynamics of this symptom or
some of the signifiers of it took root, and then it kind of accumulated into a symptomatic way of
being that eventually the symptom took on its own digital prothesis.”
JW experiences the technological world as new and perplexing, “it’s a real confrontation
with the contemporary and technology that I wasn’t having before necessarily.” In contrast to
“troubles in a marriage, trouble with parentings, trouble with career and success,” she states,
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“those things feel like we have a certain way of thinking about it that doesn’t have this flavor, of
what the fuck is going on? And where is my responsibility as an analyst in relationship to it and
feeling a bit discombobulated.” Like WH, she observes that some patients, especially younger
ones, require special effort to engage in traditional psychoanalysis. JW states, “Like with my
millennial patients, my 20 somethings and maybe early 30 patients, I have to like wrestle them
towards being someone who will allow something symbolic to happen. They don’t want to talk
about their dreams. They don’t even want to have dreams. They don’t even want to go to sleep.”
Her approach is to make use of or generate conflicts in the transference in an effort to ultimately
support the patient’s capacity for trust in the analytic process, “they will much more engage in a
funny battle with me transference-wise, it’s through teasing this out and surviving the attacks and
living through some kind of conundrum of this nature and the distrust and anxiety that then
finally it will happen. but you don’t start there, you get there.” JW has noticed that these patients
“almost protect more the positive transference and they only let it out for like a second. I try to
work with it, not in interpreting it away, oh, like you really idealize me or whatever, but actually
to find out what it is that they think they see in you because they have a lot of thoughts about that
and they are really important because it goes against the old ego-psychology adage,” where “you
don’t interpret the positive transference, you only interpret the negative transference.” JW does
remain committed to some traditional processes for their clinical utility. “I appreciate the old
psychoanalytic ideas of exploring things from all angles and then the way that pulls things
together…Its good that things still function the way they did.” JW observed that patients whose
lives are marked by digital experience “are so aware of their distrust and hate and bad feelings,”
and considers, “with these people so dispersed and fragmented in a way and this experience of
no ideal, that um, the analysis that is really deconstructed is less useful than an analysis that
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works on the basis of construction.” JW notes the flood of images available on the internet and
yet the lack of ability for certain patients to integrate coherently. “With older females, less what
is happening for younger ones, but they can’t put together wanting to have children, wanting to
have a good body, wanting to be successful, wanting to maybe have a partner in some
monogamous form – none of this is going together and there is something wrong with you that
you can’t put it together, but why should anyone be able to put this together? This is all so very
new, you know, that there is even this idea that a woman could put all this together and why are
we demanding that women be able to do all this?” She names the psychic paradox of the flood of
images available on the internet, “There are so many images, but there isn’t even a one.” JW
finds a “balance” between deconstruction, “like going into the mommy and the daddy stuff” and
construction. She will “try to find what the patient is already in the process of constructing for
themselves and to work there.” She notes that these patients are already engaged in obsessive
thought processes to support false selves, “if they are thinking, thinking, thinking all the time to
just make them think more from the outside about their past can maybe be the wrong direction,”
and instead they may need or require different types of intervention or that the sequence of when
interventions take place may be altered.” Clinical efforts may aim to use “here and now analysis”
that “would be very different from what they are doing on the internet and that like they are
doing it on the internet and this would be a false self-construction.” JW describes this as, “you
can do a certain kind of listening to whatever desire, the tenor of the conflict, different attempts
to put basic selves out that work there and that you can work on that without having to drag it all
down into the past, or the trauma, or whatever happened to them and that when you do that,
sometimes that comes up on its own accord, rather than stripping the patients down.”
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ZG recalls a “young woman who was just all about Twitch. She just wanted to be playing
video games and gaining more subscribers, totally agoraphobic, couldn't go outside.” ZG states,
‘My treatment goal was to help her be able to get outside and interact with real live human
beings and I think I would have the same goal in ten years, even if it became more and more
prevalent to be more like a physical recluse who just was online.” Here ZG oscillates towards
Turkle’s “mediated interactions are bad” and prescribes in-vivo socialization as cure for her
digital ailment.
DL considers his method as fundamentally unchanged, but takes on the responsibility of
knowing about the digital landscape. He states, “in one way it's no different. That is you have to
be able to hear your patients, what are they talking about, but in order to know what they're
talking about you have to know something about the world that they're talking about.” He
elaborates, “it's formally and structurally maybe no different, it's just that what it is that one has
to become culturally literate about now is not just content, but forms of cultural interface that are
being invented.” The demand is not on the patient, but on the analyst, who needs to be able to
enter the patient’s world on their terms. DL introduces the important distinction that the digital is
not content, but platforms, interfaces that alter how interaction takes place, whether mediated
with other people, or a patient alone with a machine. This means, “one has to be able to
recognize these inventions and their ramifications for the deployment of the social.”
Appearing digitally ignorant
What happens when a patient speaks about a significant experience with or in a
technology that is unfamiliar to a therapist? FY, WH, JW, ZG and DL all described responding
with curiosity and inquiry, however WH and ZG expressed concern that revealing a lack of
knowledge could intrude on how a patient speaks about the experience or the trust they have in
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the analyst, respectively. FY states, “I am very open to asking, can you explain that to me,” both
to further his understanding and to prophylactically intercede in a potential omnipotent
transference. FY says, “I think it’s really important to show the patients the limits of our
knowledge because otherwise you are reinforcing what might be an transference that you know
everything.” He recognized that this approach could “lead to developments where the patients
start to be your tutor, which you’d kind of have to analyze,” but felt that “most things can be
explained pretty quickly.” JW speak in a more personal language, but take a similar technical
tact, “I’m very curious, especially if they speak very powerfully about it and I have no idea about
it.” She recalls learning about apps and websites this way, however, she has also discovered how
patients can convey more disconnected emotional states when talking about their digital forays.
Regarding listening to patients talk about a video game they are deeply involved in, “there is not
a lot that comes through, in a certain way. I can’t figure out what their enjoyment is. Their
enjoyment feels really alone.”
In contrast, WH seeks to protect the patient from both his knowledge or lack thereof. He
says, “part of the reason I don’t disclose if I know something about something is to kind of hedge
against not knowing about something.” Despite knowing or not, he will use a similar method of
inquiry to “get them to talk about their engagement in it, what it means to them, get them to
symbolize it on their own.” WH admits his personal interest in the digital realm, “I am curious
about new technologies, or new things going on and I want to know about their experience
engaging those and how they are for them,” and will do independent research on a topic that may
have been spoken about in session, whether it be in the digital domain, “a political movement,”
or “if someone has a particular disease that I don’t know anything about.”
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ZG tends to inquire when he feels that better understanding the technology will allow him
to better understand his patients. With a child patient who plays Minecraft and Fortnight “I get
what he's doing, but my fifteen-year-old, I totally ask him a million questions about how his
game works and how Siege works.” The inquiry functions to support the therapeutic alliance, “I
think that was good because I think he was letting me into his world and I think it was a great
thing for us.” ZG identifies a “bind” the analyst can find themselves in where they are
“confused,” and “you don't know what they're literally talking about,” but “if it's gonna give you
up as not knowing enough and you're not confident that the person is gonna maintain confidence
in you as to understanding them sufficiently.” Unlike specific knowledge, the bind is further
problematized by the digital, as DL has described, as a form. ZG states, “it's a horizontal thing.
It's not a vertical. It's not like, oh, only people who are interested in this hobby do this thing. It's
not a hobby, it's a platform. It's like a way of relating so it's not the same as like cooking.” The
peril of the clinician’s lack of knowledge of digital platforms, especially popular ones, may
introduce substantial doubts about the therapist’s capacity more broadly. ZG imagines a patient
wondering, “What is this person not really getting exposed to in life? And do they understand
me?” This conundrum may be further evidence that patients may be advised to discuss how their
therapists think about the digital.
DL initially associates to the koan-like meditation, “does the analyst indicate that he or
she knows who Shakespeare is when a patient makes reference to Hamlet?” He continues,
“there's never been a satisfactory answer, you know, there's no answer to that question.”
However, like ZG, DL notes that it’s not a question about knowing something, but rather a new
kind of question about knowing about a form of relating. He states, “there all kinds of
complications around that and I think that that's probably multiplied because once again it's not
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just content. It's not just whether you've read the play you haven't read the play. It's form. Do you
know what it means to be communicating that way? Which is a question which would never
have been askable. There was only there were limited ways to communicate.” Like ZG, DL
considers the risks and benefits of inquiry, “Those choice point in the sense of do you indicate
you know, how important is it for you to know? And what is the effect on the treatment when
you don't? When you ask ‘please tell me what that is?’” Given DL being older and his work with
children, I inquired if there was an assumption by younger children that he would likely not
know about the digital features on their landscape. DL reflected that especially “middle year
children…begin to get this idea that adults don't get their world and you are clearly me, in this
case, a significantly older adult who won't know anything about this and will not only not know
about it but will probably be somewhat uncomfortable with it or disapproving of it.” To counter
this clinically informed presumed assumption, DL makes an effort to “allow them to bring that
into the into the treatment in a way where they don't feel that judgment.” He continues, “You
may not know everything about it but you know some things about it and you're interested to
know more. Could they tell you something about it? You understand that most adults think it's a
waste of time and you're interested why they don't. The idea is that being able to play is not a
waste of time. That was true in analytic work with children way before the digital question…and
so games and the electronic world of games is an extension of this model of play.” DL
emphasizes “the importance of the analyst establishing the non-judgmental position about what
looks like frivolous activity, including the use of technology and games. And so it's continuous
with those ethical concerns. Ethical and technical concerns that have been there all along about
play and free association.” DL is the only subject who links his stance towards the impact of the
digital on patient experience to an ethical consideration of play in psychoanalysis. Again, DL’s
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position appears to be derived from supporting the subjectivity of his patients, which includes
understanding them within their social context as agentic.
Teletherapy
As of the completion of the Spring 2019 interviews, DS, FY, WH and JW did some form
and quantity of teletherapy, however, there is a wide range of what this looked like, how it was
experienced and the degree to which the modality is conceptualized as having a psychic impact
on the treatment. As would be expected, ZG and DL, interviewed Fall 2020, were currently
doing only teletherapy. In the follow-up interviews with FY, WH and JW, they reported doing all
or 95% teletherapy. The results of the follow-up interview question will be reported in the
following section on “COVID-19 Pandemic” effects. This section will include discussion of
teletherapy as reported by each subject regardless of when interviewed.
DS has been doing teletherapy for more than a decade, and has “ramped up in the last 10
years.” DS uses videoconferencing software and states that he is “surprised at the lack of
difference between teletherapy and in person therapy.” DS had observed that there can be
differences between how in-person vs. teletherapy sessions feel, “either be an influence for
distance or it can actually allow people, because they are distanced and you are not seeing them
to get into certain things more deeply, or things that are more shameful or difficult for them,
sometimes in a way that is different than they could do in person.” He noticed that for some
patients teletherapy “gives you a little bit of a buffer and allows you to get into something you
might not otherwise, if you don’t have to actually see the person. I think it makes you feel less
vulnerable, less exposed.” When asked about starting teletherapy with a new patient, DS stated
“No, never met, I don’t think…it isn’t a principle with me I wouldn’t necessarily feel I couldn’t
start with somebody, or start with them via telecommunication and never meet them.” The
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curious shift from his initial “no,” to negating having a principle against it,” seems to refer to
teletherapy being practiced covertly by analysts as a dark secret of the trade, not necessarily to be
spoken about aloud. Indeed, DS’s request for his name to be withheld had to do with his
longstanding practice of teletherapy and a concern about risks if publicly identified. DS does
note that “mostly people want to be in your presence and I must say I know it’s going to feel
different, I sort of look forward to meeting them, if I haven’t or at least seeing them again.” He
says, “I work with a model of a field and the field is established just as thoroughly or just as
much depth whether the patient are inhabiting the same physical space.” In treatment, “we find a
way of living in that world that works for us and through which we get to know each other in the
same way that we would otherwise.” DS compares the effects of screen relations to other socially
constructed phenomena, “even if there is some sort of effect, just like the vanilla you can’t
discover it by looking at the cake batter. And that’s true of a lot of historical and sociological
matters.” Regarding speaking about these factors, “sometimes actual explicit discussion or
reference to them is important, but much of the time it’s not so visible.” DS states, “it ends up
sometimes being useful but often being clunky, if you get to know someone very, very well to
talk about identity positions.” He concludes, stating, “maybe a way of saying it is these
technological matters play a role in defining the relationship until it becomes deep enough that
they don’t. Or they do in a way that is less, much less visible. If they do.”
WH states, “I’ve actually had a good amount of work with telephone work,” but eschews
video based platforms, “I don’t use Skype, partially because I like the idea that its closer to the
couch if you can only hear.” Patients seeing “my face and that kind of interaction, in my
experience, is more of a distraction than any kind of benefit and I want this to be a break from
face to face experience.” WH has used voice only teletherapy successfully, by his measure, “I’ve
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done what I considered to be real analytic work, at several times a week, with it being led by
their free association, is that it works on the phone. It’s a lot like being on the couch.” WH’s
teletherapy work includes “a pretty in-depth analytic treatment for a good amount of time
without ever having met.” WH relies on framing techniques for teletherapy that parallel those
traditionally used for in-person sessions. He establishes a “ritualistic environment” for his
patients by having “them to go to the same place” and he will “call them exactly on the minute at
our scheduled time.” He states, “I’ve found if I trust the fundamentals of the process and the
other person buys into them or decides that they have faith in the talking and listening as I’ve
described, the analytic process can happen through the phone.” There is a curious paradox in
relation to WH’s other statements that place a premium on the embodied ego for real relating and
raises questions about how the telephone may serve as a location for a disembodied identity and
how such conflict may be addressed by use of a prosthesis.
JW, like WH, prefers audio only teletherapy, but only for “a patient who is pretty
established, because then I think it works, whereas for other people, it doesn’t work. It’s too
weird.” For JW, there is an alarming, almost disorganizing intimacy to teletherapy, “I’ve gotten
most people to FaceTime audio, which is also very intimate, it’s weird. They are really close to
you. The sound quality is insane, more with the earphones, it’s very clear. I mean it’s almost
clearer than you would ever have in the room, so it’s very strange. They are right in your ear. It
doesn’t even – when you call someone with the phone, with the regular satellite, there is a crrrr.
There is something, some static, whereas FaceTime audio is crystal clear, very weird.”
FY makes limited use to teletherapy, with strict parameters. He states, “I only do it with
cases that have been well established and the patient moves away and they are not that, for lack
of a better word, ill.” He says, “I could finish a therapy like that, but I couldn’t, I wouldn’t begin
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one that way.” FY requires therapy to start in person to work through the beginning phases of
treatment. “I think you have to have a face to face evaluation, diagnostic phase, just – first of all,
I’m a big advocate of clear diagnosis, discussion of diagnostic impression, discussing the
treatment method you are proposing and the parameters of that and then you either decide or not
to move forward. I think that has to be done face to face.” FY, who works exclusively with
serious personality pathology, states, “I would never do a predominately online therapy because I
think the risks are too high.” He cites the loss of what can be communicated via teletherapy as a
reason, “the fact that we know from multiple studies and research that a lot of the
communication is subtle, non-verbal, there is even a fascinating literature on the olfactory part of
communication in therapy, so I think the online therapy denudes the attraction, a lot of the
subtly.” FY is the only clinician to directly address his negative experience with teletherapy,
stating, “it’s just a sense of detachment that infiltrates that I hate to say it because I shouldn’t
allow it or I should be more aware of it, but it’s just the engagement seems less intense.”
ZG had made sparse use of teletherapy prior to the pandemic and “I wouldn't have started
with someone remotely. I never would have done that. Now, I do it normally.” ZG initially stated
“I don't really think that I have that many special considerations, believe it or not.” However, as
he continued to reflect, he observed that “most people who do video therapy are sitting at a desk
with a computer in front of them and they can't get out of a kind of explicit work-minded, to-do
list, goal-oriented, sort of working mindset and I want to be more in a kind of associative,
implicit, being together mindset and so that's a little tough.” Considering the body and posture in
teletherapy, ZG has made changes in his own physical configuration. “I personally used to be
sitting up at a desk with a laptop and that was out of necessity but I finally moved my office and
moved all my furniture, so now I can sit in my chair, with my laptop propped up on a small table
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in front of me. I can recline and it really has helped a lot. I feel a lot more like myself and a lot
less like a goal oriented coach and a lot more like an analytic therapist.” He shared his wish to
move patients away from video to telephone, but “I don't know how to bring that up exactly.”
Regarding video vs. telephone, he stated, “I do typically offer to people for a first session a
phone number and a zoom link and ask them to let me know what they prefer and let them
choose. Most people choose video.” The shift to teletherapy has upended ZG’s privileging of
working with a “local” in-person therapist. In the past ZG would have refused to recommend a
therapist for remote treatment, whereas now he conducts remote sessions with “people in
Vermont, Colorado, Massachusetts, like all over the place and yeah, it's totally changed.”
DL, like most subjects, made infrequent use of teletherapy prior to the pandemic. In the
present, DL observed how teletherapy introduces novel anxieties for him as a therapist that
ultimately call into question teletherapy as a mode of treatment. “I’m much more on shaky
ground because I feel like I'm managing a technology that gets the best of me all the time. I'm
not sure how I come across and I'm not sure what's being heard or whether what I'm hearing is or
how to take what I'm hearing. I think there are lots that escape our technical management in ways
which are troublesome, in ways which may even completely cast in doubt how effective we're
being as clinicians.” DL observed the unique demands that teletherapy places on the analyst as
they shift from drawing on years of practice conducting in-person therapy to being in a
disembodied virtual realm. “You're not just talking for the sake of communication. There's
always a material aspect to expression, verbal expression. How one manages those material
aspects in person, tone of voice, body language, the setting, are something you're aware of.
Similarly you have to be aware of how you're operating through the telephone, but it's a whole
different set of skills involved in that and I think we're all still subverted in ways. I don't think we
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have any idea yet how well we’re operating with that new set of skills.” DL wonders if
teletherapy disrupts the process of working through, which “involves exactly the capacity to
allow the kind of multiple identifications and the distribution of subjectivity in ways that allow
for an uncertainty about the place of speech.” Teletherapy may diminish the risk and potential of
therapy to be curative due to less being on the line when bodies are separate. DL suggests
“maybe there's this danger in a certain facile level of articulation that doesn't encounter some of
the risk and affect that might have been encountered if it was more in person and therefore
maybe what looks like working through is not working through in that sense that there's not the
risk.”
COVID-19 Pandemic Effects
Of the subjects interviewed related to the sudden shift to teletherapy in early March 2020
due to the coronavirus, all except WH expressed skepticism about the method, citing disruptions
in the transference, confounding effects of video platforms for the patient and therapist to “see”
each other, and even alarm at other colleagues acceptance of remote treatment as an equivalent
platform to in-person. Only JW reported conducting 5% of her treatments in person. FY, JW and
ZG had reported that in the past they would not have started working virtually with a new
patient, however, as of October 2020 they all have started new treatments, with varying degrees
of caution. FY reported starting a single new case but “would hesitate to start with a very
severely acting out patient because we would feel like it's just too remote to have a sense of
comfort.” WH stated, “now I'm over 40 hours a week over the telephone and my experiences
with almost everyone it works very similarly and my practice has grown rather than receded
through this. And of course my life is different, some qualities of the work are different, but the
psychoanalytic work, the essence of it seems to have remained the same through this transition.”
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FY reported that “I didn't really find it a difficult transition to make,” however, “it changes a
little bit about the feeling of the alliance.” FY locates this change to the altered relationship of
the gaze between in-person and teletherapy. In person, “you're sitting at a distance, you know,
for you to look around,” whereas Zoom “forces you to look directly at the other person.” JW
observed “the face is a problem now [laughing] because it's an unnatural situation in which you
stare at each other's faces, like you couldn't even stare at each other's faces in this way in the
room… you're doing strange things with the face the entire time… I can't imagine that that's
helpful.” For FY the effect of virtual face-to-face relating is two-fold, “it creates a sense of more
connectedness oddly because you're not in the same room,” but “it's hard to sort of switch from
the external world into the internal world because the screen connects you into the external world
and you sort of feel glued to it.” FY theorizes about a seeming paradox, “it sort of makes the
therapeutic relationship a little more real. You think it would be less real because you are not in
the same room together, but it's a little more real because you're sharing an experience. You're
both doing it because of a shared social crisis and it creates a little bit more of a real alliance as
opposed to that more open space where the transference can fill in.” JW noted diminution in
transference as well, which she attributed to a reduction in anxiety ushered in by being
disembodied . She stated, “I do think that it makes something too casual and too virtual, I think
the body and the anxiety can be covered over more which might help some people speak and
other people not, but either way it's a iatrogenic problem that I think is better resolved with the
bodies in the room then putting mediation in there to make them less anxious, because it dilutes
the transference.”
Both ZG and DL were oriented towards their own and others’ seeming lack of concern
about the sudden increase in screen time and lack of skepticism towards teletherapy. ZG stated,
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“by necessity people are using technology in different ways and are kind of forgetting about the
concerns that they used to have.” He noted “if on February 28th, I would have said, oh my god, a
kid doing this much technology, that's bad and I'm not going to say that today, I mean, we have
to kind of look at that and say, well, wait a second. We can't just do this quote out of necessity.”
ZG projects this anxiety towards the future, “I think maybe a long-term consequence of this will
be a real downgrade in the way everybody relates.” DL spoke about managing feeling troubled
about teletherapy in the past, which he managed by not doing it. Now, it “still troubles me
tremendously, but it's the only mode.” DL shared being “struck by a lot of discourse in the, you
know, listservs and blogs, which assume premature optimism and bracketing of that skepticism,
trying to convince us all that this works just fine yeah.” DL’s concern about premature optimism
is that it forecloses truly understanding digital therapy. DL stated, “we have to be able to
recognize the problems in order to address them and if we too quickly congratulate ourselves on
oh it works just like it always worked, we're not really questioning.” “The corollary question is,
is there something we can do to address that problem? And what is it we can do? And do we
have to work differently? And in what ways do we have to work differently?” He continued,
“What are we losing? And what's the effect? What was its role to begin with?”
Frame
DL locates alterations to the frame directly to the properties of the technological era,
stating, “time is one of the elements of the frame and time is now digitized and the way we live
with time is through a digital interface.” In an effort to construct a frame for analytic work WH is
explicit about attempting to separate psychotherapy from the influences of the digital era. “You
do need a place that feels like a break from the immediate gratification demands of consumer and
a place that is a kind of ritual space that does accept the limitations, the unknowns, has a certain
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kind of cleavage from consumer time.” FY and JW both remain committed to the analytic project
and convinced of its power to heal, but wonder if the culture has moved on. ZG wonders about a
future when it is safe to practice in person again, “what's gonna happen to my practice when
everyone comes back? I've no idea.” At the root, this question asks about the radical nature of the
shift to teletherapy as the frame of treatment and what it may mean for patients to “come back.”
One wonders where they went and if they will return to offices at all. Will the frame be altered
permanently by the pandemic? ZG is confident that “when this is over, we will have something
special to offer, which is being with another human being in person that other people are going to
miss out on the value of.”
Subjects reflected on how much can and should one separate out oneself from external
realities to create a protected space for reflective investigation without being negligent to
external reality? DS, FY, JW and WH tended to address the frame with concrete considerations,
specifically addressing alterations in extra-session communication and how the subject works
with it and to what degree the subject is aware of patient’s access to their digital footprints and
how that may enter their clinical processes. ZG considered the construction and use of a
professional website as part of the framing of therapy. DL observed how changes to the frame
have affected the analyst’s subjectivity, “as someone who's lived that period, that change, you
experience those differences. You experience a different sense of what the scheduling framework
is. Now, that the digitize it all.” This last speech discontinuity speaks to the fragmenting effects
of the digital era, perhaps poignantly felt by older analysts whose careers have been marked,
both consciously and unconsciously, by the progression of changes related to the digital era,
especially linked to one’s feelings about the frame, often a bastion for the analyst themselves.
Communications outside sessions
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All subjects agreed that the widespread use of digital devices has had an impact on extrasession communication. The increased ease of access and speed of transmission interact with
socialized expectations of response time and appropriateness regarding use of the telephone,
email, texting and transmission of digital multimedia files. FY, WH and ZG maintain more
classical, strict frames regarding outside of session communication. For FY work with
personality disorders, his treatment contract specifies only re-scheduling or a 1-time treatment
ending emergency call between session. He states, “they have expectations that have to be
countered and the worst thing is texting, email isn’t quite so bad.” FY continues, “the problem
with texting of course is that unlike a phone message, where the person doesn’t know when you
are going to check it, the person usually assumes you are going to see a text within the hour or
so…then the dilemma becomes, you know, do I just, I’ve seen this text, do I hold off or just
respond now.” FY maintains boundaries around working hours and will respond the following
day if he receives a text after the work day has ended. FY offers the classical explanation for
why the frame should be preserved, even if he could respond more quickly. “I think it makes you
more of an extension of them and doesn’t represent the reality that they really need to develop
internal resources more.” WH, likewise, aims to keep the frame rigid, and interprets attempts to
breach the frame in the following session. Despite this, he observes that “I’ve had patients that
will text me if they are a few minutes late, I’ve had patients that brought up some pretty involved
issues via email.” Like WH, ZG will bring the contents of extra-session communications via text
or email into the following session if it’s a “substantive thing,” otherwise it if relates to
scheduling, for example, he will “deal with it over email and that's fine.” Generally he says, “I
kind of model the fact that I'm not that into it and so it doesn't happen very much.”
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Both ZG and DL note that the ease, frequency and psychological function of rescheduling has changed. ZG observed, “it’s easier to cancel or like terminate precipitously.” ZG
cited a recent precipitous termination via email “because she claimed she wanted to see someone
in person which I ordinarily would be like, oh my god, a hundred percent yes. I couldn't help but
notice it was after a session that was much more emotionally connected than any one we’d had
before.” ZG is alluding to how the normalized digital social practices like “ghosting,” are
presenting in teletherapy. It’s easy to see how there can be a blurring effect, especially when the
very same devices that are being used for dating and socializing are now being used to conduct
psychotherapy. As the physical boundary evaporates, the psychic one seems to follow. DL links
the changes due to COVID-19 to transformations already underway in how scheduling is done,
especially the shift to scheduling outside of session via digital devices. “The idea that somebody
could send an email to rearrange a schedule, that’s a completely different notion of the frame.”
DL noted how this forecloses potential psychological space in which “you and the patient would
take out little books and look in your calendars. It'd be a whole process of consideration of time
and scheduling and appointments. You'd be looking at each other. There'd be a tremendous
amount of information exchanged when it came to that.” In-person scheduling changes “started
to erode because people preferred to email time changes. They have a record. Who changed
Thursday's appointment? We both have an email. We are sure we're on the same page, so to
speak, even though now we don't even look at a page.” DL may be alluding to the obsessional
quality of machinic processes of efficiency that humans are encouraged and enabled to take on in
the digital era, as well as the confusion about what being connected even means via digital
devices. The cost to therapy is the loss of exploration surrounding the elaboration of desire. WH
notes that the exchange of money for treatment is altered by the fact it now happens entirely
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outside of session, “I do my billing via email right now and I accept digital payment for some of
my patients, so some of those dynamics are changing.” ZG has shifted to billing via email due to
the pandemic rather than printing out a bill and sending it via email. He stated, “it’s a huge shift
and I never would have done that before.”
DS and JW both take a more flexible approach to working with digital communications
outside of session. DS states, “I communicate with patients by text all the time, sometimes by
email and they communicate with me.” DS maintains a similar separation regarding the influence
of the digital on these communications as with other domains where the digital may present
itself, “I don’t think it affects the content of the communication, it affects the freedom maybe
that people feel to be in touch with you.” DS expressed a preference for digital communication
because it was asynchronous and thus less personally demanding. He said, “I’m much more
accepting of communication outside of sessions in these ways than I would have been to be
interrupted by telephone.” “I had one person who was on, texted me a few weekends ago, all
weekend long, in a crisis – crisis about me – she made it through the other side of it, but we
exchanged 40 or 50 texts in a weekend. It was a pain, but it was necessary.” DS allows different
rules for texting, based on the lower degree of intrusion into his personal life. He imagined that
in the past this patient would have communicated by “phone calls, because she wasn’t going to
be able to inhibit herself…and I would have to set limits that I didn’t have to in this case, didn’t
feel the need to, it was much, it affected me differently because you know, you would have
irritated the hell out of me to be bothered that many times over the weekend.” DS again makes a
curious switch in pronouns from she to you, potentially suggesting his frustration with the
interviewer, who was in the subject’s home asking him questions he didn’t appear to enjoy, on a
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weekend. I had the feeling these questions caught DS both off-guard and uninterested in
engaging in thinking about this topic.
DS will engage in extended outside of session communications not just in a crisis, but
also make use of it as a part of therapy. “I have that patient, you know, has a hell of a time
getting to those sessions, but he does very good work in these texts that he sends me explaining
his absence, but they are very long they can go on for a couple thousand words.” DS finds the
“cooler” space of asynchronous digital communications offers him time to process his response.
He states “when someone faces you with an emotional demand on the telephone or in person,
you don’t have a lot of time to figure out what you are going to do and you have to respond in a
way that probably ends up demanding more spontaneity than a text when you can think about
how do I want to respond to this person.” DS concludes, “it’s easier for them to be in touch with
me and less intrusive for me for them to do that. So I guess you’d say that stretches the frame in
that respect.” DS made functional use of stretching the frame, in the name of doing therapeutic
work, regardless of setting. He did not set limits for the sake of the patient’s containment, but
rather what he felt he was interested in managing. The perceived urgency of a response that is
demanding of spontaneity and interpersonal risk seems to be the mediating factor.
JW states, “I try not to have any prohibitions, so my frame is to treat things analytically,
not to set up a certain set of constraints, but to be very aware of the effects of boundaries, that
these are gratifications and frustrations that you are going to have to negotiate.” Her openness to
“play around with anybody” and “try to figure out what it means in the context of their
treatment” has led to some extreme, if not potentially dangerous, encounters with what digital
communication affords. JW observed, “the capacity to send you things, its new.” Her approach
to extra-session communications can lead to overwhelming situations, “I had patients who just
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blow my phone up, and sometimes they will get me from every direction, the text message, the
audio voice recording, the email, the attachments, the pictures of things I don’t want to see.” She
continues, “I’ve had patients threatening to commit suicide because they are on some text
message thing with me, on the plane, they wouldn’t been able to do this before. They wouldn’t
be able to get you on a text message, on a fucking plane, with the Wi-Fi, and like threaten suicide
at you…or I’ve had situations with patients who would send me videos they made that I start
watching and they are naked, and I’m like, baaahh, I don’t want to see. What now? What do I
do? Now I have to figure out what to say about this.” The sense is that JW finds joy in the
intensity of the creative challenge of this negotiation with the contemporary and the intimacy of
analysis. She has “patients who’ve gotten me into text message wars with them. I’m in the
middle of my flight and it’s a really bad idea. I mean it’s also been very powerful to the extent
that they can sometimes talk about what it meant to get you there and see the little three bubbles
pop up or whatever. You know, so you just, it’s the wild, wild west.” While the form of the
exchange may be radical, JW’s commitment seems to be to generatively deploy analytic
thinking. “The thoughts are you’d have to do your best to figure out what it means in the moment
of the treatment, that it starts to happen in, and have some idea of where you want to go, so you
can figure out what’s best to do.” Regarding the video with the naked patient, JW had been
receiving and watching some of this patient’s other videos outside of session, “I wanted to, on
the one hand, to see what she was interested in…but I had a harder time with the ones with her
body.” JW ultimately addressed her limits with the patient, “I have a certain way of relating to
her, through speech, through her in this office and it didn’t sit right to her. This narcissistically
wounded her. She came to sit with that and talk about it and accept it.”
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While both DS and JW allow the digital to stretch the classical frame, they are uniquely
motivated by their own methods, themselves adaptations to a changed landscape of possibilities
and expectations.
The Googling Patient
DS, WH, JW, ZG and DL shared a consciousness about patients’ increased access to the
digital presence of the therapist, albeit with different considerations. DS stated, “I often wonder,
I don’t really wonder, I assume that patients or perspective patients have googled me and I’ve
learned what there is to learn. But very seldom people ever say anything about it and I don’t ask
them about it because I guess it seems, if they want to tell me, but I’m not interested in prying.
And it also, I guess, it conveys a certain suspiciousness, or it might, on my part. I mean,
whatever is there, after all, is public.” DS’s concern about conveying suspiciousness seems to
point to a larger value he holds, that his patients’ digital lives are private and not a place where
his analytic curiosity is permitted to venture. Despite his information being public, an inquiry
about their potential curiosity about his patient’s searching online for it might uncover not their
curiosity about him, but relay his anxiety about a violation or intrusion into a secret or shameful
act, that presumably the patient should speak of when ready, rather than when the analyst
demands. This anxiety may be recognized in the curious shift from the patients who have
googled him to “I’ve,” instead of “they” have “learned what there is to learn.” DS’s ambivalence
about his digital persona may stem from him playing a more passive role in its construction,
compared to the younger analysts.
ZG was very aware of his “digital footprint” and spoke both about his conscious use of it
to create a professional identity as well as that patients had found details about his life online,
which they shared in session. ZG labored in thinking through the meaning and function of
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creating a website for himself as an analyst. ZG spoke through his personal transformation
regarding the frame as he moved into private practice, “when I started my practice I kind of
thought to myself, oh, I'm not going to text. Oh, I won't even use email, I'll just have a phone…
But then you start your own practice and you get into the idea of am I going to make a website?
And I initially thought no way. And then I realized my view is like the world today is kind of a
consumer world where people want information. They want to be able to verify it. So I had the
thought I'd be really not smart if I didn't have some kind of a website. I'm going to make a very
rudimentary, simple website and it's going to let people verify that I exist. I'm just going to talk
about myself a little bit and have a simple picture of myself.” He reflected, “I'm representing
myself in words with an aesthetic that I don't think used to exist but I view it as a choice that if
someone's given my name as a referral with two other people, a big percentage of individuals
would look all three of us up and I don't and I think it would hurt me to have a busy practice to
not have that.” ZG pondered extensively on what email address to use, “That was a big deal to
me and a big question. I made a website, so I have a domain, so what's the username? Is it Z
[subject’s first name]? Dr. G [subject’s last name]? Is a ZG? Is it info? Is it contact? Like what
am I gonna do? And that setting the tone of what I think I should be called from the get-go.”
Related to ZG’s website, are recent shifts in how he receives new patients. “I get more inquiries
by email than phone maybe, four to one,” and responds to email contact from a perspective
patient. “I used to call people back instead of email them back. I did privilege the phone and now
I've realized people don't really want that. They don't want me to be in their face and pushing my
agenda of contact. They’re emailing me, I’m going to email back.” This shift straddles the
delicate line between meeting the patient where they are and scaffolding the creation of a frame
that delineates therapy from other interpersonal forms.
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WH asked that his exact age not be given “because of the power of the transference, if to
some extent I don’t disclose, patients have all kinds of ideas.” In other portions of the interview
WH expressed the understanding that fantasy is not diminished in the face of patients’
knowledge of other specific details. Despite this, his age seemed to be something he wanted to
protect. It points to a complex negotiation that is at play especially for younger analysts who may
encounter patients who know not just their age, but may have also encounter them on dating
applications or social media platforms.
Both JW and ZG addressed the material contents of what patients can find online about
them and how it makes its way into therapy. JW stated, “patients are googling the shit out of me
and I’m also someone who is not afraid of digital presence and I have an Instagram account and
stuff…but I have to be very perceptive about what they are seeing and the effects on the
transference.” ZG shared, “If one Googles me one would see like my wedding announcement in
like a small weird newspaper that my in-laws put it in, they'd see the birth announcement of our
first kid.” ZG noted, “someone told me a dream once where basically the whole dream was in
every way saying that he has read those things before.” In another example, “a more psychotic
patient once said to me, ‘I was wondering if you went into this field because of when your
mother died when you were [specific age]?” and “like when your mother [mother’s name] died?”
I mean, he really had read a lot and that was an unavailable thing to him pre-digital.” ZG may be
speaking of the vulnerability felt by the analyst due to elements of the self portrayed online that
were not explicit choices related to being an analyst. JW, rather than conceal her digital identity,
gives her digital selves freedom to follow their desires to be in the public sphere, which she
addresses clinically by being “very vigilant about getting their reactions, getting them to speak
about it.” Some patients may bring these parts of transference into her sessions, but many won’t
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speak about it for some time. JW states, “they’ve been looking at something and I have to like go
after it, and also then, you find out once you get them to talk about, oh yeah, well, you know, a
long time ago I saw this and I read this and you know there is so much they’ve been putting
aside, but I learn that it’s just true about the transference.”
Cohort/Age Effects
The data bears out differences between age based cohorts in terms of how they listen for,
conceptualize and work with the effects of the digital on patient experience. In some ways this
difference can be traced back to differences between the cohorts experience of the digital era, as
bound by chronology. The senior cohort (mean age = 71) were roughly 30 years of age when the
period in question was commencing, well past the point where their internal representation of
objects in the world was robustly consolidated. In contrast, the junior cohort (mean age = 40)
was just born as this era was dawning.
The initial question of the interview asked subjects for personal reflections on the
technological world. While most of the older cohort tended to respond with concrete specifiers,
an “old reel-to-reel tape recorder” and the ease of communicating with colleagues now compared
to in the past, the younger cohort offered rich “developmental” narratives of their unfolding
engagement with a changing digital landscape. Interestingly, for 2 of the 3 subjects of the older
cohort, the initial association was to technology encountered in their 20’s, in the 1960s, predating
the time frame of the question by upwards of 20 years. DL even does the math and is still
brought back to his youth, “40 years ago, that was 1980 I guess, right? Um, you know, I
remember when I was in high school, I remember the first discussions. This was in the 1960s, the
first discussions about computers.” There may be a critical period in one’s development where
one’s encounter with technology has a lasting trace, similar to imprinting, or the primacy effect.
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Not surprisingly, the younger cohort recalled encounters with technology from earlier points in
their life, namely at the point in time when the digital era offered modes for mediated interaction.
The younger cohort’s narratives were longer, had a greater level of detail, cited more specific
experiences with technology and noted more shifts between distinct periods of time as marked by
the availability of the latest technologies, as well as conveyed a sense that they expected new
machines and capabilities in the future that would further affect human experience. There was a
certain excitement that was conveyed in their answer to this inquiry. The younger cohort showed
much greater knowledge of and personal involvement with the specific affordances of the digital
world, and tended to attune to the allure of digital devices, such that conscious effort was needed
to separate oneself out from succumbing to its fascination. They spoke directly about their own
conflicts or precautions in navigating the power of technology. WH stated, “I think it’s important
to have time when our phones are off and away,” and JW, speaking about using file sharing
software in college, “It really absorbed our attention to the extent that we were sitting there
looking at these things.” She continued, “it’s like the last 5 years just feels strangely dominated
by these things,” “I have to spend time with the emails and the piling up of emails and the
addiction to Instagram and social media and Facebook and also, just that I don’t call anybody on
the phone. The phone is a place, a phone call is horrifying at this point and I don’t know when
that switched, but I hate getting phone calls.” Of the older cohort, neither FY nor DS were as
drawn to, engaged in, nor impacted by the digital to this degree. DL however found interest in
the field since his adolescence because of his fluency with math and access to an important
teacher doing researcher that provided him with a more sophisticated taxonomy of the digital
landscape than his same age peers. DL shared, “this whole interface between technology and the
arts, technology and design, digitization and linguistics, digitization and cultural studies, you
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know that to me was, has been something I've been interested in and observing and kind of
immersed in, not because it was a direct interest of mine. I wasn't working in those areas but I
was around people who were.” While DL demonstrated a sophisticated conceptual
comprehension about the digital era, he did not speak of any interest as an end user per se. FY
simply stated, “I tend to have an aversion to a lot of technology because I think it is an
interference with the sort of more natural face to face experience as an old fashioned person.”
For FY the decision to distance himself from the digital realm was clear and unconflicted,
whereas it was active and conflicted for those in the younger cohort.
The younger cohort, admittedly more engaged in the digital realm in their own lives,
relied on personal experience, empathy, projections and identifications with patients, allowing
them to more easily conceptualized both what was being spoken about explicitly and what may
be communicated when left unspoken. DS and FY tended to notice the presence of the digital era
when patients spoke about it directly. They were less likely to make the same kinds of
conceptual leaps between a patient’s engagement in the virtual to the impact of economic, social,
or cultural forces. In relation to the rest of the older cohort, the younger cohort and DL had far
more active concepts about the digital era and its effects on their patients’ experience and linked
listening for and conceptualizing directly to paths of therapeutic action.
The younger cohort had far more specific observations about how the digital presents in
the clinical encounter, observing both behaviors, “I have instances where people haven’t wanted,
people have resisted putting their phone away for the clinical hour,” and causal effects of the
digital era, “it really depends on the age and when I see kids…they certainly live more virtually
and this virtuality makes them more inhibited in certain ways and that is why there is less sex. I
mean I feel like these kids are not having sex. It’s very weird. It used to be like you would see
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these private school kids and they were like totally out of control and now they are like in their
rooms texting each other and playing video games.” The junior cohort tended to conceptualize
and hold in mind the digital as a pervasive force on contemporary human experience and heard
its latent presence in patient behavior and speech. This may be in the form of interpreting a
patient’s request to be “fixed” as partially derived from undifferentiated engagement in a
consumeristic culture, itself derived from Marxian concepts like technological determinism.
DL, while being a member of the older cohort, was an outlier, sometimes appearing more
congruent with the older cohort and sometimes closer to the younger group. He had the most
sophisticated metapsychological perspective about the intersection of the digital and the psyche,
however, it appeared to be derived from the Lacanian aspects of his theoretical considerations
more than clinical observation, which tended to be more unified in younger cohort. He cited
fewer clinical examples than all other analysts, and was felt to have the coolest, perhaps most
emotional balanced response to the digital era by organizing around its dialectics. DL lamented
the loss of superior analogue systems, namely the old telephone network, but showed little affect
surrounding the impact of the digital on human experience. It is important to recognize that DL
works with patients across the lifespan, including children, whereas FY and DS tend to have
modal ages around 20-30 and 50-70 respectively. Each vantage point obviously shapes
perception derived from clinical experience.
Differences in fluency with the digital overall was notable. In the senior cohort, this was
demonstrated in references to the digital being understood metaphorically as like pre-digital
constructs. DS says, “Tinder is like a singles bar,” and FY compared video game play to pinball
machines and tic-tac-toe. For FY, facebook was his freshman facebook at Harvard, filled with
grainy photos of his classmates before it was the digital empire Facebook. The emphasis tended
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to be on binding current technologies into past paradigms, leading to a loss of resolution about
the nature and possibilities for digital engagement. In general, the older cohort demonstrated less
fluency with current applications or trends in the digital world. In this particularly striking
exchange, DS struggles to recall the name of the mostly widely studied and popular category of
digital tool. “People don’t talk much about FaceTime and other sorts of um, what do you call it,
what’s the word for that? It’s a certain kind of media? [interviewer: “social media” ] I couldn’t
find the word social. But they don’t talk about it much.” Perhaps more revealing is his logic, “it
may play a part in their life, although to tell you the truth, I have the impression that people who
I work with are probably on social media a whole lot less than other portions of the population. I
don’t know why that is, it just doesn’t seem so consistent. Well, they are willing to put in a
substantial amount of time to come and see me, even if they do it on the web, it’s a different kind
of contact they are looking for than the kind you have on Facebook.” It is notable that FaceTime
is not a social media platform, but DS is likely using it interchangeably with Facebook in this
statement. More important clinically is the fact that if one is only listening for the effects of the
digital era explicitly, it may be hard to hear. The logic of DS’s argument reveals an important,
and likely common, bias: that contact via digital mediums is of lesser significance than
communication in psychoanalysis. It also includes the corollary that depth is an exclusive
property of psychoanalysis and could not be found via digital experiences, such that they are
mutually exclusive for any individual. DL cited very few specific technologies (“Zoom,” “iPad,”
“Skype,” “Minecraft”) in his interview, and struggled on one occasion to recall the name of a
particular app, potentially indicating less fluency with actual use of devices. “I was just thinking
one but it just went out of my mind. There was a kind of, oh what when, when WhatsApp came
up, right, the first time, I heard WhatsApp you know, I had no idea what it was.” This gap
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between understanding concepts and speaking fluently about applications itself may differentiate
DL’s interest in the digital era from that of the younger cohort, who both conceptualize and live
with digital devices.
While the younger cohort expressed ambivalence about the draw into the digital era, there
is also interest, curiosity and a sense that knowledge of this realm is a responsibility of therapists
who practice now.
Interestingly, in both cohorts, there was an awareness that age could affect knowledge of
and perception of the digital world. DS states, “to the extend they are younger than me, they
know more about it, they are better at it,” DL likewise observed: “As would be expected, the
younger patients who have grown up knowing no other interface, but digitized communication
bring a very different experience to it than my older patients.” One implication of this difference
was that older patients were aware of the loss of fidelity and stability of the telephone, which
went from “an extremely sensitive and reliable sound communicator. You could get nuances of
voice through the old tele-desktop telephone that are very difficult to get through cell phones,” to
now “the idea that calls would drop the way they do now as a matter of course, I think I can
hardly get through a session without an interruption in the call,” which leads older patients to
“experience simultaneous with this kind of expansion of possibility, the sense of kind of
diminution, reduction of quality of life. But we've all gotten used to these cell phones and think
they're wonderful, but in the process we've all lost what was a much better telecommunication
system.” ZG noted this “generational technological gap” from the younger cohort’s perspective,
“I am in awe of like the generational technological gap between you know, you know, me and
then the people who are like the mode population in this field who are blown away whenever I
like write notes quickly from a meeting that I was in.” It’s interesting to note the violence in the
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verb choice, which introduces the idea that analysts from the older cohort who lack fluency with
the digital experience a brutally death, or are rendered obsolete, upon exposure to its affordances.
The younger cohort’s statements about the ongoing digital “evolution,” was, in part,
marked by observations that the lives of those younger than them, who never experienced the
“analogue” world are of a decidedly different nature. WH notes, “I learn a good bit about how
people who are 10 years, 15 years younger have, how their experience psychically, but even just
the activity they go up through the day, how they organize their worldviews, are influenced by
the digital world in a way that mine hasn’t been.” He keenly observed that his own memories had
been altered by the digital. “I can’t disintegrate things I know about my earlier life, or
disentangle them about what they mean now that I’ve gone through this kind of digital transition,
so there is already a sort of digital filter put on me reflecting back on that question.”
Theory of Psychological Health
Choices about how to establish and work with the frame revealed marked difference
between subjects who identified as working towards a fully integrated ego compared to the
subjects for whom non-overlapping states of fragmentation could be synthesized in moments but
not adhere coherently at all times. As with other aspects of orientation, the nexus between a
therapist’s orientation, clinical choices and their own personality factors are a complex dynamic
that confound this finding. However, these difference do logically follow from these divergent
conceptualizations. WH, FY, and ZG adhered to strict classical thought about the frame, with
limited contact outside of sessions and rigorous efforts to establish ritualistic conditions for
treatment, even when working remotely. While ZG may act with somewhat greater flexibility,
especially in light of the pandemic, the nature of his considerations reflect coherence with a rigid
conceptualization of the frame. In contrast, but in different ways for different reasons, DS and

173

JW both permit and work with extensive therapeutic contact outside of session. If those who
work towards integration scaffold efforts by building tolerance for discomfort between sessions,
those who accept multiplicities acknowledge that different aspects of self can present and be
addressed therapeutically at different times in different ways. DL, who identified with the latter
group, spoke in a more limited way about extra-session contact by email, only reporting that “it’s
become much harder to not reply.”
There was far less evidence that differences in theory of psychological health was a
significant factor in how psychotherapists listen for and conceptualize the digital era. While
theory provides an organizing structure for thought, it did not lead to categorical differences in
the kinds of conflicts that were observed, how symptoms presented, or how they were
conceptualized in terms of psychic effects between the two groups.
Given the exploratory nature of this study, this is a tentative conclusion that could easily
change if this concept where to be operationalized differently and if the sample size increased.
While efforts were made to select subjects with more polar views of integration vs. multiplicity,
the concepts may not be meaningfully differentiated at the level of the clinical encounter or in
this sample.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion
Psychotherapists tend to listen for, conceptualize and work with the effects of the digital
age through the lens of existing theory and clinical methods. For all subjects there was a
commitment to thinking about the digital era through their chosen theoretical orientation and
working according to its practices. There was a range in the degree to which the digital era’s
effects on human experience lead to novelty in how it was listened for, conceptualized and
worked with in the clinical realm, with cohort age being the primary mediating factor. In some
ways this effect can also be explained by age and the intersection of theoretical orientation, with
the Lacanian analysts, WH, JW and DL having more coherent and sophisticated concepts to
organize the effects of the digital era on human experience. For all subjects, the effects of the
technological world were meaningful to the degree recognized in clinical material, however, the
younger cohort and the senior Lacanian clinician were attuned to subtle or broader reverberations
of the digital both at a phenomenological level and clinically whereas the balance of the older
cohort tended to observe it when presented explicitly in session content. For the younger cohort
and the senior Lacanian clinician, the effects of the digital era were seen as causal in novel
behaviors and intrapsychic processes, for example, consumerisms influence on the process of
therapy, the use of portable media to remain constantly sonically activated, a compulsion to
“perform the self,” or an expansion of possible identities afforded by digital mediums. This may
appear as a patient demand that the therapist “solve” their problem, as if one were ordering food
online for immediate delivery, forestalling risk taking in life, or in the degree to which a patient
may seek recognition externally or perform the self as opposed to assembling a life through
intrinsically constructive practices. While no modifications to theory were called for, trends in
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social behaviors, as marked by the digital era, were presenting in therapy and tending to catching
younger therapists’ attention more than older therapists, and in some cases raising novel
considerations about clinical methods, including interpretations aimed at the use of technology,
using a constructive rather than deconstructive therapeutic process, and increased acceptance that
the possibility for meaningful psychoanalytic work may take years to emerge from fragmentary
presentations associated with defenses honed in resonance with virtual identities and digital
environments. Differences between clinicians who practice based on divergent theories of
psychological health produced limited differences in this sample, namely that those who
operated from multiplicities tended to be willing to engage more clinically outside of session. It
is proposed that a different or larger sample may yield more significant findings. In this data set,
it appeared age differences matter more than theory of psychological health in how clinicians
listen for, conceptualize and work in the digital era.
The fact that analysts who named Lacan as part of their theoretical orientation had
broader and more nuanced concepts to think about the digital era makes sense, although it was an
undervalued variable in the original design of this study. Lacanian psychoanalysis, based in
critique and oriented around the development of identity as an inherently social construct are
uniquely relevant to the digital era. It is fair to suggest that analysts who are drawn to Lacan are
themselves interested in a complex, critical and philosophically-based model that attends to
shifts in the social and cultural context, which may draw their attention to the digital as a novel
moment in a different way than those of other orientations, who tended to fit the digital into
existing concepts of frame or symptom. Lacanians, in some ways, may simply be interested in
critical theory and critique of the nature and effects of the contemporary on human experience
more broadly than other analysts. In retrospect, the hypothesis that differing theories of
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psychological health may meaningful differentiate responses to the interview questions was an
attempt to address the kinds of differences that ended up being revealed by differences in
theoretical orientation. Differences in integration vs. multiplicities did not capture this effect
because this did not meaningfully differentiate the Lacanians from those of other theoretical
orientations. In fact, one Lacanian named integration rather than moments of synthesis between
multiplicities as his goal for psychological health, and one non-Lacanian was oriented towards
recognition of multiple self-states. In short, theory of psychological health did not yield
meaningful differentiation between groups other than how extra-session contact was addressed,
whereas differences between Lacanians and non-Lacanians was of greater axiomatic value for
this data set. Whether this would remain consistent with a larger data set remains an open
question.
How the social is conceptualized and therefore its impact on how analysts consider the
construction of individual experience in the digital era may refer to different things for Lacanians
compared to relationally oriented clinicians, that lead to divergent foci in clinical attention. For
Lacanians, the social refers to the signs and signifiers of the external world, that necessarily
position the individual in a particular configuration within civilization. Lacanians, oriented
around the gaze and the Other, locate individual identity in relational to society. This relation
produces a conflict as it exerts influence on the construction of identity. This position may give
Lacanians a certain clarity on conceptualizing aspects of the digital era, but it may draw attention
away from consideration of the interpersonal nature of identity. For example, Lacanians may be
less inclined to conceptualize shame as co-constructed between patient and therapist, potentially
by locating these feelings in the transference, ultimately colluding with patient inhibitions to
speak about digital forays, and leaving them to remaining outside of the treatment. Relational
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clinicians generally acknowledge a reality to the forces of society, but are primarily focused on
the social as an interpersonal creation that emerges in an interpersonal field, the unique
influences and outcomes of the therapeutic dyad as it unfolds moment to moment. While
Lacanians conceptualize healing as following symbolization and working through the
transference, relational analysts are divided on this matter. For interpersonalists healing happens
through the analyst’s presence in and through enactments that shift over time as both patient and
analyst respond to each other, leading to corrective emotional experiences. Change for
interpersonalists happen in these new experiences that do not necessarily rely on symbolization
for its curative power. In contrast, object relations is posited around understanding and analyzing
the historic formation and current maintenance of conflicted object dyads and the relational
patterns that follow. As the patient repeats historic patterns of relating with the therapist, they are
analyzed in the transference and thus necessitate a conscious symbolic process for change to
occur. In common for both interpersonalist-relationists and object relation interpersonalist is
locating transformation in the interpersonal relationship.
Lacanians may be attuned to the decentering effects of digital enmeshment, however, they may
overlook the affective significance of seeking or moderating social connection through
technologically mediated methods. Furthermore, they may overlook or deny the impact of the
real relationship to transform suffering, possibly unwittingly re-enacting negative patterns
emerging from patients’ best efforts to seek connection to others in digital realms. Relational
analysts who prioritize both the real and transferential nature of the therapeutic relationship may
have particular fluency with playing, in the Winnicottian sense, in the here-and-now, with the
dynamics of expansions and contingencies that can follow in digital spaces. DS, an
interpersonalist, may have appeared avoidant of speaking about the digital, however an
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alternative interpretation is that he locates healing in the transformative power of the
interpersonal relationship, itself something that may eschew the language of the digital.
Likewise, FY, practicing from an object-relations orientation, may be most attuned to how digital
engagement offers sites for both historic and emergent patterns of relating to unfold, without
relying on a specific concept to organize digital experience per se.
The massive expansion of digitally-based technological devices that have become
available over the past 40 years have ushered in a radical transformation in the nature of human
relating and human experience, affording novel intrapsychic and interpersonal modes never
before imaginable. These devices have captured public imagination, attention and desire in ways
that have profoundly reorganized subjective experience at both conscious and unconscious
levels. As several subjects observed, norms are and will continue to change. What may have
formerly been judged as pathological, such as spending a full day alone in a room interfacing
with a computer, may now be an unremarkable work day for many. Reality increasingly has new
platforms upon which human activity can unfold, each with particular implications for
intrapsychic and interpersonal function. Humanness, a prized quality for all the subjects, itself a
time-bound construct, is mutable. Does this implicate instability in the economy of the body?
Does this impact the fundamentals of psychoanalysis, as what it is to live has changed in the
digital era? What will become of altered patterns in the development and elaboration of sexual
desire, increasingly mediated across distance and thus fantasy? How will people locate
themselves between virtual and embodied identities? Will new platforms further segment the
population into factions based on progressively more minute demographics? What becomes of
our bodies and capacity for interoception? Does extension beget anesthetization?
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Perhaps the most striking feature of this study is the divergence in interview content,
collectively reflecting many aspects of the material covered in the literature review which
attempted to boundary this topic. Shades of Gopnik’s “the Never-Betters, the Better-Nevers, and
the Ever-Wasers,” were observed. Not only were there important differences in what was
thought about, but perhaps more significantly were differences in how subjects approached
thinking about the digital era. If video games are conceptualized as avoidance, than it would
seem to become harder for the therapist to be interested in what the video game may be offering
a patient that they find compelling, potentially hindering understanding the true nature of a
source of suffering. Each analysts digital era was itself unique, some organized by social and
cultural shifts, media and technology theory and linked to the influence of capitalism, and others
by the specifics of devices and software. JW linked the rise of CBT to certain patients desire to
see their own minds as a machine. Each had a unique imprint from early interactions with
technology, that often served as a affective and conceptual template upon which newer
experience was modelled on. This small effect may be a harbinger of how many may struggle to
adapt across the lifespan to the social and cultural changes of the digital era. Some found
themselves entangled in a virtual cathexis, reaching for their devices alongside their patients, not
wanting to miss out on a chance for connection and stimulation, while others theorized from a
detached position, perhaps drawing on more distal aspects of experience to identify with and
think about patient experience. Many recognized the digital era as one that has already altered
what it means to live through marks on language and large scale changes in behavior, while
some maintained the effects of the digital era were far more contained. Several subjects
wondered what became of life lived virtually and how infrequently it presented itself clinically.
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How are these experiences encoded and what aspects of the self are they connected, or
disconnected, from?
There are no agreed upon theories, no consensus regarding how to evaluate healthy or
pathological use, or clinical methods to listen and work in the digital era. This is not to suggest
that there is negligence, clinical impropriety, or one correct way of working, but rather that each
clinician tended to rely on their own experiences and adaptation of clinical theory to organize
how these facets of contemporary reality are understood in treatment. Clinicians were thoughtful
and generally flexible in their thinking, but few spoke from a place of certainty, instead
hypothesizing based on existing concepts, in some limited cases, wondering if long-held axioms
had reached their endpoint given the substantive changes to how human life may be lived and
experienced, but generally relied on an assumption that the fundamentals of loss and lack and the
value of in-person relating still guide a good human life, even when observing shifts in what is
considered socially normative. In explaining the digital era, subjects made connections to all of
the domains presented in the literature review section. This included references to early
psychoanalytic theory such as Freud that addressed technology as early as the 1920s, as well as
more recent writers, notably Danielle Knafo’s writing on perversion in the digital era, Marx’s
technological determinism, the symbolic meaning of the advent and rise of CBT as the primary
mode of psychotherapy practiced in America as part of an expanding trend towards humans
identifying with machine terms and machine values such as efficiency and order, which included
nods to the influence of behaviorism and functionalism to promote the idea of the mind being
like a machine, as well as critical theory about mass media as a precursor to the digital era.
Consumerism and capitalism were named as dislocating and atomizing mediating factors in both
the rise of the digital era and its effects in the clinical and intrapsychic realm. No single concept
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or group of concepts was addressed consistently, but across all interviews, there was a broad
network of associations that reflected the range of the literature reviewed.
Given the exploratory nature of this study, these results are preliminary, yet, important
questions emerged about patient expectations related to how a given therapist may work with
their digital experiences. In particular, the majority of the older cohort, less personally intimate
with the vicissitudes of virtual engagement, were more limited in the degree to which they were
attuned to its effects and ultimately less likely to engage in in-depth inquiry about these
experiences. As Essig and Kriss have pointed out, one’s engagement in the digital can offer
unique rewards and opportunities for psychological health that can be overlooked when
conceptualized a prior as avoidance or defense. Moreover, as Hartman has pointed out, in Reality
2.0 loss and lack may not be the most accurate axioms for clinical thought, when the internet’s
promise of infinite reproduction/life and multiple morphing selves may offer freedoms never
before imagined possible. No subject agreed with Hartman’s position fully, instead finding ways
to identify the location of lack and loss that remains in the virtual. It is notable how all clinicians
gave priority to embodied, face-to-face connection, when it may be the case for some that the
internet offers healthy psychic freedom from the anxieties of in-person relating, or paths to
explore contingent identities that are not reliant on the physical body to substantiate. Given this,
it is recommended that patients who do live out important aspects of their lives in the digital
realm, inquire during consultation with prospective clinicians about how such clinical material
may be explored in a treatment. Moreover, such patients may be inclined to intentionally seek
out younger clinicians whose lives have inevitably been marked by such encounters, to some
degree, however, this search may also be answered by analysts whose theoretical orientation is
grounded in critique or critical theory, namely, Lacanian analysts, regardless of age. The
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corollary is that it may be important for therapists less familiar with the potential for
“entanglement” in the digital to invite such patients to reflect on how the therapist is listening to
these parts of their life. Just as it can be uniquely powerful for a therapist to speak in a patient’s
idiomatic verbal language, to enable therapeutic work to unfold in a patient’s current reality, by
degrees real, virtual or synthetic, the therapist can grant an intimacy and compassion to clinical
work by meeting the patient in their digital territory. Conceptualizations about the digital that
presume it to be “content,” of negligible importance compared to “real” experience, or less
subject to inquiry due to its social and cultural normalization may foreclose insight into patient’s
strengths that find unique expression through the digital and potentially limit rewarding avenues
for clinical encounters. It is recommended to encourage patients to be curious about this part of
their lives, especially if its known or suspected to play a significant role in how time is spent.
What is it like for them? What exactly are they doing? How do they think about it? What is their
somatic experience? How are they relating to their own mind? For some cases, it may be useful
to encourage patients to bring this material to session, rather than remaining epiphenomena, split
off from analytic consideration. Given the expanded role that technologically mediated
interaction has come to play in most people’s lives due to stay-at-home orders, on-line school
and work following the coronavirus pandemic, attention to these factors may be even more
critical, especially when it is tempting to let them to recede into the background. A consistent
theme was how infrequently patients spoke directly about digital engagement, yet it is safe to
assume it is an activity that most patients encounter to some degree. The meaning and impact of
this shift is yet to be studied or understood, given how new it is, but clinicians are advised to
keep the effects of more profound digital engagement in mind both in the present and if and
when people return to in-person activities safely. Psychological health need include some
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incorporation or thinking about these aspects of experience, that are so prevalent, but typically
lacking coherence in both public and private discourse. There are few customs for how we speak
about such experience, and the ones that do exist tend to be reductive or overly simply,
themselves foreclosing more meaningful thought about this radical transformation we are all
living through. Without psychological attention, these moments remain split-off, dissociated and
unformulated, yet can account for many hours of one’s day. Paradoxically there is significant
psychic energy invested in one’s roles and identities in the digital era that can easily go
unnoticed, regardless of valiance. In parallel, libidinal investment and shame may act to keep
these parts hidden from mental activity, for patients and therapists alike. Much is happening but
it’s hard to put into language the dissociation between the embodied experience at a keyboard
and the mentally constructed virtual environments that screens and digital entities can produce.
One may want to consider how internalized stereotypes about age and gender may
mediate both the transference and counter-transference. A younger patient may not expect an
older therapist to be knowledgeable about the technological world, whereas that same patient
may expect a younger male therapist to be conversant about current technology. Likewise, a
female therapist may seem understandably ignorant of the experience of video game play from
the patient’s perspective. Many patients may assume the therapist does not know or is not
interested in the digital era, given how antithetical the space of therapy appears from the virtual.
One can imagine potential collusion between patient and therapist in supporting these
transferences, especially when addressing it may be uncomfortable for both parties. Inversely,
noticing and possibly addressing these transferences related to assumptions about the other’s
understanding of the digital can invite split-off digital multiples into the treatment, supporting
healing integration or moments of synthesis. Additionally, what may be in question is to what
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degree does not knowing about the digital realm limit a therapists ability to work with these
aspects of patient experience. While a therapist can listen to how a patient speaks about their
digital involvements, what may be missing is the ability to hear what is not spoken about without
understanding to inquire about the potential parameters of a given virtual environment. The same
may hold true for non-technical domains as well, however, the unique affordances of the digital
may be minimized or not amenable to a therapist’s imagination in novel ways.
In popular culture the digital divide is the gap between the haves and have nots of the
technological world. However, there may be a psychological digital divide as well, that separates
out heathy individuals who can thrive at best and suffer no significant pathology at worst as they
pursue digital engagement. In contrast, there are those who, by some intersection of diathesis,
psychological history and social/cultural/economic influence suffer illnesses related to or
expressed in the digital realm. When healthy clinicians, who live at a distance from technology,
hear of patient experience in the digital, it may lead to under-conceptualization. In particular,
DS’s reluctance, even upon inquiry, to imagine the digital as more than frame, merely backdrop
for contemporary existence, raises the question as to whether digital “health” is a privilege?
Might those who, by virtue of age, personal inclinations or psychological health not be drawn
into constellations of suffering through digital engagement, have a particularly relevant kind of
advantage in this present moment? Moreover, like other privileges, it is often out of view for
those who possess it. The digitally privileged, unaware of their dispositional advantage, can
engage in the myriad benefits that technology offers. They can thrive as digital multiples, build
vast social networks, experience generative moments in creative exploration of the many new
possibilities for relational configurations the digital grants. Or they can simple live as they
always have, with minimal motivation to use digital devices without experiencing FOMO.
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However, such an advantaged position makes it hard to image that others do suffer when these
experiences are ego-alien. While outlined thus far as polarities, privilege and vulnerability to
digital illness themselves are not dichotomous, but rather an unfolding and fluctuating
continuum. Traditionally, discrimination is focused on inherit human traits that one is born with
and cannot reasonably change, such the color of one’s skin or sex. At this point, no one can say if
those at risk of digital illness carry such a position from birth, however, the WHO’s recent
designation of Gaming Disorder does bring institutional weight to this consideration and,
potentially by implication, other yet unnamed but related disorders. Regardless of etiology,
clinical psychologists in training, as per APA mandated curriculum, are educated about privilege
and unconscious biases, both internalized and externalized, related to different race, ethnic,
sexual orientation and gender designations today, and this dissertation recommends that such
“diversity” training consider education about the proposed psychological digital divide as well.
Should it be that because one’s own life is lived in harmony with or in the exclusion of notable
effects of the digital era that it should not be conceptualized in a patient’s experience? Such
training would be likely to mitigate such unfortunate clinical events, itself an act of psychic
violence towards those with digital illness, who are likely alienated from both self and other, and
allow more therapists to reach these aspects of patient experience that can contribute to distress.
The digital era offers locations for intrapsychic conflicts to become symptoms as well as
for the emergence of new conflicts between fragmentary aspects of self. Most of the therapists
interviewed granted that there is an interaction effect between the new affordances and the
degree, complexity or potentially the novelty of the symptom, however, all subjects remain
committed to using the basic methods of psychoanalysis for conceptualizing and working with
these aspects of human experience. Some therapists were more equivocal about if or when the
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technological world might cause human experience to be fundamentally altered, however, all but
one subject remarked on the increase in or extreme nature of patient presentations that manifest
aspects of illness related to the digital domain. It is important to hold in mind the clinician’s
illusion, which aims to disambiguate the current clinical sample from a population sample. In the
case of this research, what the subjects have been asked to work from are clinical observations to
date. In this case it could be reasonable to hypothesis both greater and lesser degrees of digital
illness in the general population, since the skew towards who may be treatment seeking
regarding such afflictions is unknown, precisely because we are living through a moment where
these questions are in play culturally. It is possible these types of illness may be widespread and
increasingly socially normalized, potentially leading to significant social shifts in human
experience that may proceed without notice. To revisit Chun, as our habits become background
and investment in digital mediation seems to not matter, this is when it matters the most.
In an effort to bring coherence at the end of this dissertation, a reflection of how
symbolization is being altered along with two novel psychological constructs are offered. As
proposed in the early section, “Clinical Implications Of Divergent Conceptualizations Of the
Digital World,” the Virtual Cathexis and Techno-Shame seek to integrate reviewed literature,
psychotherapist observation and addresses emerging shifts in representation already underway.
Shifts in representations
Like the formation of object dyads, representations are formed via affective moments
with instances that accumulate into symbols. The unprecedented availability and exposure to
endless yet literal, 2-dimensional, depictions of representations, via online images and videos is
changing the nature of symbol formation. Little is left to be imagined when search is
technology’s answer to curiosity. A flood of easily and quickly available concrete screen-based
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representations, for some, foreclose the development of fantasy, by replacing analogue time with
digital time, effectively removing time for not knowing. Ironically search means there is no
searching. Google reports time in milliseconds on every search to show how quickly the results
are returned, a reminder of how little time there is to be in the unknown. A recent search
informed me that “About 13,100,000,000 results” were found in “0.99 seconds.” The results of a
search are endless depictions of everything imaginable, ready to view with a mouse click. The
quality of the symbol is changing from dense and overdetermined to diffuse and multidetermined, subject to infinite contingencies. While multiplicities can expand in such potential
space, others, less agile in negotiating provisional identity, can break. When symbols are diffuse
and multidetermined, language can suffer slippage, differences between things have lower
resolution when accessed in a parade of representations, seeming to blur into each other, perhaps
absorbed in a trance like state. There is loss without the recognition of loss. What may be
foreclosed is one’s generativity, to fill in what is not there, to wrestle with interior and exterior
experience simultaneously. This process is replaced by an array of instantaneously available
representations created by unknown others, rather than co-created with others. The
overwhelming quantity of data may, for some, beg for more extreme or pathological positions to
emerge, when seeking to establish one’s own identity or to get recognition as unique. The
“Instagram Effect,” or “compulsion to perform the self,” as JW observed. The pathological
expression may appear via psychic pain resulting from fragmentation of identity, greater
borderline diathesis which rely on the environment to contain the self and normodic illness in
which little of the self serves as an anchor, instead traversing digital space, repeating simulated
experiences, compulsive acts, and acting as a self, without a sense of interiority or authenticity.
The decentered self, introduced by Descartes, practiced in Haussmann’s re-organization of Paris,
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captured by Heidegger’s techne, McLuhan’s theories of media, indoctrinated in students of
behaviorism, functionalism, capitalism, and plied for profit by the technology industry has
demonstrated its latest effect on human experience. Stimulation replaces meaning and “it is what
it is” suffices when pre-digital curiosity might be a better companion on one’s journey.
The Virtual Cathexis
The nexus of Fairbairn’s theory of the libido as primarily object seeking coupled with the
findings of social science research that human’s easily confer human qualities and relate socially
to agentic objects leads to an advanced delusional state, similar to what Weizenbaum, creator of
ELIZA, observed, where the sense of selves enacted in the virtual world produce delusions about
self and others in the offline world. Essig terms this “simulation entrapment,” and Zizek refers to
a hallucinatory effect leading to confusion between reality and the screen. The cathexis is to
virtual objects and places which take on qualities of reality in advance of what is experienced,
yet are built upon thin digital cues. The investment is to the illusion build of projections onto
digital experience. Symbolization has gone awry. Consider that in rat studies, “space-mapping
neurons in the brain react differently to virtual reality than they do to real-world environments.”
“In the virtual world, the rats’ hippocampal neurons seemed to fire completely randomly, as if
the neurons had no idea where the rat was — even though the rats seemed to behave perfectly
normally in the real and virtual worlds” (Bednar, Chuck, 2014). "This is not easy to explain,"
says Dr. Mehta. "Our current theory, which we're testing, is that when you move around in the
real world, your brain keeps careful track of not only what you see but also what you hear and
smell, and how much your body moved. These things change consistently with each other. But
when you move in virtual reality, the smells and textures do not change consistently with the
vision, because the subjects don't actually go anywhere" (Research on Space-Mapping Neurons
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Unlocks Clues into Memory Formation - David Geffen School of Medicine - Los Angeles, CA,
n.d.). According to Dr. Mehta, the principal investigator, neurons in the hippocampus put
together information from all these different senses to create a perception of reality. "The senses
are always in register in the real world. In virtual reality, everything is not in perfect register. We
believe that's how our brains know it's not real, and because things are not in sync in virtual
reality — even in the sophisticated one we built — 60 percent of the brain shuts down." The rat
does not map virtual space as it maps reality. The rat is there, but the mind is not. The virtual
cathexis is recruited to defend against this gap to the degree one is invested in the virtual as real.
In the digital, nothing moves, nothing smells, and location is marked by others’ signifiers,
yet it is eerily devoid of the ephemera of bodies. The user’s head remains in a fixed position
while changes onscreen offer clues to location, depth, time and space, producing a confusion of
location and an unconscious sense of dislocation – a depersonalization or derealization. The
variability of rotation, spinning, rolling, floating, pulling, surface tensions of embodied
experience has yielded to the motionless flow of electrons creating simulated spaces. While there
is an illusion online that you are with others, the reality is that it places demands on attentional
resources to support this fiction. For some, it diminishes the experience of presence, such that
while a cathexis to a sense of one’s self and others in the virtual world may feel as real as nonmediated interaction, the neurobiological reality is that the virtual requires a state of doing
compared to the offline world in which one is in a state of being. The virtual cathexis is
connection to the delusion of real experience, while dissociating from the dissonance of a mind
that contains the awareness of its illusion. For those at risk of digital illness, the virtual cathexis
is the linchpin, the location of the conflict between the embodied and prosthetic selves.
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Just as the telephone offered an inverted experience of time transport, by functionally
collapsing time and space to bring individuals together via the cue of voice, the internet fulfills
the wish for teleportation, bringing contingent identities into virtual congress, each within the
mind of the participant. Yet, with sensory reality contributing only what can pass between screen
and keyboard, the delusion is one of social connection constituted primarily by a preponderance
of projections due to the lack of genuine otherness. The pathological expression is the delusion
that the virtual is equivalent to the real. The delusion is supported by the illusion of being
actively socially related and in the presence of others, yet without mutual embodied relating. It is
a delusional fantasy that is sustained by cathexis to the digital. The imagined others are
constructed as reflections of internal objects with little receptivity to the multidimensionality of
others and otherness. While the impulse has a basis in spirituality, a sense of universality or
oneness with all living objects, it can distort in the digital realm into a location for illness. The
expression can be neurotic, borderline or psychotic and as FY, ZG and DL identified, as these
states become socially normalized, they may, in time become considered “normal” human
processes, however altered they are from historic experience. As it becomes accepted, however,
the question remains if the determinants of its normalization are themselves derived from
imperatives of the digital era, to conform to its structures, its force on social organization, to
become more machinic.
Techno-shame
Most of the therapists interviewed observed a fragmented or split-off quality to digital
engagement, such that it tends to be absent from psychic activity. Patients tend to not bring their
digital forays into treatment. If it is voiced, it is superficially of activities in the digital landscape,
while the psychic aspects remain unformulated and unsymbolized. In the virtual world, one is
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alone and typically mute. The perversely named social media is an act of social isolation for
some. Another example of the slippery signifiers in the digital realm, using its proposed function
to mask its experiential nature. The digital realm is a retreat from the interpersonal, a bastion of
symbiotic merger with projections, a regressed state, often maintained by compulsive or
repetitive habits. It is the pleasure principle writ large. It is often a place for secretive activity and
guilty pleasures, be it shopping, libidinal pursuits, chasing omnipotent fantasies or the production
of multiples, sometimes false selves. What arises programmatically contains or produces
unformulated experience while the programmatic instinct arises as a defense. There is a deep
reservoir of split-off affects and yet-to-be formulated thoughts that can result from sustained
enmeshment in the digital well. When the pleasure of the harmonious merger with machines is
interrupted by a moment of recognition of the contradiction of one’s state, one encounters
techno-shame. As the internal mechanistic parts are drawn to engage in machine based
repetitions, and enact dynamics in machine processes, the embodied self exerts a counter effect,
causing psychic tension. Where does that reside? Techno-shame are the feelings of shame felt
when one momentarily becomes conscious of the delusion of the virtual cathexis; when the role
machines and technological mediation play in the construction and organization of one’s
experience of life cannot be justified. It is shame at feeling powerless to resist the virtual
cathexis, and the regret at the parts of life lost in digital fugue states. It is the chasm between a
state of expansive fulfilment enjoyed in the construction of contingent identities and the
encounter with the physical body that is unable to be or obtain these features. Exacerbated by the
media, itself an anxiety about split-off and unformatted experiences that receive projections of
loss of control, moments of consciousness emerge from oscillations to the depressive position in
relation to digital activities/behaviors, re: trolling, lurking, pornography use/masturbation,
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feeling dehumanized/depersonalized and at a loss to return to more human states while feeling
guilty about ambivalence in tolerating otherness, not wanting to leave a regressive state, a
symbiotic state with the machine as mother/lover. The paranoid encounter with the “Other,”
presumed to have witnessed the self in virtual cathexis. A shame for both desiring and the
thwarted pursuit of desired objects, inhabiting a state of grandiosity, a master of one’s domain
and demanding submission of others, while becoming aware of the delusion one is under in such
a state. Shame emerges in oscillations between anaclitic and introjective depressive states.
Shame that technology is a need you can’t deny.
Typically unconscious and defended against, techno-shame can surface in transient
moments, when links are made between dissociated and more conscious states, or in the work of
interpersonal communication, particularly therapeutic settings. Obsessive and repetitive acts,
which find manifest expression in the digital and mask collapsed states of hopelessness emerge
in encounters with techno-shame. Conflicts about sensation seeking, avoidance and other
expressions of signal anxiety become visible and necessitate a reciprocal defense. Therapy can
help distinguish between compulsive need for stimulation and machine dependence and
meaningful experiences of gratification, even in the digital realm, versus pursuing gratification
that is defensive. In Knafo’s treatment of the man with a sex doll for a partner, and for analysts
inclined to link the digital to perversion, the analysts efforts may be understood as scaffolding
the patient into and through encounters with techno-shame. Techno-shame can, in time, orient
the patient towards less shameful paths.
As we more fully understand the era of the cyborg self and accept that technology is our
environment there will be more language to speak about such experience. We were cyborgs via
use of language and tools but now we have convergence to a global corporal machine and the
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cycle is accelerating as what is modeled in the machine becomes introjected as parts of the self.
The machine that does but does not feel. It is not all, nor perhaps most, who fall on the
pathological side of the digital divide, but for those that do, these concepts are proposed to guide
listening for, conceptualizing and working with those who do succumb to digital illness.
Proposal for groups as treatment modality
One of the features of the digital era has been an increased romanticization of isolation
and the substitution of technological products and interfaces at sites where human interaction
used to be. From early iPod advertisements, starting in 2001, featuring dancing silhouettes
against colorful backgrounds, technology companies have promoted the idea that joy can, and
ideally should be found in a pod of one’s own. Isolation is the new luxury. The hermetic lifestyle
where one shops for clothes, food and has prepared meals delivered without human interaction
has been popularized and normalized, prior to the pandemic, which is further reenforcing these
habits. One traverses formerly social landscapes in a personal bubble, sonically and visually
stimulated not by the physical surroundings, but rather by what is in-ear and onscreen. Digital
illnesses emerge from and to protect states of psychic isolation. For those who succumb to these
conflicts, group psychotherapy offers the counterpoint as a curative method. Among Yalom’s
therapeutic factors of group psychotherapy are universality, development of socializing
techniques, interpersonal learning, group cohesiveness, and existential factors (Yalom & Leszcz,
2005). In brief, the cure to what ails those who suffer ills in the technological era. Digital
illnesses are cured by learning how to be part of a group and choosing to do so. An abdication of
the digital is not the treatment goal, but rather linking digital and non-digital identity and
experience.
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In my 2 years running groups for college students who self-reported with “technology
overuse,” there was a hunger for speaking about their psychological experience of the digital era.
Most had never done so and couldn’t imagined these types of conversations were possible. Many
of the students had so little in-person interaction, that simply coming and sitting together offered
a space to build much needed confidence that they used to develop in-person relationships. As
students spoke about conflicted feelings related to their digital engagement, they became better
able to navigate compulsive behaviors and reflect on the pleasures and pain they encountered.
One shared about a powerful fantasy to be seen as a wise professor, posting know-it-all videos
about various topics online, all while experiencing difficulty making friends and profound social
isolation. Another parsed the paradoxical experience of sitting nearly motionless at his keyboard
while playing a video game in which his mental experience was dominated by the sensation of
flying, moving with great agility and having incredible powers in battle. Technology was a need
the students did not have to deny from the group. Yet, in their accounts, they found
commonality. Some of the needs they sought fulfillment for in the digital realm were better able
to be served with others. Practice symbolizing experiences, speaking of loss and feeling
understood in the presence of others did something that online life alone could not do.
Discussions about self-determination, desire, and choice facilitated an expansive psychic
environment in the group field that the students were able to start dreaming into. Panic symptoms
gave way as connections between group members became stronger and, inevitably technology
use changed. It did not necessarily diminish, nor was that the goal, but rather to bring this
isolating and isolated realm into greater discourse with other aspects of human experience. In a
sense, the group borrowed from the ethos of hacking and the open source software movement,
both promoting the idea of practicing transparency in processes and freely borrowing from

195

others. The group offered a space of co-operation of the machine parts of the self, allowing
another to code and borrowing freely from each other. Relational logic was slowly integrated
into binary processes, fostering more than an either/or outcome or solution to an experience.
In light of the pandemic
In this moment where life is online, digital relationships have, for some, fully replaced
embodied experiences. As therapies go online, the embodied analyst is replaced by an image on
a screen. There are no longer two bodies in a room, there is no “encounter in the wild,” with
another who the patient can “kiss or kick” (Russell, 2015). Notwithstanding the myriad
modifications to the frame, loss, and the activation of digital multiples that suddenly populate
treatment, there is a pernicious predator just out of sight. As the analyst becomes somewhat less
real, less embodied, less present, and less dangerous, unconscious uncertainty may invite, for
some, thinking that “better than nothing” becomes “better than anything,” as Turkle has
described. In an era of slippery signifiers and a technology industry voracious for market share,
how much more easily can that real analyst, now a screen-sized 2-D representation, be replaced
by a digital avatar powered by artificial intelligence built on data science? One need not be
creative to imagine the perverse, neo-liberal, efficient/techne-based arguments for such products:
democratizing psychotherapy, access to treatment for those in remote regions or for those who
cannot afford the “luxury” of “private,” or “brand-label” therapies, the freedom to choose,
offering greater privacy, “error-free” execution of empirically validated treatment methods. At
the risk of being alarmist, when, and I think it’s when, not if, machines are providing
psychotherapy for a large number of humans, we have entered a radical new era whose
considerations are far beyond the scope of this research, yet are of profound significance for the
nature of human experience broadly. Given the ease with which humans attribute human
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qualities to machines, this market based intrusion into human to human therapy is all but
guaranteed and demands greater research and perhaps activism. As several of the therapists
interviewed had expressed, they remain committed to the psychoanalytic process, yet, recognize
that a slow journey of personal reflection and gradual change may be out of step with broader
cultural expectations accelerated by the digital era.
During the termination session for a year-long trainee process group that I was a part of
during my pre-doctoral internship, one member suggested we should all hug our laptops in lieu
of good bye hugs. The heat of our digital processors standing in for body warmth. The wish to
fill the gap invited a slippery substitution that can foreclose mourning the loss of real human
contact. Another stated, "why don't you all just follow me on Instagram so we can stay
connected!” This confusion between unidirectional broadcasts and bidirectional responsive
engagement seemed lost and bereft of insight into how or why one seeks human connection.
Another took a screen shot of our Brady Bunch like grid and emailed it back to all of us. On the
one hand these were authentic, spontaneous, creative gestures in a moment, referring to or
playing with loss, while proposing a good-enough solution to the reality of our disembodied
selves. Yet, there was little left to do with what was truly lost. The psychological digital divide
determines for whom this experience is good-enough, and for whom, the screen, unable to
absorb affect, dilutes the cathartic potential of these gestures, and other related digital
movements. For some, what is imagined to be a connected experience are lived in and propagate
further isolation. Never alone, never fully present with others, never not alone This schism can
catch some off-guard, confused, and without a place to locate such feelings, or a vehicle for
expression. Do todays alexithymic and borderline patients represent the two poles of
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maladaptation to the digital landscape? Winnicott’s “The Capacity to be Alone” could easily be a
text about the digital era.
Reflection and direction for future research
The scope of this dissertation is large, and the scale of research relatively small, although
it has depth. It is my opinion that building links between various fields of study that influence
and describe features of the digital era highlight how ideas already in circulation created the
waves that culminated in the tsunami of the technological world. The quantity of literature
reviewed, not to mention what has been excluded or overlooked, is an indicator of how
provocative and powerful the mediums leading up to and that make up the digital era have been,
for so many, in so many disciplines. There is no one way to comprehend the present, as reflected
by the range and diversity in the interviews. Likewise, there are an array of plausible paths to
work with these effects clinically. Personally, speaking with an variety of analysts about thinking
and working in light of the digital era was illuminating, expanding my own capacity to reflect on
the clinical implications of living through this massive cultural shift into the digital and in what
ways it is and is not continuous with historic long-standing analytic questions and maxims. I feel
far better equipped to listen and work with digital illness, to recognize the possibility for others
to thrive in this domain, and generally to take a more dialectical view towards the expansion and
limitations of the virtual. Most importantly, I feel inclined to inquire when I pick up signs that a
virtual cathexis and techno shame may be lurking in the background of what I hear. This moment
is just a point in an ongoing timeline, and I hope this dissertation can be useful in the future to
reflect back on this moment from the view only possible to capture in the present. These analysts
voices collectively tell a meaningful story about the history of psychoanalysis and how it
attempted to negotiate the changed world.
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There is so much more to explore. One significant limitation of this study is the sample
size, which makes conclusions tentative and not generalizable. This limitation may be addressed
in future research by increasing the sample size, potentially working with multiple researchers to
analyze data. Other qualitative methods, such as grounded theory, may offer better means to
achieve generalizability as well. The inclusion of more factors, especially a wider range of
locations, theoretical orientations and patient ages would broaden the ability to draw conclusions
that address regional differences, local cultures and impact more therapists and patients. To
better understand how psychotherapists practice in the digital era, one must include not just
additional factors, but consider temporality as well. Temporality includes both changes in the
period of time under study, as well as how individuals and analysts are relating to the digital in
smaller units of time. While some argue that digital time is fragmented, others assert its dynamic
temporal aspect in which experience is responsive to a multiplicity of influences in real time. The
internet, social media and digital tools of today are not static, they are constantly in a state of
becoming. This was an overlooked aspect of digital engagement in this study and one that
promises important insight into better understanding how and why patients are so drawn to the
technological world. This becoming, for some, can exist in harmony with an identity that is
becoming. Of course, for others, the challenge of finding synchronicity in these environments
can lead to lack and suffering. The inclusion of temporality may be especially important for
thinking about the multidetermined nature of the digital as a place that houses recreation, work
and the site of clinical practice.
Future researchers would be advised to continue to track changes in how the phenomena
of the digital era are integrated into or excluded from psychoanalytic literature. The pandemic
offers the possibility of many studies related to nature of a radical change to the practice of
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psychoanalysis, as it now exists largely in the virtual realm. Many such studies have been done
or are underway, and ongoing study of these effects on both therapists and patients will be
crucial to understand what may be gained and lost as teletherapy will likely remain a standard of
care. Furthermore, it may offer important data to reflect back on long-held axioms about the
centrality of the body in psychological treatment, the frame, the practice of in-person sessions,
no less, in how operating these totems may function in the virtual realm, as advances and interest
in simulations further blurs the lines between bodies in contact. It is a vastly stimulated era and
one where the draw towards deeper merger with the virtual appears certain. How human
experience, nature and even fundamental concepts about humanity are altered by this change and
what the implications of this alteration are clinically remain important areas for study, least they
simply become background. While many believe psychoanalysis has much to offer for
contemporary hyper-reality, in question is to what degree does this future want psychoanalysis?
It is the position of this dissertation that research continue to mark and study these changes, as it
will be crucial to the survival of psychoanalysis.
Coda
I awoke from a recent afternoon nap to “Androgenous,” a song by The Replacements and
was hit with a strange mix of emotions. I can’t recall the last time I heard this song, but I know it
well. An important, idealized, older friend in high school had put it on a mix tape he handmade
for me that I treasured and played over and over. This cassette tape had hand drawn art on its
cover and the tracks were written out in his iconoclastic hand. It was a prized possession and an
object that opened doors for me as it ushered me into a new phase of my life. The cassette has
been tucked away in a storage box for decades, but the sounds I’m hearing and images I’m
remembering are vivid as I’m transported into a state of reverie. My wife had set Spotify to play
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algorithmically programmed music based on a Velvet Underground song. She had never heard
this song before, yet it was playing. This moment happened because Spotify engineers had
organizing data about patterns of music listening that linked the seed track to this song. In
contrast to the mix tape where the choice was personal, this event was the product of a computer
algorithm processing nomothetic dataflows. As I’m listening I’m flooded with teenage memories
and a love and enjoyment of this song, yet both intrigued and a little disturbed by how it came to
be filling our air. It’s not even the same music. It’s a digitally compressed file that is transmitted
over the internet to a “sound bar.” At the same time, I’m moved and add it to a digital playlist, so
it can return to a place of prominence in my life, for the time being.
Listening to the song again, I want a closer look at the lyrics and search online and in less
than a second, I’m see all the words simultaneously, condensed in black and white, rendered in
Arial font on screen, dissociated from their location in the song, the music, the voice that sings
them and the affects in the intonation. Just there as a text to be read. I am a cyborg and the
internet is part of my mind. The search brings up images of androgynous people, women with
men’s hairstyles, men with effeminate features accentuated by clothes or posturing. With a click
I can watch a music video for a “(REMASTERED)” version of the song. I contemplate if I want
my memory of the song to be replaced with what now, post-hoc, has been decided to be the
official record of this recording. The whole scene is transformed by the digital. There is no tape
hiss, no click or clack of the tape head mechanism starting or stopping. I put the song on repeat
and delve into an emotional location that would have remained unconscious save these chance
circumstances that are not fully chance. This is not John Cage’s chance, but rather a chance that
my historic listening preferences were algorithmically aligned with those of others. The
network’s associations are more powerful, more predictive than my own. The knowledge of
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Spotify is remembering for me, without being able to remember at all. It is the collective
unconscious of musical associations, a “deep mind” mined from millions of users’ behavior, a
trail of searches past. The algorithm is very likely autonomous and divorced from human logic,
even language, crunching data to walk a path through music that predates its own existence. It is
an encounter with the uncanny. In a previous era this moment could only have been arrived at
through serendipity. A chance conversation with a music buff, reminiscing with old friends, or
peers who shared this association, reliant on their memories, perhaps not linked via a chain of
music at all, but rather through subject. Now, it just happened, connected and disconnected alike.
Here come Dick, he's wearing a skirt
Here comes Jane, you know she's sporting a chain
Same hair, revolution
Same build, evolution
Tomorrow who's gonna fuss
And they love each other so
Androgynous
Closer than you know, love each other so
Androgynous
Don't get him wrong and don't get him mad
He might be a father, but he sure ain't a dad
And she don't need advice that'll center her
She's happy with the way she looks
She's happy with her gender
And they love each other so
Androgynous
Closer than you know, love each other so
Androgynous
Mirror image, see no damage
See no evil at all
Kewpie dolls and urine stalls
Will be laughed at
The way you're laughed at now
Now, something meets boy, and something meets girl
They both look the same
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They're overjoyed in this world
Same hair, revolution
Unisex, evolution
Tomorrow who's gonna fuss
And tomorrow Dick is wearing pants
Tomorrow Janie's wearing a dress
Future outcasts and they don't last
And, today, the people dress the way that they please
The way they tried to do in the last centuries
And they love each other so
Androgynous
Closer than we know, love each other so
Androgynous

This is that tomorrow. In 1984, this song expressed optimism that gender expression
conflicts could be resolved via androgyny, perhaps an erasure of difference, but imagined in the
song as progressive freedom from others’ judgements based on gendered stereotypes. David
Bowie and Boy George come to mind. I myself imagined a world free of gender in this past
future. Today the form of these concerns have transformed into gender theory, sexual fluidity,
multiplicity and trans and non-binary identities. Ironically the internet age ushered in a return to
a more polarized era of gender starting in the mid-90s, sometimes referred to as the new 1950s, a
prior era of revolutionary technological change paired with “Leave It To Beaver” style sex
stereotypes. Perhaps this regressive swing catalyzed the more progressive discourses as well.
Today, the digital realm offers unique sites for the exploration and expression of these identities,
as individuals find themselves searching for an acceptable form to subdue experiences of gender
dysphoria. They are searching for a new position, looking for a forum for free expression, for
recognition. Perhaps the digital realm can offer this for some. Perhaps novel mutating digital
identities offers experimentation and freedom that could not have been imagined in 1984. Its old
and its new and its transformed.
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“He may be a father but he sure ain’t a dad.” A lyric I didn’t give much thought to
originally, but this past year my father died and my first child was born. These words catch my
curiosity in a new way. They resonate, they make me think, they add something to my life,
stirring up emotions. A tear fills my eye as I affectively merge with the lilting bar-room style
piano and casual, loose, smoky reverb on the vocals. Such a strange, discursive relationship to a
piece of music could not have existed in another era. Its filled with a unusual constellation of
emotions unique to the digital era: fragmentation, displacement, but also connection and joy. It is
Freud’s telephone. It is good enough. It is now.
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